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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a framework for assessing water
governance by consolidating and refining disparate principles of water governance in the
existing research literature. The developed framework is then applied in a case study of the
Lerma Chapala basin in Mexico to assess the state of water governance, and identify
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of an effective water governance
system. The study conducts a content analysis of primary data collected through semistructured interviews with multiple stakeholders in the basin (N=51) and secondary data
from national water policy documents (N=18).
Overall, the study identified one major achievement and five major constraints in
the implementation of water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin. The achievement
pertains to successful stakeholder negotiations that resulted in a treaty for the allocation of
scarce surface water resources in the basin; hence, mitigating allocation conflicts.
Constraints include (1) the failure of water user representatives to advance issues that
pertain to their stakeholder group in the Basin Council, (2) a fragmented approach to water
management that hinders the success of programs and activities at the basin level, (3) the
persistence of a centralized decision making protocol that neglects local context, among
other issues. Overall, the application of the developed framework in a content analysis of
policy documents and stakeholder interviews reveals a major disconnect between policy
and practice in the Lerma-Chapala’s water governance experience.
The dissertation contributes to the existing literature by providing a conceptual
framework for assessing water governance systems. The refined set of five meta-principles
allows for better conceptualization, and makes it easier to identify policy-practice
disconnects and tease out achievements and constraints to water governance. In this sense,
the framework could assist in guiding water sector reforms where changes are needed, to
improve the water governance system.

Key words: water governance, integrated water resources management, Lerma-Chapala,
content analysis, Mexico, assessment framework, water policy, river basin
council.
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Chapter One
1

Introduction

1.1

Introduction to the study
During the 1990s, there was general consensus among most professional

associations, international organizations and national governments with regards to our
failure to properly manage water resources (Serageldin, 1995; Falkenmark, 1997; GWP,
2000; Biswas, 2008). The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992 as a solution to existing and foreseeable water management problems. In
general terms, Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 describes IWRM as a holistic, integrated and
participatory approach to water resource management that considers the catchment and subbasin as its working unit (UNDSD, 1993). Hence, the implementation of this new paradigm
requires new legislation and policy instruments, new administrative structures and
procedures, and the redivision of labour and authority (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al.,
2006; Ballweber, 2006). These changes are particularly challenging in middle- and lowincome countries (Sajor & Minh Thu, 2009; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012). Encouraged by
major international funding, development and aid agencies, many countries have adopted
IWRM reforms, which have transformed the way water resources are governed, especially
in developing nations. While this strategy has been successful in some jurisdictions,
attempts to decentralize control over water resources have failed in other contexts, resulting
in the persistence of state-centred top-down approaches to water management that were
evident in the 1990s (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013;
de Boer et al., 2016).
Existing literature on water management largely recognizes that the present ‘water
crisis’ is often a crisis of governance (GWP, 2000; Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003;
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Varis et al., 2014). The
hydrological, technical, scientific, and physical dimensions of water management are
essential for solving issues associated with water quality and water quantity. However,
many experts agree that at present, the main implementation challenges for water
management lie on issues associated with important components of water governance, such
as decentralization, regulation, deregulation, privatization, water allocation, equity, policy
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development, stakeholder engagement, transparency, accountability, collaboration, and
institutional arrangements (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001; Tortajada, 2001; Solanes &
Jouravlev, 2006; Mehan, 2010). For example, Tropp (2007) and Mitchell (2013) have
emphasised that water governance strategies will determine the ability of jurisdictions to
effectively apply technical and scientific aspects of water management that are necessary
for solving water related problems and consequently, creating effective functioning water
infrastructure and deliver services. In the words of Mitchell (2013:143), governance is “a
key component for successful water management”.
The broad scope of water governance research has resulted in the development of
diverse assessment frameworks. The multifaceted nature of water governance research is
largely a result of researchers approaching water governance from their unique disciplinary
lenses (e.g., sociology, political science, economics, environmental science), and
researchers seeking to answer different research questions. Hence, this body of work
remains fractured (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Araral & Wang, 2013). Existing frameworks
have different purposes, which include but are not limited to understanding the role of
institutions in the functionality of water governance systems (Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen
et al., 2015), untangling the interplay of formal (statutory) and informal (customary)
components of water governance systems (Wood, 2015; Rola et al., 2016), and explaining
the impact of stakeholder participation in planning and decision making on the outcomes
of water governance (Carr et al., 2014; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo, 2014). Biswas and
Tortajada (2010) argue that independent studies of good water governance would improve
our understanding water governance. However, it has been noted that it could be
challenging to compare the outcomes of multiple studies due to the utilization of diverse
assessment frameworks (Woodhouse & Muller, 2017).
This dissertation addresses this issue by developing a framework for assessing water
governance. This developed framework is based on a consolidation and integration of core
water governance principles that have been established in the literature over time. Since the
existing water governance literature has emerged from multiple disciplines, the framework
developed here is multidisciplinary in nature. Following its development, the framework is
applied in a case study of Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB). Mexico is a country that
began its IWRM reform in 1992, resulting in the formation of the Lerma-Chapala Basin
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Council (LChBC) as a water governance forum in 1993. This experience is considered
appropriate to examine progress in the transition between water governance paradigms, and
to identify factors that support or limit the implementation of a viable water governance
system.
1.2

A shift in water management paradigms
Before the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de

Janeiro in 1992, most countries (including Mexico) utilized a sub-sectoral project-based
approach to develop, allocate and manage water resources (Garcia, 1998; Savenije & Van
der Zaag, 2008). This was characterized by senior government institution(s) utilizing statecentred top-down approaches. This system was also based on a centralized, hierarchical
and bureaucratic model, with little or no coordination between sectors and water resource
interest groups; thus decisions were made primarily by high ranking officials (GWP, 2000;
Falkenmark et al., 2004; Savenije & Van der Zaag, 2008; de Loë et al., 2009). Additionally,
water management had a predominantly sectoral-technical approach that focused largely
on planning, construction and operation of water infrastructure for the purposes of
irrigation, energy generation, domestic consumption and industrial uses, while neglecting
the management of ecosystems (Radif, 1999; WWAP, 2006; Garcia, 2008).
After the 1992 Rio conference and the publication of ‘Agenda 21’ (UNDSD, 1993),
major international funding, development and aid agencies started promoting IWRM as a
solution to water-related problems around the world (Mitchell, 2005; WWAP, 2006;
Saravanan et al., 2009; Tortajada, 2014). Consequently, IWRM has been adopted in many
countries with varying degrees of success. Examples of these attempts include Mexico’s
enactment of the National Water Law in 1992 (Mestre, 1997), South Africa’s
implementation of a National Water Act in 1998 (Aston et al., 2006), and Ghana’s
establishment of a Water Resources Commission in 1996 (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012),
among several others.
Implementing an IWRM process signals an attempt to move away from the
technocratic state-oriented top-down approaches that characterized water management
before the UN Rio conference, towards more flexible multilevel and multi-stakeholder
approaches associated with water management that became prominent after 1992. In this
thesis, the terms pre-Rio and post-Rio are used to depict prevailing water governance
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paradigms that existed before and after the 1992 Rio conference respectively. The key
characteristics of these contexts are illustrated in Table 1.1. Ongoing water policy reforms
represent major changes in many countries. Many jurisdictions are therefore struggling to
implement these reforms on the ground (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann &
Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Rola et al., 2016).
Table 1.1: Governing approaches for water management before and after Rio
Pre-Rio
Sectoral approach
State Control
Decisions made by high ranking officials and politicians
Centralization
Top-down approach
Political boundaries form planning and management units
Economic development approach
Focus on supply management

Post-Rio
Integrated approach
Inclusive stakeholder engagement
Stakeholder participation in decision making
Subsidiarity
Dominance of bottom-up approach
Basin as planning and management unit
Sustainable development approach
Focus on demand management

The IWRM reforms adopted by many countries are characterized by
decentralization policies, multiple stakeholder engagement, polycentric decision making,
and the formation of multilevel collaboration networks (Jacobson et al., 2013; Giordano &
Shah, 2014; Grigg, 2014; Rola et al., 2016), which are key properties of water governance.
Relative to developing countries, developed countries have generally been more successful
in the adoption of IWRM, but not without challenges. Rogers and Hall (2003), note that in
developed countries the establishment of water governance systems that utilize an
integrated approach to water management, followed a long evolutionary process that
spanned several decades. For example, “it took the US almost two hundred years to finally
build in participation and ecosystem concerns into its water governance” (Rogers & Hall,
2003:30) strategy. By contrast, international financing, development and aid agencies that
advocate IWRM expected client countries (largely developing) such as Mexico, Ghana,
Mongolia, Philippines to go through this transition over comparatively shorter periods of
time (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013;
Rola et al., 2016). Thus, little attention was paid to the fact that variations in political and
cultural contexts could result in IWRM implementation gaps.
1.3

IWRM and Water Governance
While there exist many definitions of IWRM, the most widely cited definition is

that provided by the Global Water Partnership (2000:22) as follows: IWRM is “a process
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which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems”. Despite its wide use,
this definition has been criticised as being normative, ambiguous and hard to implement
(Biswas, 2004, 2008; Giordano & Shah, 2014; Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). IWRM is also
described in the literature as a holistic approach that cuts across all sectors and includes
social, economic and environmental concerns and interests (Mitchell, 1990; Grigg 2008).
An appropriate execution of IWRM should be characterized by inclusive stakeholder
participation that considers all water uses in planning and decision making. It should also
consider both surface and groundwater, and utilize the basin as a planning and management
unit (GWP, 2000). Despite implementing IWRM as a water reform strategy, problems of
water availability and quality continue to persist in some jurisdictions among other
challenges (WHO & UNICEF, 2014; OECD, 2015; WWAP, 2015).
Tensions and conflicts are inevitable when multiple stakeholders from varying
sectors and with widely differing interests depend on the availability, quality and allocation
of water resources for their wellbeing and/or success. These conflicting interests among
stakeholders over scarce water resources often generate political and organizational
problems. Since water is fundamental to the wellbeing of humans and ecosystems,
decisions around water allocation and utilization should be approached in an intersectoral
(rather than a sectoral) scale to ensure that solutions address diverse needs in a holistic
manner.
The World Water Assessment Programme (2006:48) interprets the concept of water
governance as follows:
Governance is about making choices, decisions and tradeoffs. Governance addresses the
relationship between organizations and social groups involved in water decision-making,
both horizontally, across sectors and between urban and rural areas, and vertically, from
local to international levels. Operating principles include downward and upward
accountability, transparency, participation, equity, rule of law, ethics and responsiveness.
Governance is therefore not limited to ‘government’ but includes the roles of the private
sector and civil society. The character of relationships (and the formal and informal rules
and regulations guiding such relationships) and the nature of information flow between
different social actors and organizations are both key features of governance.

This interpretation suggests that governance involves dialogue and negotiations among
multiple stakeholders (not only government) who are engaged in decision making
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concerning water resources (e.g. allocation, policy, development, and rights). It also
emphasises the importance of the subsidiarity principle, evident in the need to create
vertical and horizontal collaboration and information networks, and the harmonization of
formal and informal regulatory and administrative frameworks 1. Finally, this definition
also provides us with seven operating principles of water governance: accountability,
transparency, participation, equity, rule of law, ethics and responsiveness, which the
present study regards as core concepts that can be used as criteria to assess water
governance, and view what happens in practice. It is in the effort to promote order and
mitigate or settle existing and potential problems and conflicts that the link between IWRM
and water governance lie.
Water governance pertains to the formal (statutory) and informal (customary) rules,
institutions and organizations that guide the actions and interactions of multiplestakeholders and determines the processes through which water-based decisions are made
(Lautze et al., 2011; Cook, 2014; Boer et al., 2016; Cookey et al., 2016). Water
management on the other hand involves day-to-day tasks, including practical, technical and
routine functions, such as infrastructural development, operation and monitoring, and the
practical implementation of measures and decisions made through a governance processes
(Lautze et al., 2011; Cook, 2014; Cookey et al., 2016). As such, water governance and
water management have been defined as independent but interacting concepts (Tortajada,
2010a). Griggs (2011) offers an illustration of this relationship by comparing roles of
management and governance in different water sectors (Table 1.2). These examples aid in
our understanding of the concepts of water governance and water management within
different sectors as used by prominent scholars in the field of water studies (e.g., Tropp,
2007; Tortajada, 2010a; Mitchell, 2013).

1

Formal and informal systems are those through which authority is exercised (Rogers & Hall, 2003) applying
clear mechanisms of control (Aminova & Jagers, 2011). The literature describes formal rules as those being
codified and legally adopted (i.e. laws, regulations, legal codes and procedures), and informal rules as those
that are not codified and rooted in customs, traditions, practices and/or social conventions (i.e. unwritten
socially shared codes of conduct that regulate social life) (WWAP, 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Pahl-Wostl
et al., 2008). Nonetheless, different elements (i.e., authorities, institutions, regulations, rights, organizations,
structures, networks, and processes) and their interactions, are also considered as components of formal and
informal systems.

7

Table 1.2: Management and governance roles for water sectors
Water sector
Public and industrial
supply

Management Roles
Supplies water through utilities and
other systems

Waste water and
environmental
quality

Provides removal and treatment of
wastewater and takes steps to enhance
environmental water quality

Stormwater and
flooding

Provides stormwater and flood control
services

Irrigation and farm
drainage

Provides raw water and drainage
systems in irrigated and rain-fed zones

Instream flow
control

Coordinates flow for hydropower,
navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife

Governance Roles
Regulates access, allocation and
quality of water resources while
empowering utility services in their
role.
Ensures access to water is regulated,
regulates discharges and water quality,
empowers waste water service
providers in their role
Regulates flooding and nonpoint
sources of water, ensures policies and
plans exist as precautionary measures
Regulates allocation of water for
irrigation, allocates farm drainage,
empowers irrigators
Establish instream flows, control
diversions and discharges rules and
principles
Source: after Grigg, 2011.

In general terms, water governance establishes an enabling environment that
legitimises appropriate action through regulations, policies and institutional structures
(both formal and informal). In this context, water governance should enhance order,
transparency, legitimacy, and accountability among water stakeholders, and cater to the
appropriate management of water resources.
IWRM policy reforms require changes in the existing interactions (both formal and
informal) among politicians, law makers, institutions, regulators and civil society (Rogers&
Hall, 2003; Tropp, 2007), among others. To date, these reforms have transformed the way
water resources are governed in many jurisdictions that demonstrate a successful transition
from more traditional hierarchical state-centred top-down approaches to more inclusive and
pluralistic approaches to decision making. Several authors identify this transition among
governing systems as a pivotal roadblock to the successful implementation of IWRM
(Tropp, 2007; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al.,
2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Rola et al., 2016). This is a difficult problem to solve, but
Rogers and Hall (2003) suggest that the solution may lie in establishing systematic methods
to assess progress and to identify where changes are needed, in order to aid in this transition.
This thesis agrees with Jacobson and colleagues (2013), who suggest that an
assessment framework could help bridge the implementation gap and provide a systematic
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approach for analysing how water governance systems are performing. This is also
supported by Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2012:1548), claim that the implementation of
an IWRM process “often requires a fundamental realignment of governance structures”.
For example, many developing nations have adopted IWRM reforms, and this has required
restructuring and creating institutions and organizations (such as river basin councils), to
aid in the transition from traditionally authoritarian regimes to more inclusive participatory
models for governing water resources. An assessment framework is here seen as a
diagnostic tool that will help identify the strengths of governance systems, constraints that
hinder the viability of the system, and possible areas of opportunity for improvement.
Hence, an assessment framework can help guide water sector reforms towards desired
governance and management goals (Halbe et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; Akhmouch
& Correia, 2016).
1.4

Approaches to assess of water governance.
In separate reviews of water governance literature Bachelor (2007), Araral and

Wang (2013), Woodhouse and Muller (2017), and Pahl-Wostl (2017) found that there is no
shortage of approaches for studying water governance due to its interdisciplinary nature,
and the absence of a consensual definition of the concept itself. In this context, Woodhouse
and Muller (2017) point out that this diversity does not only poses a methodological
challenge for the study of water governance, but also makes it difficult for the outcomes of
multiple studies to be easily compared. Pahl-Wostl (2017) contends that there is limited
knowledge on water governance systems and conditions necessary for successful water
governance reforms. Both, Pahl-Wostl (2017) and Woodhouse and Muller (2017)
emphasise the need to develop approaches that are context-sensitive. However, Pahl-Wostl
(2017) recommends further research on ‘transformative water governance’, and the
development of frameworks for analysis as key to enhancing our understanding of water
governance.
The present study started out by surveying water governance literature on
assessment frameworks. Contemporary water governance literature reveals a wide array of
frameworks and methods to assess water governance, which echoes the findings from most
studies that have involved a critical review of the literature. It is possible to group the
literature based on the main thematic areas of research. These four broad and relevant

9

clusters of literature include (1) the importance of considering the existing local context
(i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, environmental, scale), when developing
institutional and/or policy reforms (Hornidge et al., 2013; Wood, 2015; Casiano Flores et
al., 2016; Mapedza, et al., 2016); and (2) the value of stakeholder engagement in water
policy and in development planning (Bell et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2014; Kuzdas et al.,
2015; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016). For example, in the first case, Casiano Flores,
Vikolainen and Bressers (2016) borrowed the “Governance Assessment Tool” developed
by the OECD and applied it in the Atoyac sub-basin in the State of Tlaxcala, Mexico. This
tool analyses the local context to identify supportive or restrictive conditions for the
implementation of water-based policies and/or projects. Their study utilized data from
official documents and interviews, which are analysed using a combination of matrix
models with descriptive-analytical and semi-normative categories. In this case, results
indicated that federal water sanitation policies could not be fully implemented in the subbasin because the municipality lacked sufficient operational capacities. They concluded
that decision makers did not consider local conditions during the policy development phase,
resulting in implementation failures. However, they noted that more recent contextsensitive reforms by the state government increased the state’s role in sanitation, which
resulted in improved implementation of wastewater treatment policy in the sub-basin.
In the case of an example addressing the second thematic area, Dore, Lebel and
Molleb (2012) adopted an exploratory problem-solving framework for analysing
transboundary water complexes, and applied it in the Mekong basin 2. The researchers
examined connections among water-based stakeholders and institutions, the drivers that
influence and motivate actors in their decision making, various tools used for decision
making, and the impacts of water allocation decisions. The authors observed that although
decision-making processes are not always equitable, there are hopeful signs that the water
governance system is becoming more inclusive. They suggest welcoming a diversity of
stakeholders with different perspectives as a mechanism for improving water allocation
decisions.
While the assortment of frameworks found through the survey of literature
contribute to the advancement of knowledge, they add to the complexity of assessing water
2

The Mekong basin is shared by five countries: China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.
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governance. The themes of focus are largely acknowledged in the literature as key to better
understanding water governance (Rogers, 2002; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada,
2010; Mitchell, 2013; OECD, 2015; Akhmouch & Correia, 2016), and therefore, their
results provide valuable information that helps in our understanding of water governance.
However, the broad range of frameworks found in the literature makes it difficult to
compare results among case studies, and hence, it also constrains the advancement of our
knowledge of water governance. This wide array of frameworks to assess different facets
of water governance justify the need for a refined and holistic framework which adequately
captures multiple stakeholder perspectives, legal and administrative frameworks, existing
policies and the trajectory of water governance systems.
1.5

Conceptual framework
Building on existing water governance literature, the current dissertation develops

a framework for assessing water governance by refining, consolidating and clearly defining
a set of assessment principles 3 (Rogers, 2000; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006;
Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Batchelor, 2007). A framework is here interpreted
as a structure that keeps a research project focused by aiding researchers analyse and
compare the contents of different data sources to help address their research question
(Green, 2014; Imenda, 2014). In the case of the current study, the research question pertains
to the efficacy of water governance, while the data that are analysed and compared include
policy documents and interviews with the various stakeholders. In geographical terms, such
a framework makes it possible to also understand how issues of water governance evolve
over space and time. The framework developed in the current study attempts to simplify
the analysis of water governance by refining and categorizing existing water governance
principles in the literature into fewer coherent groups. The proposed framework is aimed
at helping assess the effectiveness of water governance systems by identifying
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of water governance. This
framework could also help stakeholders in the planning process by revealing existing water
governance deficiencies and making it possible to compare conditions in different sociopolitical contexts.

3

Principle is here understood as a fundamental declaration of values, in relation to a specific issue, which
functions as a guide that explains how something works (after Ashton et al., 2006).
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Peter Rogers (2002) made the first known attempt at offering a set of water
governance principles with their respective operational definitions. To date, the most
commonly cited water governance principles are those offered by Peter Rogers and Alan
Hall (2003) who identified 12 principles that they believe should characterize the structure
of effective or viable water governance systems. By doing so, they also "create the
important basis for assessing the state of water governance in a given location, and it is
through these assessments that opportunities for improvement can be identified" (Lauttze
et al., 2011:3). The proposed principles suggest that water governance systems should be
(1) open, (2) transparent, (3) inclusive, (4) communicative; (5) coherent, (6) integrative, (7)
equitable, (8) ethical, (9) accountable, (10) efficient, (11) responsive, and (12) sustainable.
These principles are widely recognized as qualities of a viable water governance system,
and remain largely consistent within the broader literature (Lautze et al., 2011). In addition
to these principles, the current study draws on other cluster of water governance literature
to create a refined set of principles as criteria to assess water governance in the LermaChapala basin.
Methodologically this thesis utilizes content analysis of various official water
policy documents and interviews with key informants in the LChB. This research method
was chosen for its ability to effectively reduce large amounts of data into coherent themes.
Content analysis also made it possible to superimpose the framework on different clusters
of data (i.e., policy documents and interviews) and compare them. In this study, eighteen
documents spanning over two thousand pages and 51 interviews that cover 84 hours and
48 minutes were analyzed. Because of the broad nature of water governance themes,
content analysis is a preferred methodology for researchers working in this context (for
examples see Drieschova et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008; Atuyambe et al., 2011;
Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Lukasiewicz et al., 2013; Gillet et al., 2014; Vedachalam et al.,
2016). By analysing policy documents and stakeholder perspectives in the context of the
proposed framework, the current study also analysed links between theory (i.e., existing
policies and plans) and practice (i.e., stakeholders’ experience of water governance on the
ground). By going back to the basic principles of water governance to develop an allencompassing framework that captures multiple aspect of water governance this thesis
attempts to find common ground, consolidate concepts, strengthen the debate on water
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governance, and allow for the comparison of results between case studies. The application
of the developed framework to a case study in Mexico also tests the effectiveness of the
developed framework.
1.6

Area of study
The Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB) in central Mexico (Figure 1.1) provides an

opportunity to apply the proposed water governance assessment framework and further our
understanding of the practice of water governance. The LChB experiences common sociopolitical water management problems that remain prevalent in developing countries
seeking to adopt IWRM and improve their water governance strategies. These challenges
include a high and continually growing population, rapidly expanding urbanization and
industrialization processes, and water demand by the agricultural sector, among other issues
(WMO & CONAGUA, 2011). Decades of development in the basin have also created
severe water problems, such as high pollution levels and anthropogenically induced water
scarcity that have resulted from surface water being over-committed and aquifers overexploited (WMO & CONAGUA, 2011).

Figure 1.1: Geographic location of the Lerma-Chapala basin
Existing literature identifies the LChB as having one of the richest water governance
experiences in Mexico and the broader Latin America (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001;
Mestre, 2001; Parrado Diez, 2004; Sanchez Mesa, 2006; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011). For
example, the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (LChBC) which was created in 1993 was the
first water governance forum in Latin America. The literature also acknowledges that
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Mexico adopted an IWRM approach to solve its water management problems with the
enactment of its National Water Law in 1992 (González-Villarreal & Garduño, 1994;
Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001). Nonetheless, a viable water governance system has not
been achieved in the LChB, as progress in water user participation and the decentralization
of functions has been very slow (Torregosa, 2004; Webster et al., 2009a).
The LChB is also characterized by a high population density, a high urban
population concentration and rapid economic development that relies on water resources.
These key characteristics have placed the basin at the core of Mexico’s social, political and
economic life. Despite covering a small geographical portion of the Mexican territory (i.e.,
2.4% of the total landmass), the basin supplies drinking water to 16% of Mexico’s
population, including 2 million from Mexico City and another 2 million from Guadalajara
(Cotler Avalos et al., 2006) through interbasin water transfers. Furthermore, as much as
17% of all industry in Mexico is located within the confines of the basin (Jaime Jáquez,
2004), contributing as much as 35% of Mexico’s industrial GNP (Mestre, 1997; Castelán,
2001). The LChB houses approximately 13% of all irrigated lands in Mexico, which are of
great worth to the country’s agricultural export earnings. Overall the basin’s tertiary sector
supports a fifth of all national economic activities (Wester et al., 2000; Mestre, 2001). The
dominant uses of water in the LChB are for agriculture, domestic consumption (i.e.,
drinking water) and industry (Figure 1.2.a). As illustrated in Figure 1.2.b, most of the water
that is put to these uses are derived from groundwater sources. Decades of development
and growth in the basin have resulted in surface water been over-allocated and groundwater
sources which have generally been over-exploited (Mestre, 2001; Sandoval, 2004; Wester
et al., 2009c; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011).
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Figure 1.2: Water use in the Lerma-Chapala basin
The contested nature of water within the LChB has resulted in conflicts among state
governments, water uses, and water-based stakeholders. The Lerma-Chapala Basin Council
(LChBC) was created to implement the water allocation policy, improve water quality and
water use efficiency, and conserve the resources and ecosystems of the basin (Mestre et al.,
1994; Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000; Castelán, 2001). However, official documents are
not specific and only mention that these goals were to be achieved through the creation of
‘specialized’ workgroups, through consensus building mechanisms, and through a
participatory approach. The World Meteorological Organization and Mexico’s National
Water Commission (WMO & CONAGUA, 2011) report that water pollution and scarcity
problems persist in the basin, which raises questions about the ability of the LChBC to
achieving desired water governance goals and implement an effective IWRM process.
Conflicts within the basin can be grouped in two different categories: direct resource
use conflicts and institutional conflicts. The most relevant direct resource based conflict in
the basin is between the states of Guanajuato and Jalisco (up-down river) concerning the
availability and allocation of surface water from the Solis Dam. This conflict began in the
1950s and consistently resurges during prolonged periods of drought, the most recent one
being between 1999 and 2003. This conflict between the agriculture-based water users in
Guanajuato, environmental citizen groups in Jalisco, and Guadalajara’s water utility
services who use water from Lake Chapala, further demonstrates the persistence of
problems in the basin. This also illustrate the need for negotiation and dialogue around
issues of water allocation, monitoring and governance. The LChBC is the forum where the
negotiations pertaining surface water allocation and the signing of the agreement/treaty for
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the allocation of surface water by stakeholders took place. This mutually agreed document
was reached through a water governance process, where water users and government
representatives from all five states in the basin negotiated for two years before reaching an
agreement. This agreement seeks to bring legitimacy, transparency, rules, and clarity to the
yearly allocation of surface waters; thus, mitigating the conflict for surface water allocation
in the basin.
Regarding institutional conflicts, the most evident challenge exists between the
federal government and the government of the state of Guanajuato. One of the most serious
problems in the LChB is the overexploitation of groundwater. To address this problem, the
government of Guanajuato organized water users into Technical Water Councils (COTAS),
which are subsidiary organizations of the LChBC, without the involvement of the National
Water Commission (NWC). Consequently, the NWC, which is Mexico’s sole water
authority, did not recognize these councils and has not delegated authority or
responsibilities to manage groundwater by COTAS in Guanajuato (Wester et al., 2009a).
This conflict illustrates the need for stakeholder participation, capacity strengthening,
agreements for groundwater allocation, and the application of the subsidiarity principle.
Details of major conflicts surrounding water governance, management and allocation in the
LChB will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
1.7

Problem statement
The current study recognizes the importance of assessment frameworks for

monitoring the evolution of water governance over time (e.g., pre-Rio and post-Rio as
demonstrated in Table 1.1). The literature recognizes that the shift from one water
management paradigm to the next represents a change in status quo in many countries,
especially developing nations (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al., 2006; Sajor & Minh
Thu, 2009; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Halbe et al., 2013; Hornidge et al., 2013). Such shifts
often results in complex problems that cut across social, political, cultural, and local
contexts, consequently influencing the viability of governance systems and their capacity
to support or restrict the implementation of IWRM systems (Rogers, 2002; WWAP, 2003,
2006; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Jacobson et al., 2013; Mapedza, et al., 2016). The problem
statement of this thesis is as follows: To tease out and understand constraints and
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opportunities that emerge from attempts to implement a viable water governance system
and an IWRM process through the application of a newly developed framework.
1.8

Research aim and objectives
The current thesis attempts to develop a holistic water governance assessment

framework by refining existing principles of water governance contained in the research
literature. This could enhance our understanding of water governance by highlighting its
core aspects.
The three major objectives of the study are:
•

to develop a water governance assessment framework by refining normative
attributes that best conceptualize water governance in the existing research
literature;

•

apply the developed water governance assessment framework to official water
policy documents with the aim of understanding pre-/post-Rio water governance
transitions in Mexico; and

•

apply the developed water governance assessment framework to stakeholder
interviews to understand the state of water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin,
and how these conditions relate to policy and the overall creation of a viable IWRM
process.

1.9

Overview of content of thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter introduces the study by

outlining its aims and objectives. It briefly introduces the conceptual framework and the
nature of conflicts in the study area. The second chapter presents the conceptual framework
for water governance, outlines its operating principles, and provides working definitions
for each of the principles to be used as assessment criteria. The third chapter provides
background information on the case study and outlines details of the main conflicts present
in the LChB. The fourth chapter discusses the research methods and analytical approaches
that were utilized for the study. Chapter five presents the study results, while Chapter six
examines the achievements and constraints to water governance in the Lerma-Chapala
basin. The thesis concludes with Chapter seven, which discusses policy recommendations
and future research opportunities that emerge from this dissertation.
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Chapter Two
2

Literature Review
This chapter reviews the existing water governance literature that was drawn on to

develop the water governance assessment framework. A total of five water governance
principles were developed after reviewing the literature and consolidating existing
principles. The chapter also clarifies key concepts such as water governance that are central
to the study.
2.1

What is water governance?
While there has been long standing implicit research on water governance, explicit

research on the notion is still relatively new (Tropp, 2007; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010;
Mitchell, 2013; Pahl-Wostl, 2017; Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). ‘Governance’ is a concept
that was prominently discussed in the social and environmental sciences during the1980s
and 1990s. Traditionally, the concept of governance, was strictly defined as the act of
‘governing’, as is practiced by government and public administration officials (Turner
& Hulme, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Johnston et al., 2000; Marinetto, 2003; Van Kersbergen &
Van Waarden, 2004; Tropp, 2007; de Loë et al., 2009). Overtime, the concept of
‘governance’ has evolved to include the ways in which power, authority, and decision
making are arranged within a multilevel and multi-stakeholder (i.e., civil society, private
sector and various levels of government) collaborative structure, where government
maintains some steering capacity 4 (Jessop, 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Fukuda-Parr
& Ponzio, 2002; Marinetto, 2003). Thus, the concept now transcends previous notions that
portrayed it as characterized by top-down structures and practices. This is noteworthy in
the area of water governance since the implementation governance in the water sector
requires major changes in policy, institutional structures and management, which in many
jurisdictions represents an important change to the prevailing status quo (Hornidge et al.,
2013; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016). Hence, attempts to implement water
governance systems often encounter resistance from powerful traditional forces that favour
a centralized, hierarchical, state-oriented, top-down approach.

4

Steering capacity refers to the idea of being able to “influence” or “steer” decisions in a particular direction,
as opposed to a control-command structure where decisions are made unilaterally by top level authority.
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Good governance in the water sector was first identified as a means to achieve water
security at the Second World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000 (Rogers & Hall, 2003).
As part of the forum, the Global Water Partnership identified water governance as the first
of four priority areas for action, stating that “the water crisis is mainly a crisis of
governance” (GWP, 2000a:16). To date no strong census exists on a single definition for
water governance (Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010,
2010a; Lautze et al., 2011; Araral & Wang, 2013; Varis et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2017;
Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). There are therefore many interpretations and definitions of
water governance. For example, Rogers and Hall (2003) see water governance as a range
of political, social and administrative ‘systems’ meant to develop and manage water
resources and services. Further, the World Water Assessment Program (2003) considers
water governance as including all social, political and economic ‘organizations and
institutions’, and their ‘relationships’ to water resources development and management.
Finally, the United Nations Development Program (2004) views water governance as
political, social and economic ‘processes and institutions’ through which multiple
stakeholders ‘make decisions’ about how best to use, develop and manage water resources.
As a consequence of water governance having multiple definitions and
interpretations, there are no standard approaches for assessing water governance. Water
governance research also remains largely fractured (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Araral &
Wang, 2013), hence the need for an assessment framework that consolidates multiple
approaches to understand water governance. A search for common ground is desirable
because a unifying assessment framework could make it possible to compare and
understand the evolution of water governance structures over time and between different
jurisdictions.
Since the 1990s, IWRM reforms have been changing the way water resources are
governed in many countries. However, the extent to which water sectors have transitioned
form traditional state-centred top-down approaches (i.e., pre-Rio approaches), to a
multilevel, multi-stakeholder collaborative approaches implied in the concept of water
governance (i.e., post-Rio approaches) remains unclear (Chan, 2009; Sajor & Minh Thu,
2009; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Dell’Angelo et al., 2016). Rogers (2002) explains
that a framework to improve water governance systems is needed because experiences from
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many countries have shown that the actual performance of ‘textbook’ laws, institutions and
regulations in the water sector have produced poor outcomes, suggesting that there are no
‘reasonable’ functioning political system to implement them. Within the literature, there is
an abundance of examples that indeed reveal the poor implementation of water governance
related reforms (Wester et al., 2009a; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012;
Hornidge et al., 2013; Casiano Flores et al., 2016; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, the literature also shows that within some socio-political contexts, some levels
of success have been achieved (Lemos & Farias de Oliveira, 2004; Biswas & Tortajada,
2010a; da Costa Silva, 2011; Lennox et al., 2011; Dore et al., 2012; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo,
2014; Mitchel et al., 2014). As has been noted by Norman et al (2013) and others (e.g.,
Grwcksch, 2015; Kuzdas et al., 2015; de Boer et al., 2016) the wide range of approaches
to assessing water governance makes it difficult to compare these case studies. To date,
there have been several calls for a unifying holistic framework for assessing and monitoring
the progress of water governance (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Tropp, 2007;
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Jacobson et al., 2013; OECD, 2015; Pahl-Wostl, 2017). These
examples further justify the need to develop a water governance assessment framework that
builds on the fragmented and largely dispersed literature.
Rogers (2002) warns that there is no blue print or single model for effective water
governance, because each case is dependent upon context. He also contends that the
practice of water governance could become clearer through post-hoc examinations, and
offers twelve principles of what should characterize an effective water governance system.
These principles provide an evaluative lens against which to assess the characteristics of
different water governance systems, and could help to identify challenges and opportunities
to guide reforms aimed towards shaping an adequate or valid water governance system. In
this sense, the present study agrees with Woodhouse and Muller (2017), who suggest that
due to local complexity and diversity, practice can only be guided by general principles of
water governance to address water issues and achieve social, economic and ecological
goals.
The water governance literature offers a number of explicit principles that have been
used in diverse combinations. This thesis postulates that these principles provide common
ground for debate and consolidating ideas. Though dispersed, they represent an important
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step towards a unified concept of water governance. Through a literature survey, the current
study identified seventeen different water governance principles, for which operational
definitions are provided in the literature. These commonly cited water governance
principles are: participative, inclusive, democratic, coherent, efficient, responsive,
effective, equitable, ethical, accountable, integrity, rule of law, open, transparent,
communicative, integrative, and sustainable (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP,
2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Barreira, 2006; Batchelor, 2007;
Lautze et al., 2011; FAO, 2013; Mitchell, 2013). A critical look at these principles and the
context of their use in the literature clearly revels that differently labeled principles
sometimes overlap in meaning. The current study therefore categorizes them into fewer
coherent groups based on similar meanings and key unifying elements. Following the
categorization, the new framework is tested by applying it to a case study.
Before moving any further into our framework, it is necessary to briefly present an
in-depth summary of literature that addresses different water governance assessment
frameworks and methods.
2.2

Water governance: issues and frameworks
The present study agrees with Woodhouse and Muller (2017) and Pahl-Wostl

(2017) who both contend that the wide range of perspectives on water governance pose a
methodological challenge for researchers seeking to understand the concept of how it
evolves in specific contexts. A comprehensive review of literature that has sought to assess
water governance between 2009 and 2016 reveals that there are almost as many assessment
frameworks or approaches as the published articles. While these diverse frameworks are
valuable in themselves, it is evident that a unifying framework could be more beneficial by
making studies comparable and giving researchers the opportunity to track the spatiotemporal evolution of water governance. The only common ground in these clusters of
literature is the frequent use of the basin as the spatial unit for assessing water governance.
Despite the wide range of frameworks and approaches to assess water governance,
the present study grouped the assessment frameworks identified into four overarching
thematic areas of research associated with water governance. These include (a) the
importance of considering the existing local context, when developing institutional and/or
policy reforms, (b) prevailing governing systems and their role in the implementation of
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water governance reforms, (c) stakeholder engagement in water policy and in development
planning, and (d) the capacity of water governance systems to adapt and address changing
or evolving challenges and their adverse effects.
It is important to note that these groups are not mutually exclusive. As Aston and
colleagues (2005) have explained, various components of water governance are interrelated
and interdependent. Consequently, studies that focus on one thematic area of research tend
to touch on attributes of water governance that are associated with a different thematic area.
An example can be seen in the work of Dell’Angelo et al (2016) in their study of the
capacity of water governance systems to adapt and address changing or evolving challenges
within the Ewaso Ng'iro River basin of Mount Kenya. Despite their primary focus on the
adaptive capacity of water governance systems, their study veers into other topics
associated with stakeholder engagement. Such complexities explain the fact that water
governance themes overlap. Hence, the four thematic groups developed in the current study
to capture the key issues addressed in the assessment of water governance within the
literature are not mutually exclusive.
The first thematic group pertains to the need for decision makers to consider local
context (i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, environmental) when developing
institutional, legal and or policy reforms. In the end, it could be the prevailing local context
that determines the outcomes of implemented policies, plans and programs (Jacobson et
al., 2013). When assessing water governance in local context, the relationship between
formal (statutory) and informal (customary) systems has characterized the work of several
researchers (Funder et al., 2010; Hornidge et al., 2013; Wood, 2015; Mapedza, et al., 2016;
Rola et al., 2016). In their work that assessed water governance reforms in the Philippines
using a ‘stage-based approach to institutional reforms’, Rola and colleagues (2016) noted
that formal institutional reforms have often met opposition from local traditional (informal)
systems. Hence, the core goals for most structural changes were unsuccessful. A study by
Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva (2013) that drew from social constructivism and
boundary work came to similar conclusions upon assessing the implementation of irrigation
reforms in Uzbekistan. They concluded that local (informal) water management practices
remained dominant, in spite of formal institutional reforms (i.e., local water governance
forums are not working). These examples relate to the water governance principles of rule
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of law, transparency and accountability mentioned in the literature, since they illustrate the
need for a strong and clear regulatory system which amalgamates formal and informal
systems and highlights the importance of local voices in policy implementation.
Another justification for the need to consider local context in the development of
institutional, legal and or policy reforms, lies in the issue of scale. Dewulf, Mancero,
Cardenas and Sucozhanay (2011) state that paying attention to scale is particularly
important for outlining problems and defining relevant actors that should be factored into
the conflict resolution process. The fact that water resources are not spatially confined to
political boundaries also makes the issue of scale relevant. For example, the pollution of
water in a specific jurisdiction could impact the quality of water that flows into another
jurisdiction connected to the same water body. Gillet, McKay and Keremane (2014)
addressed the issue of scale when they examined water disputes among water uses (i.e.,
irrigated agriculture and commercial forestry) triggered by a water allocation reform in the
Lower Limestone Coast of south Australia. They found that conflicts could not be solved
at the local level; hence, the judicial process had to be moved up to the state level in order
to resolve the situation. This demonstrates that scale is inherently political, and should also
be factored into the level at which issues are resolved. The scale level is directly associated
with the concept of subsidiarity with regards of making decisions and taking actions at the
most appropriate level, which is related to the water governance principles of coherence,
responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness.
A second thematic area of research assesses issues related to the prevailing
governing systems and their implication in the implementation of water governance
reforms. International financing, development and aid agencies have pushed client
countries to pass IWRM reforms, which in many cases represent a change in status quo
(Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al., 2006; Ballweber, 2006; Sajor & Minh Thu, 2009;
Agyenim & Gupta, 2012). As a result, the assessment literature has paid attention to the
role of various actors and institutions in the implementation of water governance systems.
De Boer, Kruijf, Özerol and Bressers (2016) in the examination of the relationship between
the existing water governance system and collaborative actions and interactions among
stakeholders build upon a collaboration framework with eight distinct and previously
established classes of governance systems, which they apply to five case studies. They
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conclude that the outcomes of a water governance system can be determined by the
supportive and/or restrictive nature of stakeholder actions, especially those in higher levels
of government.
This finding is supported by several other studies (e.g., Wester et al., 2009a;
Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen
et al., 2015). Oliveira, Heller, Nacimento and Lobina (2012) who applied the path
dependency theory to the municipality of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, concluded that policy
reforms towards an integrated and participative water management model have not been
sufficient to break down old practices. Similarly, Franzen, Hammer, and Balfors (2015)
who analyse how institutional legacies affect water policy reforms in southern Sweden
concluded that the governance approaches utilized by different river basin organizations
around water user participation vary in part because of ‘institutional memory’. They also
conclude that the legacy of memory within institutional arrangements can facilitate or
impede the development of cooperative networks, stakeholder participation and
consequently, goal achievement. Finally, Horlemann & Dombrowsky (2012) apply a
theory-based approach drawing from Young’s (2002) fit-interplay concept to analyse
progress and problems in the implementation of IWRM in Mongolia. Their results show
that horizontal and vertical coordination is challenging in Mongolia because the roles and
responsibilities of stakeholders are not clearly defined in law, and because the capacities of
newly created institutions and organizations need to be strengthened. They also conclude
that rapid institutional change created friction between new and old institutional structures
thus creating a gap in the implementation of IWRM.
This thematic area of research is associated with several water governance
principles. First, it addresses the need to clearly establish roles and responsibilities of actors
and institutions (i.e., rule of law), in order to hold institutions and individuals accountable
for their actions (i.e., accountability), but also to facilitate collaborative stakeholder action
(i.e., coherence, participation). This group of frameworks are also associated with the idea
that water management functions best when and resource-based decisions are made at the
lowest appropriate level of social aggregation (responsive, efficient, effective), which
implies vertical and horizontal information and collaboration networks (open, transparent,
communicative, integrative).
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A third thematic area deals with stakeholder engagement in water policy and
development planning. Public participation has been part of the sustainable development
debate since the late 20th century. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development
declared that environmental issues have better results with the participation of all citizens,
(see Principle 10, Rio Declaration 1992). Today, stakeholder participation is being
promoted globally by international development and financial institutions when promoting
sustainable development, IWRM, and water governance. With regards to water governance
in particular, it is considered that the effective implementation of stakeholder participation
in a decision-making process could bring transparency and accountability to the process,
and led to decisions that are grounded in consensus and legitimacy. Such decisions tend to
be more achievable (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006).
This literature provides evidence that stakeholder participation can enhance the
implementation and outcomes of water policies and programs (Bell et al., 2011; Dore et
al., 2012; Norman et al., 2013; Carr et al., 2014; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo, 2014; Kuzdas et
al., 2015; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016). Utilizing an “Analytical Hierarchical Process”,
Gallego-Ayala and Juizo (2014) in an assessment of stakeholder involvement in the context
of Mozambique’s Incomati River Basin acknowledge that stakeholder participation and
involvement in the planning and decision-making process is central to successful water
governance. Norman and colleagues (2013) developed the Water Security Status Indicators
assessment method, which utilizes participatory methods that allow communities to assess
their water security status. After applying the assessment, they concluded that active
stakeholder engagement is an essential component of integrated planning and management,
without which water governance goals cannot be achieved. Finally, Akhmouch and
Clavreul (2016) conducted an OECD study on “Stakeholder Engagement for Inclusive
Water Governance” (OECD, 2015a), and sought to assess stakeholder engagement in
water-related decision-making, and the extent to which this leads to greater effectiveness,
efficiency and inclusiveness. Their findings support recommendations for balanced
stakeholder representation and open and regular communications among stakeholders to
help steer successful water governance systems.
This thematic area of research is in agreement with several water governance
principles. First, it establishes the idea that decision making in a water governance process
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should involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders (inclusive, democratic,
equitable, participation). Second, it promotes the notion that relevant clusters of
information should be made available to promote effective dialogue, negotiations and
decision making (open, communicative, transparency, accountability).
Within the water governance research community, debates around the extent to
which participation should occur and what role it should play continue to persist. The extent
to which stakeholders should get involved, the nature of the involvement, the extent of
power sharing, and the planning stage at which stakeholder participation should be
considered largely depends on the socio-political context and the supportiveness or
restrictiveness of prevailing governance systems (OECD, 2015a). It is also important to
bear in mind that cultural, political, social, economic, educational and other local
characteristics change over space and time, potentially impacting the level and type of
stakeholder involvement at different times. This is illustrated in the work of Da Costa Silva
(2011) who developed and applied a framework for understanding environmental justice in
the context of ‘community-based watershed management’ in four Latin American
countries. She concludes that the community-based watershed management projects have
been able to mitigate environmental vulnerability and risk to access water resources.
However, her results also reveal constraints that limit social participation, including the
lack of clarity in stakeholder roles and the lack of capacities of the institutions responsible
for implementing participatory tools. Interestingly, despite governance systems that
promoted decentralization and participation, within the study communities, her study did
not find any evidence of communities being empowered.
Akhmouch and Clavreul (2016) are the only researchers found in this review of
literature who provided an explicit typology of levels of stakeholder participation for their
research. To determine the levels of stakeholder involvement, this dissertation uses
Arnstein’s (1969) levels of participation, which has been commonly utilized in the
literature. These levels, representing the degree to which power is redistributed from a topdown to a bottom-up approach, are illustrated as rungs on a “ladder of citizen participation”
arranged in a descending order of degree of participation (i.e., from optimum to minimal
participation) (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: Arnstein’s Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation
Rungs on a
Ladder of Citizen
Participation

Nature of the Involvement

8. Citizen control

Citizens have full charge of policy and managerial aspects

7. Delegated power

Citizens are given management power for selected or all parts
of a particular plan or program

6. Partnership

Trade-offs are negotiated, and there are no unilateral changes

5. Placation

Advice is received from citizens but not necessarily acted
upon

4. Consultation

Citizens are heard but not necessarily considered

3. Informing

Citizens’ rights, responsibilities and options are identified

2. Therapy

Power holders educate or cure citizens

1. Manipulation

Rubberstamp advisory committees

Degree of
Involvement
(Power Sharing)

Degrees of citizen
Power

Degrees of
tokenism

Non-participation

Source: Arnstein, 1969.

With regards to the type of participation, the literature suggests that this should be
selected according to individual and institutional capacities, context, and the goals and
objectives established (Mitchell, 2002; Gomez & Nakatt, 2002). These forms of
stakeholder participation may be applied in various combinations at different stages of
implementation.
The fourth thematic area of research seeks to understand water governance systems
and their capacity to adapt and address ever changing challenges. These studies focus on
the adaptive capacity of water governance systems to respond to the uncertainties of climate
change and increasing population. These changing or evolving factors usually involve
many different sectors and require an integrated approach to be adequately addressed.
Consequently, the frameworks in this group assess aspects related to collaboration,
information sharing and the ability of stakeholders to respond to adverse effects such as
drought and flooding (Engle & Lemos, 2010; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Grecksch, 2015; Van
Leeuwen & Sjerps, 2015, 2016; Dell'Angelo et al., 2016). For example, Grecksch (2015),
modified the Adaptive Capacity Wheel by adding two dimensions (i.e., adaptation
motivation and adaptation belief), and assess the adaptive capacity of water governance in
the Keiskamma River Catchment, South Africa, and uses the framework as a
communication tool with stakeholders to identify strengths and weaknesses in the
implementation of adaptation measures. He concludes that to overcome the implementation
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gap it is necessary to ensure better coordination across and within governmental levels, to
raise awareness, to strengthen institutional capacities and skills of decision makers and the
public, and to increase the political will in order to overcome adaptation barriers. He
recommends developing councillor awareness program in order to have better informed
participation.
In another example, Dell'Angelo, McCord, Gower, Carpenter, Caylor, and Evans
(2016), applied a multimethod approach and used Ostrom’s eight ‘design principles’ of
natural-resource management as a diagnostic framework for five communities on the
Ewaso Ng'iro River basin on Mount Kenya. They conclude that the current water
governance system on the basin has produced positive outcomes, increased stakeholder’s
dialogue and participation, and decreased conflicts. However, there are concerns that the
system is not adaptable to changing conditions related to population growth and climate
change. This study illustrates the importance of institutional systems that stakeholders to
collaborate and share information around issues of adaptation to population increase and
environmental change. This last thematic area of research relates to a number of the water
governance principles. It addresses the participation of a wide range of stakeholders (i.e.,
inclusive, participation, equitable), the importance of defining stakeholder roles to
facilitate the collaboration (i.e., coherence, rule of law), the importance of making relevant
information available to stakeholders to aid in decision making (i.e., communicative,
transparent, open), the necessity of considering local context (i.e., coherence, responsive,
ethical), and the importance of decision making that has implications for the long-term
management of water resources (i.e., integration, sustainable).

This cluster of literature discussed above shows that a variety of approaches have
been applied to assess different aspects of water governance. It also reveals that there are
many methods that have been applied, but there is no common ground on methods for
evaluation, which further explain the complexity of assessing water governance. For
example, some researchers use hypothesis testing (de Boer et al., 2016), others identify key
themes (Wood, 2015), some measure percentages (Funder et al., 2010) or frequencies
(Baumgartne & Pahl-Wostl, 2013), others look for trends (Carr et al., 2014) or patterns
(Cook, 2014), and some used a comparative approach (da Costa Silva, 2011; Oliveira et
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al., 2012; Franzen et al., 2015). For the most part, researchers have studied formal and
informal aspects of water governance and relied on primary and secondary sources of
information (i.e. interviews and surveys, or articles, media, texts). The literature review
also reveals that most authors tend to use a descriptive approach (Chan, 2009; Wester et
al., 2009; Bakker & Cook, 2011; da Costa Silva, 2011; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012;
Hornidge et al., 2013; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Cook, 2014; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et
al., 2016) to evaluate different characteristics of water governance, while others use a
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Engle & Lemos, 2010; Bell et al.,
2011; Cookey et al., 2016; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016; Dell'Angelo et al., 2016). The
present study, like others, considers systematization and replicability as fundamental to a
good data analysis, especially in studying confect ridden issues. Due to the complex and
multifaceted nature of issues that emerge in water governance and the large amount of data
that was analysed in the current study (i.e., policy documents and interviews), content
analysis was used as a systematic and replicable data analysis tool.
Finally, the survey of literature identified that most frameworks use a normative
approach and compare case studies to desired ends and ideas that determine what ought to
be done. It also identified a total of eight articles that used specific principles in their
assessment. The principles used by Dell'Angelo and colleagues (2016) 5 and those proposed
by Akhmouch and Correia (2016) 6 are the ones that at first glance seem more different
from those offered by Rogers and Hall (2003). However, their associated concepts are
described or defined similarly. The other researchers (Engle & Lemos, 2010; da Costa
Silva, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Grecksch, 2015; Van Leeuwen
& Sjerps, 2016) use different combinations of three or four principles, with participation
and accountability being the most frequently used, followed by responsiveness, equity and
capacity. Most of the principles used in these six studies are included in the group of

5

Ostrom’s eight ‘design principles’ of natural-resource management: (1) Clear boundaries, (2) congruence
with local conditions, (3) collective-choice arrangements, (4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conflict
resolution mechanisms, (7) recognition of the right to organization, and (8) nested governance (Dell'Angelo
et al., 2016).
6
Twelve OECD principles on water governance: (1) Capacity, (2) policy coherence, (3) appropriate scales
within basin systems, (4) clear roles & responsibilities, (5) monitoring &evaluation, (6) trade-offs across
users, rural & urban areas, & generations, (7) stakeholder engagement, (8) integrity & transparency, (9)
innovative governance, (10) regulatory framework, (11) financing, and (12) data& information (OECD, 2015;
Akhmouch & Correia, 2016).
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seventeen principles for which operational definitions were found in the literature (Rogers,
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006;
Batchelor, 2007).
In summary, there are two major considerations necessary for deriving the core
components of water governance and developing an assessment framework. These include
the multifaceted nature of water governance, and the multiplicity and diversity in
approaches found in contemporary literature that assesses the different aspects of water
governance. Since the literature covers sufficient grounds on water governance when
viewed as a whole, it seems unreasonable to add to the complexity of existing approaches.
Hence, the study attempts to refine and consolidate existing frameworks or concepts that
have been used to study water governance into fewer and understandable clusters. This can
be seen as an attempt to go back to the basic principles of water governance, finding
common grounds within the disparate literature and developing a holistic framework.
The framework developed in this study therefore provides opportunities for the
comprehensive and systematic analysis of water governance systems to identify where
changes are needed and hopefully, help bridge the gap in the implementation of IWRM
processes in practice.
2.3

Back to the basics: principles for building a water governance framework
Theoretical challenges that are presented by the complexity of assessing water

governance and management have resulted in the proliferation of principles used in the
literature to assess different water governance systems. The present study identified seven
publications with commonly cited water governance principles. Thus, the principles cited
in most of the literature overlap with at least one of these seven clusters of literature.
Additionally, these seven publications (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003,
2006; Aston et al., 2005; Aston et al., 2006; Bachelor, 2007) provide clear operational
definitions for each principle. In total, this study identified seventeen different water
governance principles with clear definitions in the literature (see Table 2.2). These
principles are considered essential for effective water governance (Rogers, 2002; Rogers
& Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Barreira, 2006;
Batchelor, 2007).
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Table 2.2: Water governance principles defined by researchers
Principles

Rogers,
2002
X

Rogers &
Hall, 2003*

WWAP,
2003
X

1 Participative
2 Democratic
3 Equitable
X
X
4 Inclusive
X
5 Coherent
X
X
6 Efficient
X
X
7 Responsive
X
8 Effective
X
9 Ethical
X
X
10 Accountable
X
X
11 Integrity
12 Rule of law
13 Open
X
X
14 Transparent
X
X
15 Communicative
X
X
16 Integrative
X
X
17 Sustainable
X
X
Total number of
12
12
principles
* Consolidated principles were segregated to better
publication.

Ashton et
al., 2005
X
X

Ashton et
al., 2006
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

WWAP,
2006
X

Batchelor,
2007 *

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

8

7

5

10

X
X
X
X
X
12

represent the water governance principles included in each

The existing range of principles in the literature, which sometimes have overlapping
meanings, makes the analysis of water governance complicated and difficult to capture
coherently. Some researchers have attempted to reduce the number of existing principles
into fewer categories to enable more coherent and well-structured analysis. Rogers and Hall
(2003) consolidated twelve principles that were proposed by Rogers’s (2002) into seven
principles. For example, to reduce redundancy, they bundled the principles of open and
transparent into one principle (i.e., Open and Transparent) since both principles pertain to
good governance being open (i.e., having institutions that work in an open manner) and
being transparent (i.e., having structures in place that ensure that ensure policy decisions
are transparent so that all policy stakeholders can easily follow the steps taken in the policy
formulation). As seen in the above example, overlaps among principles makes it possible
to reduce them into fewer coherent and well connected categories. Another example to
reduce water governance principles is evident in the work of the World Water Assessment
Program (2006). They identified an overlap between effectiveness and efficiency, and
merged them into a single principle (i.e., Effectiveness and Efficiency), stating that
“processes and institutions should produce results that meet needs while making the best
use of resources”. This definition captures individual definitions of the Effectiveness and
Efficiency principles provided by Rogers (2002).
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There are also cases where commonalities among principles are not as clear. For
example, Rogers and Hall (2003) bundle inclusive and communicative; where the former
makes reference to wide stakeholder participation that follows “an inclusive approach when
developing and implementing policies”, and the later identifies the need for governance
institutions and systems “to communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct
ways”. Even though broad participation is recognized by the authors as being built on the
free flow of information, the overlap among these two principles is not explicit. The
bundling of the principles inclusive and communicative by Rogers and Hall (2003) provides
a good example where it is effective to merge two complementary principles that may not
directly have a shared meaning.
After examining the seventeen water governance principles offered in the literature,
several redundancies and/or overlaps of concepts were identified. Thus, while the authors
captured in Table 2.2 utilized different principles to assess water governance systems, there
were concepts that were labeled differently and defined similarly. The two publications that
provide a more detailed definition for each principle are the ones by Rogers (2002) and
Rogers and Hall (2003), and their work appears to influence the operational definitions
provided in later publications (see Appendix II). It was also noticed that researchers often
used different terminology in reference to the same concepts. For example, effective and
responsive are two principles that were found to be redundant. Rogers (2002) states that a
water governance system should be effective. He then mentions that “Effectiveness also
depends on implementing policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the
most appropriate level” (Rogers, 2002:3). Rogers and Hall (2003) do not include effective
within their list of principles but include responsive instead, and state that “Responsiveness
also requires policies to be implemented in a proportionate manner and decisions to be
taken at the most appropriate level”. ‘Participative’ and ‘inclusive’ were another set of
principles with different labels and similar meanings. In such cases where the definitions
provided for diverse principles were very similar the principles were merged under a single
umbrella principle.
The reduction and refinement process reduced the number of principles from
seventeen to five overarching water governance principles (i.e., participation, coherence,
rule of law, knowledge, and integration). Refined definitions were then developed for each
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new principle, based on the consolidation of minor differences in multiple definitions that
depicted the same idea in the literature. For example, when Rogers (2002:3) operationalises
the principle open, he states that stakeholders “should actively communicate about what
the institutions and government do and the decisions they take” and “use language that is
accessible and understandable for the general public”. This characterization overlaps with
that of transparency, which requires that “policy decisions be transparent so that both
insiders and outsiders can easily follow the steps taken in the policy formulation” and with
communicative, which considers that “governance institutions and systems need to
communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct ways”. Therefore, open,
transparent and communicative principles could be encapsulated within a single principle.
Two steps were taken in the development of the water governance principles
proposed in the current study. First, it was necessary to make generalizations that subdivide
various features into component parts, after which attention was focused on key unifying
elements and similarities. Once the main topics were identified and the groups organized,
it was necessary to divide some of the principles offered in the literature into subtopics.
This was done in order to include them in the operational definition of a more coherent
principle. For example, the principle equitable, which is defined by Rogers and Hall
(2003:28) as:
All men and women should have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.
Equity between and among the various interest groups, stakeholders, and consumervoters needs to be carefully monitored throughout the process of policy development and
implementation. It is essential that the penalties for malfeasance are, and are seen to be,
equitably applied.

This definition appeals to the concept of participation in the sense that it makes reference
to an enabling environment that provides the opportunity for all men and women to
participate in decision making to defend their rights to water. Nonetheless, this definition
also makes reference to established mechanisms that monitor and guarantee the inclusive
participation of all interest groups in policy development and implementation, and
encourages penalties for wrong doing, which makes reference to the concept of rule of law.
Consequently, the principle equitable was subdivided into component parts; (1) the idea
that all men and women should have the opportunity to voice their concerns and defend
their interests in a decision-making process, was included in the principle ‘Participation’
proposed in the present study, while (2) the idea that a clear system of oversight and checks
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and balances should be established, to monitor compliance with the law, and the idea of
allocating penalties was included in the definition of the principle ‘Rule of law’ proposed
in the present study. Table 2.3 provides details of all five principles that were generated
from the aforementioned process.
Table 2.3: Water governance principles
Principles commonly offered in the literature
Participative
Democratic
Equitable
Inclusive
Coherent
Efficient
Effective
Responsive
Ethical
Integrity
Accountable
Rule of law
Open
Transparent
Communicative
Integrative
Sustainable

Refined principles used in the
proposed framework

Participation

Coherence

Rule of Law

Knowledge

Integration

This responds to the call of Ashton et al (2005) who emphasize the necessity of
integrating and including all water governance principles into a coherent cluster for the
study and effective implementation of water governance. These principles not only
represent the ideal settings of how water governance should function, but also provide a
system for establishing and assessing criteria pertaining to the state of water governance
and its associated strengths and opportunities in specific geographical locations (Rogers,
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006;
Barreira, 2006; Hooper, 2006; Batchelor, 2007; Saravanan, 2009; Lauttze et al., 2011;
FAO, 2013; Mitchell, 2013).
Literature points to the importance of considering formal and informal structures in
the assessment of water governance systems (Aminova & Jagers, 2011; Farrelly & Brown,
2011; Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson, 2013; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016). In
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this regard, Jacobson, Meyer, Oia, Reddy, and Tropp (2013) indicate that formal (statutory)
and informal (customary) structures may be compatible or incompatible, and they could
effectively manage water resources or could compete with one another. Because water
governance operated under various formal and informal structures, the current studies also
factors these structures into the study of water governance
2.3.1

Water governance principles
This section presents the five water governance principles 7 proposed in the current

thesis. The section is organized according to the five principles. Under each of these
principles, various clusters of literature are reviewed to capture the context of their use and
multiple meanings associated with them. Following this exercise, each subsection
concludes with the conceptualization of the principle as used in this thesis. The five water
governance principles proposed in this thesis are discussed and conceptualized as follows:
(a) Participation:
In order to be successful, water governance should involve a multilateral and
inclusive decision making process that ensures the participation of all stakeholders within
the context of a river basin (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003;
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Parrado Diez, 2004; Ashton et al., 2005;
Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). These stakeholders should include all levels of government,
the private sector, civil social organizations, and all other public and private service water
users. To the best extent possible, these stakeholders should be engaged the policy- and
decision-making process from conception, to implementation, and evaluation (Rogers,
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; Tortajada,
2010a). Power sharing and legitimate stakeholder representation are key elements that
should characterize a successful water governance system (WWAP, 2003, 2006;
Falkenmark et al., 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009).
A viable water governance system should also provide opportunities for the
participation of all men and women, regardless of their social, ethnical or religious
conditions. Broad stakeholder engagement in decision making at different scales
strengthens legitimate representation, empowers people, and makes the water governance

7

Principle is here understood as a fundamental declaration of values, in relation to a specific issue, which
functions as a guide that explains how something works (adapted from Ashton et al., 2006).
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system more responsive to local issues (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003;
WWAP, 2003, 2006). For a water governance system to be more effective, it is necessary
for stakeholders to have clear and regular communication (both vertically and horizontally).
Concerning non-government stakeholders in particular, it is essential to have a fluent
exchange of information between stakeholder representatives and the groups they
represent, and vice versa (WWAP, 2006, 2012). For a water governance system to be
viable, it is important that all voices are heard and all interests represented, especially in
cases with marginalized and disadvantaged groups (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003;
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006;
Batchelor, 2007; Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Inclusive stakeholder engagement also
encourages cooperation and collaboration, and has the potential to improve the likelihood
of success in achieving set goals (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003; WWAP,
2003, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Ashton et al., 2005; Saravanan et al., 2009). Public
participation could result in transparency, legitimacy, accountability, equity, efficiency,
responsiveness, flexibility, continuity, and cohesiveness in water governance system.
Based on the clusters of literature reviewed on participation and other related
concepts, participation in the current thesis will imply inclusive and legitimate multistakeholder representation in water-related decision making forums. Additionally, these
stakeholder representatives should speak and/or act in the best interest of the groups they
represent while valuing the interests and perspectives of other stakeholders.
(b) Coherence:
Water governance systems should ensure that policies, plans, programs, regulations
and actions in the water sector are coherent, consistent, and clear. It should also avoid
ambiguity by ensuring that various initiatives do not have conflicting goals (Rogers & Hall,
2003). Achieving these goals requires a clear definition of stakeholder roles and
responsibilities to help facilitate collaborative and well-coordinated stakeholder action
(Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003; UNDP, 2004; Ashton et al., 2006; Biswas &
Tortajada 2010, 2010a; WGF, 2012), and to avoid overlapping or contradictory roles that
often result on conflicts (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WGF, 2012). It is also important that roles
are matched with authority and responsibility, and that institutions and organizations at all
scales have the necessary financial, human and other logistical capacities to carry out their
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roles and responsibilities effectively (WWAP, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor,
2007). While individual stakeholders and their respective roles are important, the principle
of coherence also requires that information be shares among stakeholders in order to
encourage the coordination of activities, and create synergies in the implementation of
solutions to common water management concerns (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes &
Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015).
To be effective, water governance systems should have the capacity to adequately
respond to anticipated problems and solve existing water resource issues. Water
governance systems depend largely on their ability to make decisions and act at the most
appropriate level (subsidiarity principle), making the system effective and timely,
delivering what is needed when and where it is needed; while making the best use of
resources to improve overall outcomes (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015;
Ashton et al., 2005; Conca, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). Proximity to the source
of the problems allow stakeholders and their decisions to be more in tune with the context
in which issues present themselves (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015;
Conca, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a). Therefore, the devolution of power and authority to lower
levels of government and civil social organizations, and the creation of water governance
forums (such as river basin councils), could allow for decisions to be made and actions to
be taken at the lowest relevant level of social aggregation, while using the basin as a
planning unit. Regional and local authorities, as well as organized water users, should get
increasingly involved in water management, which would make it easier for institutions
and processes to adapt to change, while ensuring that there is a clear social, economic and
environmental gain to be achieved by following enacted policies (Carr et al., 2014;
Gallego-Ayala & Juízo, 2014; Grecksch, 2015).
Grounded in the discussion of literature around the issue of coherence, coherence
as used in the current study will refer to the facilitation of well-coordinated actions and
stakeholder collaborations at all scales in order to deliver what is needed when and where
it is needed, while making the best use of available resources. This requires that stakeholder
roles are clearly defined and well matched with the delegation of authority and
responsibility. As well, stakeholders should have the capacity to carry out their duties

37

effectively. These aforementioned actions should result in the effective management of
water resources.
(c) Rule of Law:
Sound water governance requires a strong and clear regulatory and administrative
framework to regulate planning, development, management and the equitable allocation of
water resources (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003,
2006; UNDP, 2004; Tortajada, 2010a; Grigg, 2011). Laws, norms, regulations, treaties,
agreements, protocols, management plans, and property rights are tools that provide
legitimacy, clarity, transparency and credibility to the water governance system while
reducing arbitrary actions and decision making (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). The
“rules of the game” and the consequences for violation of those rules need to be clear and
easily accessible to all citizens (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Batchelor, 2007).
Formal (statutory) and informal (customary) rules are aimed at providing security,
certainty, and transparency in water governance systems, while reducing arbitrary decision
making, mitigating conflicts, and minimizing corruption (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers &
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006; Batchelor, 2007). It is essential that the rules specify what is
allowed, what is not allowed, the penalties for wrongdoing or misconduct, and who has the
authority to enforce them and to what extent (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Water
governance requires that authority be legitimately exercised only in agreement with
publicly disclosed laws (formal and informal), which are adopted and enforced in
accordance with established procedures. Penalties should be equitably applied for wrong
doing to all stakeholders and stakeholder groups in a manner that encourages accountability
and a sense of responsibility (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Gaps and contradictions
in the rules of the game should be avoided, since they make regulatory frameworks less
effective, and provide opportunities for corruption and abuses (WWAP, 2003, 2006;
UNDP, 2004; Funder et al., 2010).
Effective water governance requires clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities
of all the institutions, organizations, actors and networks involved in developing,
implementing, and evaluating policy, at all levels (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall,
2003; WWAP, 2003; UNDP, 2004; Ashton et al., 2005; Biswas & Tortajada 2010;
Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). Conditions in which contradictory roles are merged under
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a single authority, like being provider and regulator of services, should be avoided because
they create operational and credibility problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006;
Batchelor, 2007; Griggs, 2011; Jacobson et al., 2013). A clear system of oversight and
checks and balances should be established, to monitor compliance with the law and with
stakeholder's responsibilities, and help avoid abuse of power by authorities or local elites
(Rogers & Hall, 2003; Jacobson et al., 2013). Water governance systems also need well
defined water governance forums with built-in arbitration, monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms, which could help with the resolution of conflicts associated with water
resources (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Having roles and responsibilities clearly
defined brings transparency to a water governance system, and strengthen with a system of
oversights and establishing checks and balances. This in turn allows government officials,
institutions and other stakeholders to be held accountable for their actions, decisions and/or
omissions (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF,
2012; Jacobson et al., 2013).
Water governance must be strongly based upon the ethical 8 principles and context
of the society in which it functions and rooted in the rule of law (Rogers, 2002; Rogers &
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Batchelor, 2007). It is important to consider local context
(i.e., cultural, social, economic, political conditions), since unique conditions in specific
contexts remain determinants of the viability of water legislation, policy and regulations
and their respective outcomes. This is particularly critical when attempting to implement
an imported water governance model (Moench et al., 2003; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010;
Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; OECD, 2015; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et
al., 2016). Not taking local context into consideration when developing and implementing
institutional and policy reforms could weaken the water governance system instead of
strengthening its functionality (Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; Mapedza et
al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016).
As evidenced in the review of literature, the concept of rule of law has many
components. This principle will be used in this thesis to denote the existence of strong and
clear regulatory and administrative frameworks (both formal and informal) that are rooted

8

Ethical is here understood as a system of accepted beliefs that conform to moral principles of what is right
and wrong behavior.
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in the socio-cultural contexts within which they function. It requires legitimacy in
exercising authority and also requires that stakeholders are held accountable for their
actions through the impartial application of penalties. It requires that roles involving power
and authority are distributed in conjunction with checks and balances. The existence of
arbitration forums for conflict resolution should also characterize the rule of law.
(d) Knowledge:
For water governance systems to function effectively, it is necessary that all actors
and stakeholders communicate with each other in very direct ways (Rogers, 2002; Rogers
and Hall, 2003). Dialogue and negotiations are a cornerstone of a successful water
governance system; therefore, it is important to have relevant current and historical
information that is relevant for making decisions around water resources (e.g. quantity and
quality of surface and groundwater resources). This information should be made available
to actors, stakeholders and the general public for scrutiny and evidence-based decision
making (UNDSD, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Biswas &
Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP, 2012, 2015). The mobilization of knowledge among
stakeholders can yield decisions that are more fruitful and likely to achieve better outcomes
that meet diverse stakeholder needs in an equitable manner (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Ashton
et al., 2006; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015). Stakeholders
should work in a clear and open manner, actively communicating about what they do and
the decisions they are taking, using clear and simple terminology, hence making all policy
formulation and decision-making processes easy to follow by both insiders and outsiders.
This will enhance the quality of water governance by promoting transparency, clarity,
confidence, and credibility (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2005, 2006;
Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Batchelor, 2007). This open flow of information
not only facilitates a more effective coordination of collaborative activities both vertically
and horizontally, but also provides the opportunity to hold institutions, organizations and
actors accountable for their actions and decisions by monitoring progress (Rogers & Hall,
2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP, 2015).
An effective water governance system also utilizes communication and information
systems for educational purposes. Disseminating information through formal and informal
educational programs could increase awareness over a wide range of issues at local,
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regional, national and international levels, among stakeholders and the general population
(Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2012, 2015;
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Learning about water issues in other sectors or
places and about strategies followed to solve water problems, not only aids on building
empathy among water users at local and basin levels, but it also helps build consensus
among stakeholders on how to achieve common set goals (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Dore et
al., 2012). Increased awareness regarding water problems, policies, plans and programs
could also increase the levels of stakeholder involvement and the implementation level of
success (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Dore et al., 2012).
Based on these multiple perspectives pertaining to knowledge in the literature, the
current study deems knowledge as making relevant information accessible to all
stakeholders and the general public for the purposes of education, decision making,
awareness, public scrutiny and capacity building programs. In order to create a level ground
for negotiations and quality collaboration, multiple stakeholders should communicate in
open and direct ways using simple and clear terminology. This should, in turn, improve
decision making, enhance stakeholder collaboration and put stakeholders in the position to
make responsible decisions.
(e) Integration:
Water governance follows an intersectoral approach that recognises that all water
uses and users are interrelated and interdependent, and considers the basin as a planning
and management unit (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Ashton et al., 2005; Batchelor, 2007; WGF,
2012; Mitchell, 2013; WWAP, 2015). A viable water governance system takes into account
existing and future demands of surface and groundwater resources and their possible
impacts to environmental, social, and economic interests within the basin, and considers
vital aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems as present and future freshwater users (Rogers &
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a). It is important for policy and decision makers
to consider strategies such as the rehabilitation, remediation and restoration of local and
regional water cycles, more efficient and effective ways to preserve and protect the quantity
and quality of surface and groundwater resources, and reducing risks and hazards
associated with extreme weather events, aimed at the sustainability of water resources and
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water services in a given river basin (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP,
2003, 2006; Grigg 2008; WGF, 2012; Mitchell, 2013; WWAP, 2015).
Water governance should be strongly rooted in local traditions and context, taking
into account availability and quality of water and associated resources, because they could
determine the outcomes of water policies, plans, and programs (Moench et al., 2003;
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Tortajada, 2010a).
Changing conditions in space and time require water governance systems to be flexible and
be able to adapt and respond to the dynamics established by local contexts (Moench et al.,
2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Cook, 2014). An effective water governance system should
account for existing rights (including informal traditional water rights) and the rights of
posterity through the policy- and decision-making process The overall goal of the
appropriate water governance system should be to achieve long-term sustainability of water
resources (Rogers & Hall, 2003).
Grounded in the above literature, this thesis interprets integration as the application
of an intersectoral approach that uses the basin as the planning and management unit. It is
rooted in local contexts and considers existing and future demands of water resources and
their possible impacts on environmental, social and economic interests, while seeking to
promote long-term sustainability of water resources.
While each of the five principles described above could independently act as a topic
of research, assessing them collectively under a unified framework will paint a holistic
picture of water governance and tease out various shortcomings. This thesis analyses all
five principles together under a common framework to better understand water governance.
This thesis poses that it is in these basic principles that a unifying definition of water
governance can be captured. The principles proposed here, capture critical traits that should
be evident in an ideal water governance system. In general terms, they indicate that ideally,
a viable water governance system should have a strong regulatory framework that clearly
establishes the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and holds stakeholders
accountable for their actions. They also recognize that relevant information should be made
readily available to enable stakeholders negotiate issues on a level playing field, and make
informed decisions that respond to the local context. These principles also reflect that
decisions should be made close to where problems originate and that top-down and bottom-
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up networks need to be established to effectively coordinate stakeholder actions and
decisions at various scales. They emphasize the importance of taking the values and
interests of all stakeholders (including marginalized groups, ecosystems and future
generations) into account during negotiations and decision making. Finally, they insist that
decisions be made bearing in mind local conditions while aiming towards long-time
sustainability.
2.4

Expected contributions
Water governance involves many scales, stakeholders, capacities and networks (to

name just a few), which make it difficult to establish a single assessment framework that
addresses all these differences. Researchers have applied several assessment frameworks,
mainly approaching water governance from their area of expertise, or according to the
nature of their research topic. This has, in turn, resulted in an increase complexity of
assessment frameworks. For this reason, this thesis considers that ‘going back to the basics’
is a fundamental approach to establishing an all-encompassing framework.
The framework proposed here aims to contribute to the literature by integrating the
principles from the most complex to the more basic ones. For example, the proposed
operational definition for the Participation principle includes the former definitions
provided in the literature, like: (a) participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, (b)
informed participation, to multilevel of cooperation and decision making and equity
considerations, when those decisions are applied within the basin (c) equity between and
among the various interest groups, (d) multilateral processes of decision making, and (e)
collaboration and cooperation (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003;
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010, 2010a; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF,
2012).
The survey mentioned above (Section 2.2), points that most assessments were
conducted at the basin scale. The present study considers a good opportunity to test the
assessment framework proposed here to assess the conflicts in water management and
governance in the Lerma-Chapala river basin. The next chapter presents complexities
around water in this region.
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Chapter Three
3
3.1

Area of Study
Introduction
Mexico has a long-standing history in water resource planning and management;

hence, the country is regarded as a leader in the Latin America context (Dourojeanni &
Jouravlev, 2001; Mestre, 2001a; Dourojeanni et al., 2002). The enactment of the National
Water Law (NWL) on December 1, 1992 marked an intended shift from a traditional
centralized top-down sectoral approach (i.e., pre-Rio approach), to an integrated water
resource management (IWRM) paradigm (i.e., post-Rio approach) (González-Villarreal &
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). In
general, this law embraced concepts such as decentralization, stakeholder participation,
collaboration and coordination, water efficiency, polluter pays principle, subsidiarity
principle, and full-cost pricing, as well as the integration of surface and groundwater
management, and the use of the basin as a management unit (Hearne, 2004; Wester et al.,
2009b; Wilder, 2010).
Within this thesis, Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB) is used as a case study.
A major factor that makes the LChB an appropriate case study is the fact that it has been
used by the Mexican government as a ‘testing ground’ for water policy. For example,
IWRM which was originally an international policy prescription was first implemented in
the basin (Wester et al., 2009b). The 1993 Lerma Chapala Basin Council (LChBC) was
also the first multi-stakeholder water governance forum in Mexico and Latin America as a
whole. Tortajada (2006) describes the LChBC as the most advanced River Basin Council
(RBC) in Mexico, though she notes that RBCs were not functional in Mexico by 2006. The
process of transitioning to a multi-stakeholder approach to water governance has been
challenging, evident in the persistence of issues relating to anthropogenic induced water
scarcity, water pollution, and environmental degradation in the basin (Tortajada, 2006;
Wester et al., 2008; Wester et al., 2009b; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Preciado-Jimenez
et al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; Delgado-Galvan et al., 2014). A major goal of
this case study is to apply the developed five-tier framework to further our understanding
of how these persistent challenges have stemmed from issues associated with water
governance and the implementation of an IWRM reform.
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3.2

The physiography of the Lerma-Chapala Basin
The location of Lerma-Chapala basin relative to the rest of Mexico is displayed in

Figure 3.1. The River Lerma is the longest inland watercourse in the country (WMO &
COAGUA, 2011). The basin has a total area of 47,116 km2 (CONAGUA, 2014), which is
equivalent to 2.4% 9 of Mexico’s territory. Its headwaters are located in the State of Mexico
at the Chignahuapan Lagoon (Hidalgo & Peña, 2009) at 2,600 masl, and flows northwesterly for about 708 kilometers until it reaches Lake Chapala (1,510 masl), which is the
largest natural lake in Mexico (CONAGUA, 2014).

Figure 3.1: Geography of the Lerma-Chapala basin
The LChB has a high level of variability with regards to surface water availability.
The basin has a yearly average rainfall of 711.5 mm, with regional variations throughout
the basin (Figure 3.2). Temporally, rainfall is also highly variable, with a minimum average
annual rainfall of 494mm in 1999 and a maximum of 1,022mm in 1958 (CONAGUA, 1999,
in Wester et al., 2000). This variability, coupled with high population density, urban

9

Percentage of area calculated using the total area for Mexico of 1,959,248 km2 provided in Atlas del agua
en Mexico 2014 (CONAGUA, 2014).
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concentration and economic development, has resulted in decreased water quality and
availability. Water scarcity and pollution has generated environmental, economic and
social problems, which have further triggered conflicts in the region (Preciado-Jimenez et
al., 2013). Arguably, the most prominent conflict in the basin pertains to the allocation of
surface water. Water resource vulnerability is projected to increase in the LChB, as climate
change is expected to decrease surface runoff, aquifer recharge rates, and the annual
availability of water (Rivas et al., 2011; Acosta &Martinez, 2014).
Precipitation (mm/year)
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Figure 3.2: Mean annual precipitation in the Lerma-Chapala basin
3.3

A shift in water management paradigms in Mexico: A policy-based perspective
In addition to the physiography, there are policy components that add to the

complexity of water governance in the LChB. The legal framework for governing water
resources in Mexico draws its authority from the Mexican Constitution of 1917, with which
Article 27 legitimizes the State as the sole owner of all land and water resources.
Historically, water management in Mexico focused on building water-related infrastructure
to satisfy sectoral demands, based on a supply-oriented strategy (Garcia, 1999; Wester et
al., 2000; Castelán, 2001; Dourojeanni et al, 2002; Castro, 2006). Between the 1920s and
the 1980s, the federal government supported and aggressive agrarian policy and therefore
developed large-scale irrigation systems through the country, including the LChB (SARH,
1984; CONAGUA, 1993a; Estrada Reyes, 1994; Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Castro,
2006; Santos, 2007; Wester et al., 2009b).
The prevailing paradigm during the 20th century in Mexico was that highly
centralized and powerful federal government agencies were responsible for all water
planning, development and management in the country. In 1926, the National Irrigation
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Commission (NIC) became the first federal institution dedicated to water policy, enabling
the federal government to plan and develop water infrastructure in the country (i.e., large
dams and irrigation networks) from a highly centralized institutional structure (Whiteford
& Melville, 2002; Castro, 2006; Santos, 2007). Then, in 1946, the federal government
replaced NIC with the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (MHR), which became the first
public institution at the level of federal cabinet exclusively dedicated to governing water
resources. The MHR approached governance based on a centralized and technocratic
institutional framework (Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Castro, 2006; Wester, 2009; Wester
et al., 2009c).
In 1976, water functions were subdivided among different government agencies.
On the one hand, MHR merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to create
the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (MAHR). On the other hand, all the
responsibilities associated with drinking water and sanitation services were transferred to
the newly created Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works (MHSPW), and then
moved to the Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (MUDE) in 1983. Several
authors mention that this institutional rearrangement emphasised sectoral differences, and
consequently this separation of water planning, management and development activities
between two federal ministries made coordination efforts difficult (Mestre, 1997;
Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Tortajada, 2005; Tortajada & Contreras-Moreno, 2007).
Several internal and external events led Mexico to change its centralized, sectorand supply-oriented water policy during the 1980s. On one hand, there were the financial
constraints caused by repeated economic crises. On the other hand, a radical transformation
in the conception of the role of the state by international development and financial agencies
was taking place (Castro, 2006). This was, in part, driven by requirements for funding that
were imposed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
resulting in the Mexican State modifying its centralized hierarchical bureaucratic model
with a series of structural changes that included a decentralization process (Rodriguez,
1997; Hamnett, 2006; Buchenau, 2008), and the devolution of power from the centre to
lower levels of government (Rodriguez et al., 2003; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006).
For example, reforms to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution in 1983 permitted the
transfer of responsibilities for drinking water, drainage and sanitation services utilities from
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federal to state and municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995; Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda
Pablos, 2004; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). Consequently, MUDE and other federal
institutions began to open state offices in the mid-1980s, to aid in the transfer of power to
local scale (Rodriguez, 1997 Tortajada, 2005; Tortajada & Contreras-Moreno, 2007;
Hidalgo & Peña, 2009).
Following the above-mentioned events, the National Water Commission (NWC)
was created on January 1989, becoming the sole water authority in the country responsible
for growing water related problems. The economic crises of the 1980s had left the water
sector in a critical state, and by the end of the decade water infrastructure was in a state of
disrepair (Buras, 1996). By the late 1980s, water scarcity, unsuitable water allocation, water
pollution, environmental degradation and a host of other problems worsened. The NWC
was created with a mandate to define a new policy for water resource management and a
new water law to solve water related problems (Johnson, 1997; Mestre, 2001; Pérez Prado,
2003).
The enactment of the National Water Law (NWL) in December 1992 arguably
marked the most significant paradigm shift in Mexico’s water management approach. This
shift was marked by the attempt to move further away from a the traditional top-down
centralized sectoral approach, and into an IWRM approach (González-Villarreal &
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). A
partial explanation for this shift is offered by Wilder (2010), who states that Mexico’s
federal government was under pressure to modernize its water policy framework during the
negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1992. This law
demanded decentralization in the water sector, the adoption of a subsidiarity principle, the
engagement of multiple stakeholders in decision making, the creation of RBCs, the
establishment of collaboration and coordination networks, as well as the integration of
surface and groundwater management, and the use of the basin as a management unit
(Hearne, 2004; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). For example, Article 13 of the NWL
states that the NWC “will establish RBCs as coordination and consensus-building forums
between the NWC, agencies from the federal, state and municipal levels and water users of
a given river basin”. These forums have the “objective of developing and implementing
programs and actions to improve water development, management, and service provision,
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as well as the preservation of related resources [i.e., soils, forests, aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems] in the basin” (DOF, 1992: Article 13). Therefore, the RBCs envisioned in the
1992 NWL are consistent with the definition of IWRM provided by the Global Water
Partnership (2000:22), as follows: IWRM involves “the coordinated development and
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the
sustainability of vital ecosystems”.
Other changes took place in Mexico’s water sector during the 1990s. After the 1994
financial crisis, Mexico needed to comply with ‘good governance’ and IWRM
requirements imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in order to
qualify for funds and work its way out of the crisis (Hamnett, 2006; Wilder & Romero
Lanko, 2006; Wilder, 2010). One of the changes that took place was the transfer of the
NWC from MAHR to the newly created Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources
and Fisheries (MENRF) in 1994. This change transformed the NWC from an agency with
sectoral predisposition that was focused on supplying water for agriculture, to an
intersectoral system that placed emphasis on issues such as water conservation (Wilder,
2010). In essence, changes that took place in Mexico’s water sector during the 1990s
marked a shift from a state-oriented top-down approach to a multilevel, multi-stakeholder
and collaborative approach to water management.
3.4

Water management in the Lerma-Chapala basin
As part of the agrarian policy that was implemented by the Mexican government

between the 1920s and the 1940s, agricultural areas of the LChB increased with the
construction of dams and irrigation districts (Ruiz Briseño, 2005; Santos, 2007; Wester,
2009). As result, irrigated area in the basin increased from 155,000 hectares in the 1930s,
to 214,000 hectares in the 1950s, and 675,000 hectares in the 1980s (Wester et al., 2008).
With regards to drinking water supply, population increased in the basin from 2.1 million
in 1930 to 4.5 million in 1970, resulting in an increase in water demand mainly for
consumption in urban areas (Wester et al., 2005). Water demand in the LChB also increased
by the completion of two major projects that transferred groundwater to Mexico City and
surface water to Guadalajara since the 1950s, even though these two cities are located
outside the basin area (Caire, 2005; Castro, 2006; Wester et al., 2008). Industrial
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development also increased rapidly in the basin in the 1950s and has continued to increase
significantly, making the LChB one of the most important industrial corridors in the
country (Castelan, 2001; Sandoval, 2004). According to Sandoval (2004), water resources
in the LChB had reached equilibrium limits of withdrawal to availability ratio
(m3/person/yr) by the end of the 1970s. Wester, Scott and Burton (2005) mention that by
the mid-1980s, the consumption of surface and groundwater by agriculture, industry and
municipalities was more than was renewably available, thus creating a condition known as
river basin closure. These examples illustrate how the federal government implemented
water demand and use policies in the basin.
By the end of the 1980s, issues associated with the deteriorating quantity and quality
of water resources in the LChB needed be addressed. With regards to quantity, several
authors agree that water resources in the basin were over-committed (Barker et al., 2000;
Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2005; Wester et al., 2008; Hidalgo & Peña, 2009), while
formerly rich aquifers were being over-exploited (Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000;
Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2005). Pertaining to water quality, Mestre, Leon and Martinez
(1994) stated that untreated municipal and industrial wastewater discharges were added to
the existing flow of the River Lerma and its tributaries, and by the end of the 1980s, the
LChB was considered as the most polluted basin in Mexico (Figure 3.3). Pressing problems
such as increasing water demand, water scarcity, groundwater over-exploitation, low water
efficiencies, surface and groundwater pollution, land use change, deforestation, and soil
erosion, still prevail in the basin (Mestre, 1997; Castelan, 2001; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et
al., 2008; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Estrada Godoy et al., 2013; Preciado-Jimenez et
al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; Delgado-Galvan et al., 2014).

Figure 3.3: Surface water pollution levels in the Lerma Chapala Basin
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3.5

Institutional and resource based conflicts
Institutional conflicts and direct resource use conflicts are the two central types of

conflicts that have emerged in the LChB. The main conflict in the LChB exists between the
states of Guanajuato and Jalisco (Figure 3.1) and pertains to the allocation of surface water
resources (specifically surface water from the Solis dam). The first Lake Chapala crisis
revealed that the basin had reached its limits of water availability, as a period of lower than
average rainfall 10 resulted in a prolonged drought (1945-1958) and lake storage levels
declining from an average of 6,429 million of cubic meters (hm3) between 1935 and 1945,
to its lowest recorded level at 945 hm3 in 1955 (Wester, 2009; Wester et al., 2008). Santos
(2007) explains that many people form Jalisco associated low water levels in Lake Chapala
with the inauguration of the Solis dam (the largest in the basin) in 1949. Tensions increased
as Jalisco appealed for the health of the lake ecosystem and Guanajuato defended the
interests of its agricultural users. This ecological/agricultural conflict resurges during times
of drought.
The second Lake Chapala crisis began in 1994, and the NWC responded by
transferring volumes of water from the Solis dam to Lake Chapala. During this crisis, lake
levels dropped critically to the second lowest recorded levels in history in 2002, (Escobar,
2006; Wester et al., 2008). The first transfer of surface water took place in 1999 (200 hm3)
before members from the irrigation districts joined the LChBC. A second transfer was
authorised in 2001 (270 hm3) but this time it was met with resistance from agricultural
water users. Finally, a third transfer took place in 2003 (270 hm3) regardless of strong
opposition from the Board Member for the agricultural use to the LChBC (Wester et al.,
2008). Figure 3.4 shows the volumes of surface water allocated and used in the LChB from
1991 to 2015. Today, the availability and allocation of surface water remains the most
disputed issue in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (LChBC). (See Wester, 2009, Wester
et al., 2007; Wester et al., 2008, and Wester et al., 2009b for further reading). For example,
due to the transfer of vast volumes of water from Lake Chapala to the city of Guadalajara,
conflicts have emerged between individuals living around the lake and those in
Guadalajara.

10

Average rainfall in the Lerma-Chapala basin for the period 1935-1944 was 683 mm, while for 1945-1958
it was 626 mm (from Paula Sandoval, 1994, in Wester, 2009).
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Figure 3.4: Surface water allocated and used (cycles 1991/1992 – 2014/2015)
Another conflict that exists in the LChB is the transfer of groundwater from the
headwaters of the River Lerma in the State of Mexico to the adjacent basin, which is the
Mexico City valley. Since 1950s, approximately 323 hm3 of water was extracted from
underneath the wetlands of the River Lerma annually (Wester et al., 2000; Wester et al.,
2008). Decades of exploitation reflect a steady decline of piezometric levels of 1 to 3.5
m/year, which in turn resulted in the desiccation of three lakes, the loss of aquatic
ecosystems, the drying up of springs, a decrease of river flows, and land subsidence in the
Valley of Toluca (Esteller & Diaz-Delgado, 2002). This conflict involves the federal
government on one hand and the State of Mexico on the other hand. Traditionally, this
ecological/urban conflict has been addressed bilaterally and treated as a localized problem
(Santos, 2007). The overexploitation of groundwater resources at the headwaters of the
River Lerma and the desiccation of these wetlands could have an impact down-river.
However, this problem is seen by Council members as only pertaining the State of Mexico,
and therefore is not discussed in the LChBC.
With regards to institutional conflicts, the best example is between the government
of Guanajuato and the federal government. One of the most urgent water problems in the
LChB is groundwater overdrafting (Wester et al., 2005); nonetheless, the number of
overexploited aquifers in the LChB continues to increase. In 2001, Mestre (2001a) reported
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that almost 70 percent of all 38 aquifers in the LChB had been overexploited, and in 2014,
the NWC reported that 30 aquifers (80 percent) had been overexploited (Figure 3.5)
(CONAGUA, 2014). This problem is more acute in Guanajuato, which represents 49
percent of the basin’s surface area, and has close to 17,000 deep-water wells, with a
significant deficit in groundwater balance estimated at over 1,000 hm3 per year, that reflects
an average of yearly drawdown groundwater level of two to three meters per year (CEAG,
2001a; Sandoval, 2004).

Figure 3.5: Overexploited Aquifers in the Lerma-Chapala Basin
In January 1993, the NWC and the five state governments in the basin signed a
coordination agreement to help cope with water problems in the basin. Among other things,
this document recognised the need to reduce or stop groundwater overexploitation, and
included the development of regulations for aquifers within the LChB (CONAGUA, 1993;
Mestre et al., 1994; Mestre, 1997). In 1995, the state of Guanajuato, aware of the relevance
of water resources for economic development and social well-being, began organizing
water users and creating Technical Water Councils (COTAS), expecting them to play an
active role in the preservation of their aquifers (Castelan, 2000; Guerrero Reynoso, 2000;
Marañon, 2002; Wester et al., 2009a). The NWC created three Technical Groundwater
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Committees 11 in 1998, while Guanajuato created fourteen Technical Water Councils (11
within the LChB) between 1997 and 1999, encompassing the entire territory of the State of
Guanajuato (Guerrero Reynoso, 2000; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et al., 2009). Guanajuato
did this without an active involvement of the NWC, hence, the NWC did not recognize or
support these COTAS. Though they have won recognition by the NWC through the years,
there has been no delegation of responsibilities to manage groundwater (Maganda, 2003;
Wester et al., 2009a). In this sense, Wester, Hoogesteger and Vincent (2009a) indicate that
COTAS in Guanajuato cannot self-regulate and reduce groundwater extractions before
solving the institutional disputes over water control between the state and federal
governments. This institutional conflict limits the level of participation of water users in
reducing groundwater overexploitation, and consequently restricts progress in the
implementation of water governance in the basin.
3.6

Strategies to confront water management problems (1983-1992)
A number of strategies have been implemented by the federal government to

address problems like water scarcity and pollution. These strategies include: (a) legal
reforms that bring together state and municipal (local) governments as stakeholders in
water management, (b) signing collaborative agreements at the basin level; and (c)
structural reforms to decentralize water authority.
One strategy involves a major legal reform, which took place in 1983. Reforms to
Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution permitted the transfer of responsibilities for
drinking water, drainage and sanitation services utilities from the federal level to state or
municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995; Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda Pablos, 2004;
Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). State and municipal governments began to participate
in water management activities, before 1983 the federal government was responsible for
these activities. In Jalisco and Querétaro, urban water services were transferred to the state
governments, while in Guanajuato, the State of Mexico and Michoacán, the transfer was to
municipal governments (Pineda Pablos, 2004). However, various authors point out that this
decentralization process was only partial because there was no transfer of federal funds to
carry out these new municipal responsibilities efficiently, which partly resulted from

11

Regardless of the name difference, authors use the Spanish acronym COTAS indistinctively for both water
user organizations.
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Mexico’s severe economic crises of the 1980s (Ingram et al., 1995; Pineda Pablos, 2004;
Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). This decentralization efforts were strengthened during
the 1990s.
A second strategy was adopted on April 1989, when the NWC introduced a new
approach to dealing with pressing water management issues in the LChB, mainly the high
pollution levels of the River Lerma and the drying up of Lake Chapala (Mestre et al., 1994;
Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000). Before, the federal water authority would act
independently to achieve its goals and objectives. In this new approach, the federal
government joined efforts with all five state governments within the basin and signed a
collaboration agreement to promote a coordinated development of water uses and clean up
the basin. Four main objectives of the agreement were: (a) to develop and establish a new
water allocation policy, (b) to improve water quality and reduce pollution, (c) to improve
water efficiencies, and (d) to preserve the resources and ecosystems of the basin
(CONAGUA, 1991; Mestre et al., 1994; Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000; Castelán, 2001;
Sandoval, 2004). On a practical level, they agreed to build and operate 48 treatment plants
in what is known as the First Wastewater Treatment Stage (Mestre, 1997), which was an
urgent step towards solving conflicts related to water pollution.
By September 1989, the NWC and the five state governments created a Consultative
Council 12 to review and assess the completion of goals and actions relative to the objectives
in the agreement. Some of the main objectives established in the agreement have been
achieved, like the signing of the Agreement on Availability, Distribution and Water Uses
of the LChB in August 1991 and the construction of the 48 wastewater treatment facilities,
while others remain in progress. It is important to highlight that all tasks and activities
associated with the Consultative Council were carried out by the federal and state agencies
(Mestre, 1997). There was no participation from water users or other stakeholders in
decision making, nor in the negotiations that resulted in the 1991 allocation agreement.
A second collaborative agreement was signed by the members of the Consultative
Council on January 1993. This agreement confirmed the intentions of the Council to to
improve water efficiency, and preserve the resources and ecosystems within the basin,

12

With the publication of the 1992 NWL, the Consultative Council was transformed into the Lerma-Chapala
Basin Council in 1993.
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which were established in the first agreement. Finally, it aimed to regulate the use,
exploitation and development of groundwater in the LChB and establish a Second
Wastewater Treatment Stage, which included the construction of 52 wastewater facilities
(CNA 1993; Mestre et al, 1994; Mestre, 1997). Besides confirming the need to improve
sanitary conditions in the basin, this agreement also recognized that more groundwater was
being pumped from the aquifers than was being recharged (CNA, 1993), and provided the
basis for the creation of COTAS.
A third strategy was implemented during the 1990s, in response to the enactment of
with the 1992 NWL and to the federal government’s decentralization policies (Mestre,
1997; Castelán, 2001). Decentralization strategies for the water sector included: (a) the
decentralization of functions and powers from the NWC’s headquarters in Mexico City to
13 Regional Management Offices (Figure 3.6), to ensure that all coordination and
organization issues involving water management could be handled at the river basin scale
(Tortajada; 2006; Scott & Banister, 2008; Wilder, 2010); and (b) the creation of 26 River
Basin Councils (Figure 3.7) in the form of water governance forums, were stakeholders
(e.g., NWC, government officials and water user representatives) could build consensus
and coordinate actions and programs to improve water management practices at the basin
(González-Villarreal & Garduño, 1994; SEMARNAP, 1996; Dourojeanni et al., 2002;
Parrado Diez, 2004; CONAGUA, 2014).

Figure 3.6: Hydro-administrative Regions in Mexico
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These three strategies significantly changed Mexico’s approach to water
management. Between 1983 and 1992 the federal government ceased to be the sole player
in overseeing water related issues in Mexico, as state and municipal authorities, and water
user representatives started assuming these roles. With these three strategies Mexico began
its transition from the traditional authoritarian pre-Rio model to a more flexible one in
which multiple stakeholders were involved in decision making processes. The increase in
stakeholder participation signals an embracement of the post-Rio concept of water
governance.
3.7

Establishing a water governance forum: the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council
As a result of the 1992 National Water Law drawing attention to institutional

structures for water management, the LChBC was created on January 28, 1993. Article 13
of the NWL describes River Basin Councils (displayed in Figure 3.7) as water governance
forums, where stakeholders (i.e., three levels of government and water user representatives)
can defend their interests, discuss their differences, and (where possible) reach agreements
to collaborate and coordinate their activities and projects to improve the development,
management, and preservation of water and associated resources in the basin (DOF, 1992,
2004).

Figure 3.7: River Basin Councils in Mexico
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Though the NWL was enacted in December 1992, there was no official structure
for RBCs until 1994; hence, only government officials participated in RBCs. The first basic
structure for RBCs was provided in Article 15 of the mandatory Regulations of the National
Water Law (RNWL) (DOF, 1994). Article 15 of the RNWL was later amended in 1997,
reducing the rank and number of government representatives while increasing the number
of water user representatives (DOF, 1997). It was not until 1997 that Mexican legislation
allowed water users in the basin to participate in equal numbers as government
representatives in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
An important component of the Council was the establishment of a more detailed
official structure (Figure 3.8) and roles, after the publication of the Basin Council
Organization and Operation Rules (BCOOR) in July 2000. These organizational and
operational rules were aimed at bringing more transparency and clarity to the River Basin
Councils (RBCs). It is important to clarify that the NWC’s hydro-administrative regions
(Figure 3.6) normally cover more than one RBC, and are intended to help resolve conflicts
that arise between RBCs. The main objective of these rules was to regulate the activities
and procedures that govern the organization and operation of RBCs (Article 1-BCOOR).
According to these ‘rules,’ the LChBC has five main objectives:
•

to achieve a balance between supply and demand of water resources throughout the
basin, for all uses;

•

to prevent, stop or rehabilitate pollution on surface and groundwater to achieve
sanitary conditions;

•

to conserve and enhance land and aquatic ecosystems in the basin;

•

to promote sustainable and efficient use of water resources throughout the water
cycle; and,

•

to promote a “water culture” which views water as a vital and scarce resource, with
economic, social and environmental value and encourage public participation to
achieve sustainable water use (CONAGUA, 2000, 2003a).

These main objectives, as with Article 13 of the 1992 NWL are also consistent with the
Global Water Partnership’s (2000) definition of IWRM.
The structure of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council established in the ‘Basin Council
Organization and Operational Rules’ (CONAGUA, 2000) included the participation of
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various stakeholders, including representatives from the main water uses in the basin, as
well as federal, state and municipal governments. The structure of the LChBC (Figure 3.8)
has six main components:

Figure 3.8: Structure of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (2000-2008)
a) The Board of Governors: this is composed of the head of the Director General of the
NWC, the governors of the five states in the basin, and the elected water user
representatives for the six water uses recognised in the basin. In total, there are six
government and six water user representatives with voting rights, thus complying with
the structure established in the mandatory Regulations of the NWL (DOF, 1997).
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b) The Evaluation and Monitoring Group: this represents the Council’s operational
branch, and its role is to track all Council’s agreements and actions, gather data and
information to be used for further agreements, and assist in decision making (Article
22–BCOOR). The group consists of representatives of the state governments, a
representative of the Director General of the NWC, the Technical Secretary of the
Council and the water users’ Board Members (Article 23–BCOOR).
c) Specialized Workgroups: these, are created by the Evaluation and Monitoring Group
with the purpose of carrying out special tasks assigned to them by the group. Council
members are welcome to join these groups (Article 22- BCOOR). There were seven
Specialized Workgroups established in the LChBC in 2008.
d) An Information and Consultation Centre: this centre closed in 2004 (Silva Jimenez,
2005) and had not reopened in 2008.
e) The Water User Representatives’ Assembly: this is where the basin’s water users elect
their representatives to the Board of Governors (Article 48-BCOOR).
f) Auxiliary Organizations: these are smaller administrative units such as Basin
Commissions, Basin Committees and Groundwater Technical Committees (COTAS),
whose work pertains to sub-basins, micro-basins and aquifers, respectively (Figure 3.9).
They are spatial components of RBCs that attempt to bring decision making to the
lowest level of social aggregation by promoting water user participation in order to
preserve water resources and contribute to water planning.

Figure 3.9: Spatial Components of River Basin Councils
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This general structure seems to provide the different stakeholders of the basin with the
opportunity to be engaged in discussions and negotiations involving planning, development
and management of surface and groundwater resources in an integrated manner. As shown
in this section, there are multiple water user representatives for each state in the basin, as
well as the federal and state government representatives involved in the LChBC.
Additionally, stakeholder roles within the basin have evolved over time.
3.8

Auxiliary Organizations: stakeholder engagement at the local level
In 1997, the National Water Commission (NWC) began promoting the organization

of water users in the LChB. By then the State of Guanajuato had already started its own
organizational process (Castelan, 2001; Marañon, 2002; Scott & Banister, 2008). NWC
created three COTAS in 1998, while Guanajuato created eleven COTAS in the LChB
between 1997 and 1999 (Guerrero Reynoso, 2000; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et al., 2009a).
There was no specific mention of COTAS in the 1992 NWL, nor in the 1994 mandatory
Regulations of the NWL or its 1997 amendment. Guanajuato acted independently and
without the involvement of the NWC in the creation of COTAS, which occurred before the
publication of the BCOOR in 2000. Table 3.1 lists all COTAS in the LChB to December
2013. These implementation differences resulted in differences between COTAS in
Guanajuato and those created by the NWC, mainly in their objectives, general structure,
and funding sources. The most important difference, from a water governance perspective,
is variations in the level of participation. On one hand, the NWC expected groundwater
users to participate in water management only for consultation purposes, which implied
that the consideration of opinions and concerns of its members in developing policies and
strategies was discretionary (Castelan, 2000; Marañon, 2002; Wester et al., 2009a). On the
other hand, the State of Guanajuato created opportunities for surface and groundwater users
to participate in water management activities to regulate water use, preserve their aquifer
and use water resources efficiently (Castelan, 2000; Marañon, 2002; Sandoval, 2004:
Wester et al., 2009a). Scott and Banes (2008), and Wester, Mollard, Silva-Ochoa, and
Vargas-Velazquez (2009b) describe COTAS as playing a nascent role in the basin council
and having a minimal impact in reducing groundwater extractions.
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Table 3.1: COTAS in the Lerma Chapala Basin (2013)
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Name
COTAS Celaya
COTAS Laguna Seca
COTAS León
COTAS Silao-Romita
COTAS Irapuato-Valle de Santiago
COTAS Pénjamo-Abasolo
COTAS Salvatierra-La Cuevita
COTAS Río Turbio
COTAS Acámbaro-Cuitzeo
COTAS Moroleón-Ciénega Prieta
COTAS Río Laja
COTAS Valle de Querétaro
COTAS Amazcala
COTAS Huimilpan
COTAS Valle de Toluca

State

Guanajuato

Queretaro
State of Mexico

Date of establishment
November 28, 1997
November 28, 1997
October 1st 1999
October 1st 1999
November 6, 1998
November 6, 1998
January 7, 1999
June 1st, 1999
August 24, 1999
August 31, 1999
October 1st 1999
February 20, 1998
September 25, 1998
December 10, 1998
July 30, 2003

Source: CONAGUA, 2014.

3.9

The Water User Representative Assembly: the election of water user
representatives
Because stakeholder engagement in a water governance process is described in the

literature as representative participation, it is important to explain the election process in
the LChBC. According to the Organization and Operation Rules, the election of water user
representatives occurs in the Water User Representative Assembly, which is part of the
structure of the LChBC (see Figure 3.10 for the full structure). This forum is where water
users (at the regional, sub-regional, state and/or aquifer level) come together to elect their
representatives to the RBC’s Board of Governors (articles 5 and 48 - BCOOR). But, the
rules lack clarity and do not do not explicitly tease out how individuals are appointed to the
assembly of representatives or explain their respective responsibilities. They also fail to
specify how to incorporate the RBC’s Auxiliary Organizations (Figure 3.8) in to the
election process. The assembly is also supposed to enable water users come together to be
informed about topics discussed in the basin council, and/or to present their views on topics
discussed in the RBC (Article 49 - BCOOR). Figure 3.10 outlines the structure of the
Assembly.

62

Figure 3.10: Water User Representative Assembly
3.10 Conclusion
As demonstrated in this section of the thesis, water governance in the LChB is
highly complex. There are multiple stakeholders involved at multiple scales, attempting to
address multiple problems while defending their rights and interests in water resources.
These complexities have together resulted in an abstraction of common problems and
solutions. There are technical plans and programs in place, as well as laws, policies and
institutional structures to address water management problems in the basin, however, these
policies are not always reflected in practice. Technical and legal solutions are important,
but it is also essential to consider social components in water governance. For example,
shifts in water management paradigms may encounter formal and informal structures that
support or constrain the implementation of a viable water governance system. It is
important to assess how the water governance system reacts to this type of changes. To
address these complexities, the assessment framework proposed in this thesis is used to
assess the formal and informal aspects of water governance in the LChB. It is anticipated
that this water governance assessment framework would provide opportunities for
monitoring progress and identifying opportunities to improve the state of water governance.
Consequently, this could help enhance the effectiveness of the IWRM process in the LChB.
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Chapter Four
4
4.1

Methodology
Research procedure
This chapter discusses the data sources and analytical procedures that were used in

the current study. The research started by creating a refined water governance assessment
criteria. This was achieved by consolidating disparate water governance principles in the
literature into five meta-principles (see Chapter 2). These principles were then used to
conduct a content analysis of relevant water policy documents with the aim of assessing
the nature and extent to which the Mexican government employed key water governance
principles between 1972 and 2008. Finally, the LChB was used as case study to determine
the degree to which water governance principles laid out in various policies and plans have
been successfully implemented on the ground. Three data sources used in this study
included water policy documents and interviews with diverse stakeholders in the LChB.
The next section details the content analysis protocol and the utilization of NVivo software
for the analysis.
4.2

Content analysis protocol
Content analysis was used in the analysis of documents and interviews because it

allows for effective data reduction through well-structured and consistent coding of
multiple themes into fewer content categories (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Graneheim &
Lundman, 2004; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Bryman, Bell & Teevan, 2012; Krippendorff,
2013). This was particularly useful because of the vast amounts of data analysed (i.e., 18
official water documents and 51 interviews). As well, it made it possible to compare the
discussion of various water governance themes in the documents and interviews. The
textual data included three water laws and six water policy documents enacted between
1972 and 2008. Further detail on textual data is provided in Section 4.4.1. Interviewees
include individuals from agencies at all levels of government directly and indirectly
involved in the LChBC as well as water user representatives to the basin council. Finally,
it was deemed important to include voices from three federal ministry’s headquarters in the
sample because of Mexico’s centralized approach to water management before 1992.
The study of water governance is complex and multifaceted, involving the
perspective of multiple stakeholders with varying interests. Hence, similar to the current
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study, multiple researchers (Drieschova et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008; Atuyambe et
al., 2011; Dewulf et al., 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Knüppe, 2011; Khalid et al., 2012;
Lukasiewicz et al., 2013; Tambudzai et al., 2013; Gillet et al., 2014; Gruszczynski &
Michaels, 2014; Nerkar et al., 2016; Vedachalam et al., 2016) have applied the
methodology to gain a coherent understanding of water governance in different contexts.
An additional benefit of the methodology lies in its ability to help researchers gain valid,
reliable and replicable insights (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2013).
Content analysis pays attention to two major clusters of text: (1) manifest content,
which refers to the visible characteristics of texts (e.g., word frequencies, paragraph
lengths) and (2) latent content, which refers to the contextual meaning embedded in texts
(Krippendorff, 2013). This study is based on the notion that manifest and latent contents
are part of a continuum that work together to construct meanings (Holsti, 1969; Weber,
1990; Gray, & Densten, 1998; Berg, 2001; Sandelowski, 2001; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009;
Krippendorff, 2013). Consequently, both characteristics of the texts were analyzed.
Specifically, the latent content analysis was used to interpret the meanings behind texts, for
example, the context within which various water governance themes were discussed in the
documents and interviews. The manifest content analysis on the other hand involved an
assessment of the physical features of the text to understand variations in the level of
attention given to various water governance principles within documents and interviews
(e.g., the prominence of different themes that were discussed in documents). The analysis
of both manifest and latent content made it possible to assess the existence of various water
governance principles (i.e., within policy documents), and understand how these principles
played out on the ground through testimonies of 51 key informants.
As has been acknowledged by many previous researchers, counting remains a very
controversial topic in qualitative research (Giacomini et al., 2000; Hannah & Lautsch,
2011; Kuhn, 2012). Nonetheless, counting qualitative data is generally viewed as useful for
identifying important patterns in the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In the words of Seale
and Kelly (2004:317), “counting in qualitative research can help in reassuring the reader
that the researcher has not simply trawled through a mass of data and selected anecdotes to
report that support his or her particular bias”. In the case of this thesis, it was important to
compare dominant perspectives among diverse water stakeholders to those contained in
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policies and other official documents. Hence, the number of instances in which various
issues recurred in documents and interviews were registered to help record and visualize
these trends, consequently making it possible to tease out disconnects among stakeholders
and their experiences with prevailing policy conditions.
All the data were imported into a qualitative data analysis software suit (NVivo 9)
for analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994) define codes as labels to assign meaning to
clusters of information of different sizes (i.e., phrases, sentences or paragraphs), which are
used to organize, retrieve, categorize, and draw conclusions from the data. As such, the
data was coded under the five principles. The use of NVivo facilitated “solid analytical
observations and kept a clear trail of the data and the outcomes” (Chow, 2016:3); hence,
enhanced the overall reliability of the analysis. The consistency of the coding structure
within the software also made it possible to compare key emergent themes within and
between documents and interviews (see QSR International, 2010). To enhance reliability,
the codebook was discussed and refined with a fellow PhD student to ensure clarity.
Satisfying the content analysis requirement of replicability requires an in-depth
documentation of the data analysis procedures (Krippendorff, 2013). Hence, details of the
analytical protocols that were used for policy documents and interviews are presented in
the next section.
4.3

Analytical structure
The water governance framework developed in the study was used as the analytical

structure for both documents and interviews. The purpose of the analysis was twofold: (1)
to assess the implementation of various water governance principles in the LChB through
the application of the developed framework (see Chapter 2 for framework); and (2) to test
the efficacy of the developed framework. Figure 4.1 provides a conceptual summary of the
protocol that guided the coding process. It highlights the main data sources, the structure
of the data analysis (coding) and the outcomes that were derived from the analysis. Content
analysis requires that an analytical codebook be formulated to guide the analysis. The
codebook provides rules which govern what and how data is coded (see Appendix III).
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Figure 4.1: Thematic structure for coding documents and interviews
A summary of the coding protocol is provided in Figure 4.1. For parcels of
documents and interviews to be coded, they had to adhere to one of the five water
governance principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation, Coherence, Knowledge, and
Integration) in a pre-Rio or a post-Rio context. Principles were considered as pre-Rio
context if they adhered to a technocratic state-oriented top-down approach, while they were
considered as occurring in a post-Rio context if they adhered to a more flexible multistakeholder approach. These aforementioned thematic structures were applied in a
deductive coding process, since they had strict definitions outlined in Chapter 2. However,
matches between data and definitions did not have to be literal to be coded. In the context
of participation for example, post-Rio based occurrences included themes such as
participation in multilateral decision-making forums, and multiple stakeholder engagement
among others. The inductive coding process therefore resulted in the emergence of a broad
range of themes under each water governance principle. Finally, the inductive codes were
reduced into a few and more comprehensive categories through a code revising process
which ensured that similar themes were lumped further together (Miles & Huberman,
1994); hence, making the process of summarizing the results more effectively.
4.4

Data sources
The data for the case study of water governance in the LChB came from various

sources. The Technical Committee of the Global Water Partnership suggests that when
analysing water governance systems, it is important to understand its three primary
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functions: constitutional, organizational and operational (Rogers & Hall, 2003). These
primary functions cover diverse issues that include but are not limited to policy, legislation,
institutional and organizational structures, and implementation mechanisms and processes
for water development and management. These functions have also been discussed in the
institutional arrangements literature (Mitchell, 1975, 1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young,
2002; Lamoree & Harlin, 2002).
Constitutional (regulatory) functions create an enabling environment within which
the other two functions can operate, by developing policies, laws, norms and regulations,
and disclosing them publicly; thus, establishing clear goals and rules that safeguard against
arbitrary governance. It includes both statutory (formal) and customary (informal) laws that
legitimize exercising authority according to established procedures (after Mitchell, 1975,
1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003).
Organizational (actor/stakeholder) functions establish clear demarcation of
responsibilities. These include checks and balances, and the division of power through
clearly established roles that separate administration, regulation, enforcement and service
provision functions, filling jurisdictional gaps and eliminating overlaps, and matching
responsibilities to authority and to capacities for action (after Mitchell, 1975, 1989; Watson
et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003).
Operational (implementation) functions pertain to processes used to carry out water
management activities efficiently. It includes practical water management instruments such
as information dissemination and awareness campaigns, but also those that fulfill specific
needs such as service provision, enforcement, monitoring, data collection, and other
activities established by the constitutional and organizational functions (after Mitchell,
1975, 1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003).
Data sources were selected for the current study with these functions in mind. Water
laws and policies, as well as institutional structure documents for the water sector are used
in this dissertation for the collection of data concerning the constitutional and
organizational functions of water governance. Face-to-face semi-structured interviews
with key informants provided data pertaining to the implementation of the operational
functions. It is important to note that research was conducted in series, and interview guides
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were developed based on themes that emerged from document analysis. The next sections
detail the nature of these data sources, their retrieval, and analysis protocols.
4.4.1

Document data and analysis
The specific documents which were analysed were grouped into three sets: (1) water

laws, (2) Internal Regulations 13 (institutional structures), and (3) water policy documents 14.
These document groupings made it possible to compare water governance principles among
documents and understand major landmark events in the evolution of water governance in
Mexico. Documents published between 1972 and the year of the study (2008) were
retrieved and used in the analysis. This represented a total of 18 documents spanning 2,011
pages. A summary of all the documents which were analysed is provided in Table 4.1.
Water policy documents are the cornerstone of water resource planning in Mexico;
consequently, all accessible water policy documents at the time of the research were
included in the sample in order to analyse the evolution of water management narratives in
Mexico. The 1972 Federal Water Law (FWL) was the earliest accessible document at the
time of research, and is the law that preceded the shift from a pre-Rio to a post-Rio approach
to water management.

13

Internal Regulations documents (Reglamento Interno) are published in the Official Daily Paper of the
Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación) where the official structure of an institution is made public. This
documents also outline the duties and responsibilities of all major areas within the agency. From here onwards
will be referred to as “institutional structure documents”.
14
There is no consistency for naming these documents, because the different presidential administrations
change the name from “National Hydraulic Plan” to “National Hydraulic Program” or simply “Hydraulic
Program.” For that reason all these documents are referred to as “water policy documents”.
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Table 4.1: List of official documents analyzed
Type of
document

Governance
Function

Paradigm
Shift
(1992)
Before

Legislation

After

Constitutional

Before

Policy
After

Before

Institutional
structured
documents

Organizational

After

Number of Pages
Title

Original
Document

Text
Only*

Federal Water Law (1972)

29

44

National Water Law (1992)

23

49

National Water Law (2004 Reforms)

69

122

National Hydraulic Plan 1975

582

244

National Hydraulic Plan 1981

139

82

National Water Program 1984

256

103

Hydraulic Program 1995-2000

54

69

National Hydraulic Program 2001-2006

128

165

National Hydraulic Program 2007-2012

163

103

Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1977)

49

22

Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works
(MHSPW), Internal Regulations (1977)

39

34

Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology
(MUDE), Internal Regulations (1983)

38

24

Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1985)

48

38

Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1989)

38

19

43

24

48

28

82

40

183

83

Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1993)
Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources
and Fisheries (MENRF), Internal Regulations
(1996)
Ministry of the Environment and Natural
Resources (MENR), Internal Regulations (2001)
Ministry of the Environment and Natural
Resources (MENR), Internal Regulations (2006)

Total number of pages
2,011
1,293
* The original documents have different font, size, line spacing, margins, etc.; consequently, for standardization purposes
all documents were edited in Word from Microsoft Office 2007 considering only text with Times New Roman 12" font,
1.5 line spacing, Normal Margin, and no spacing between paragraphs. Policy documents and water laws only include
text, and for the institutional structure documents, only the administrative and operative areas included in the study were
considered.

Both manifest and latent content of the policy documents were analyzed. To enable
analysis in NVivo, older documents in hard copy format were digitized, after which all
documents were imported into the software for analysis. The analysis involved capturing
varying levels of attention given to different aspects of water governance. This helped
assess the dominance of pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts with which the five water
governance principles that were developed occurred. The analysis involved reading all
documents and coding them under their respective orientations (i.e., pre-Rio context or
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post-Rio context) and principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation, Coherence, Knowledge,
and Integration). The analytical structure applied for both text and interview data is
summarized in Figure 4.2. It depicts the deductive portion for coding data, which includes
first and second tier nodes (see Figure 4.1). After coding all texts under their respective
orientations and principles, NVivo automatically generated the percentages of texts in each
document that were coded under each of the coding categories. Frequencies and
percentages of text coverage are useful for assessing the relative level of attention given to
various themes and topics (e.g., see Millar & Budgell, 2008). In the current study, these
percentages and frequencies of coverage were used to assess the level of attention given to
the five principles in a pre- or post-Rio contexts.

Figure 4.2: Coding structure for documents and interviews
4.4.2

Interview data and analysis
Based on major themes that emerged from document analysis, interview guides

were developed, after which interviews were conducted with key local and national
stakeholders whose activities pertained to the LChB. This presented an opportunity to
assess water governance within the context of the basin and test the water governance
assessment framework which was developed in this thesis on the ground. The interview
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process also provided insights on the extent to which existing water governances policies
were being successfully applied on the ground. Thus, the study was able to identify key
policy/practice disconnects.
Out of 58 potential participants who were contacted, a total of 51 key informants
participated in interviews, representing a response rate of over 80%. Key informants were
selected among government officials, water user representatives within all states in the
LChB and federal government representatives from headquarters in Mexico City. Details
of these participants are contained in Table 4.2. Semi-structured interviews were used to
enable the comparison of perspectives within and across stakeholder groups and provide
opportunities for the emergence of individual stories (Schensul et al., 1999).
Table 4.2: Informants from the Lerma-Chapala basin and
from federal ministries’ headquarters
State
• State of
Mexico
• Queretaro
• Guanajuato
• Michoacán
• Jalisco

Federal Government
• National Water
Commission *
• Ministry of the
Environment and
Natural Resources *

• National Water
Commission
• Ministry of the
Environment and
Mexico City
Natural Resources
(headquarters) • Ministry of
Agriculture,
Livestock, Rural
Development,
Fisheries and Food
Total Interviews

#

10

State Government
• State Water
Commission
• Ministry of
Agriculture
• Ministry of the
Environment and
Sustainable
Development

#

Water users
Agriculture
Livestock
Industrial
Drinking
water and
sanitation
• Other
Services
• Aquaculture

#

Total

23

48

•
•
•
•
15

3

0

0

3

13

15

23

51

* Local Office of the federal agency in each state in the Lerma-Chapala basin.

The subset of key informants made it possible to capture a wide range of voices
which were both directly and indirectly associated to IWRM related activities and the
LChBC. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants engaged in the LChB in
different capacities (Patton, 1990; Guarte & Barrios, 2006), which included: (1) federal or
state government representative engaged in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council, (2) water
user representatives from all states, and (3) state level liaisons for various institutions
indirectly engaged with the Council, for example, ecology and environmental ministries.
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted using an interview guide on topics
related to the five water governance principles developed in this thesis. Specific topic
emerged from the document analysis, and are summarized in ten major thematic areas in
Table 4.3. In-depth interviews helped diagnose problems, identify alternatives, and capture
stakeholders’ suggestions for better water governance in the LChB (Paneque Salgado et
al., 2009).
Table 4.3: Interview topics and associated water governance principles
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)
(8)

Topics
The role played by all three levels of government and water users in
governance forums and networks.
The type of issues and concerns brought forward and discussed within
the LChBC.
Stakeholders’ role the LChBC, their engagement in decision making,
and in the execution of agreements.
The role of the LChBC in the application of an integrated water
resources management process.
The degree of cooperation and coordination among institutions,
organizations and water users in the implementation of policies, plans
and programs.
The capacities of the LChBC and of its members (where applicable)
with regards to human resources, professional profiles, equipment,
funding, training, and information flow and availability.
Limitations and opportunities to establish an effective water governance
system in the LChB
Changes they would like to see to improve water governance systems in
the LChBC.

Associated Principles
Coherence, Rule of law
Participation, Knowledge
Participation, Coherence
Integration, Participation,
Coherence
Coherence, Integration

Coherence, Knowledge
All five principles
All five principles

Face-to-face interviews were conducted between July and October of 2008. While
the shortest interview lasted 32 minutes, the longest interview lasted 3 hours and 19
minutes. The average duration of each interview was 99 minutes. All interviews were
recorded in digital format. Interviews were imported into NVivo 9 for analysis in audio
format. NVivo 9 allows the researcher to code audio files be capturing and saving key
parcels of the files. The software also documents the ‘time span’ for each and all coded
excerpts and provides a column for transcribing or making notes that pertain to the coded
parcels of audio. A major advantage of audio coding and analysis is that it keeps the
researcher close to the original data, as it preserves features that are lost in transcription
(i.e., tone of voice, silences, utterances, intonation, shifts in emphasis, levels of interests),
hence helping the researcher contextualize the data more clearly (Gibson et al., 2005;
Wainwright & Russell, 2010). Since interviews were conducted in Spanish and the research
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was produced in English, only audio aspects of the interview that were coded and
transcribed were translated. Language translation aspects are further addressed in Section
4.5. Similar to the document analysis, the interviews were coded based on the content
analysis structure provided in Figure 4.1.
After interviews were coded under the principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation,
Coherence, Knowledge and Integration) and contexts (i.e., pre-Rio / post-Rio) they
reflected that interviewees often focused on certain dominant principles even when
questions concerned other principles. For example, issues around water pollution or the
allocation of water resources, water users tend to complain about a feeble participatory
water governance structure and the failure of their representatives to defend their interests.
To get a sense of the major issues of concern to interviewees, the number of instances in
which various principles were repeated (in the pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts) were
quantified. Bernard (2003:101) contends that “looking for repetitions and similarities”
within qualitative data constitutes a useful way of discovering dominant themes. In the case
of this study, repetitions were used to identify commonly recurring themes, under the five
principles and contexts that were discussed by interviewees as having implications for
water governance.
The final analysis that was conducted in the study involved comparing outcomes
from the interviews to the contents of the official documents that were enforced at the time
of the study. These documents included the 2004 National Water Law, the 2006 Internal
Regulations of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, and the 2007-2012
National Hydraulic Program. The purpose of this comparison was to assess the extent to
which existing policies were being implemented in practice. This analysis also provided
insights on various constraints and achievements in water governance within the LChB.
By applying the same codebook to the interviews and documents, it was possible to
identify similarities and differences between both data sources though content analysis.
This comparison made it possible to compare theory (i.e., water governance policies) to
practice (i.e., the state of water governance as experienced by stakeholder on the ground).
All documents and interviews that were used for this study were obtained in
Spanish. The researcher conducted the analysis in Spanish for as long as possible because
original narratives could be altered and even lost in translation. The decision to conduct the
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analysis in Spanish was also motivated by time constraints. For example, documents
spanned over 2,000 pages, while total length of interviews was over 80 hours long. It was
therefore not time efficient to translate these contents to English prior to analysis. Since the
thesis was written in English, only direct quotes which were drawn from interviews and
documents were translated. This is in agreement with Van Nes, Abma, Jonsson and Deeg
(2010) who recommend that researchers remain in the original language for as long and as
much as possible in order to avoid potential limitations such as loosing meanings in the
analysis.
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Chapter Five
5

Results and Analysis
This chapter focuses on reporting quantitative trends that emerged from the data

analysis that was conducted to account for dominant themes within documents and
interviews. This serves as a first step to understanding the aspects of water governance that
were most prominent within Mexico’s water policy documents and the interviews that were
conducted with stakeholders in the Lerma-Chapala basin. Because wide range of themes
that emerged under the five proposed water governance principles, the quantification of
emerging themes within interviews and policy documents made it possible to tease out
dominant commonalities and differences. In addition to discussing these trends, the current
chapter provides brief highlights of the key contexts within which various themes were
discussed. Chapter 6 provides more depth by focusing on the nature and characteristics of
the issues that emerged in the document analysis and interviews, after which documents
and interviews are compared to understand the extent to which water governance policies
translate into practice.
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section presents
descriptive trends of the amount of coverage that was given to various principles within
policy documents (N=18), after which it briefly discusses the context of these themes. The
second section provides trends on the frequency with which various themes emerged in the
interviews (N=51) and briefly highlights key aspects of these themes. The third section
compares the two aforementioned sets of results to understand the extent to which various
water related polices are reflected in practice. In terms of the results presented here, the
pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts are used to denote compliance and non-compliance to the
five proposed water governance principles (i.e., Participation, Coherence, Rule of law,
Knowledge, Integration) respectively.
5.1

Longitudinal study: patterns in the occurrence of water governance principles
in official documents through time (1972-1992 and 1993-2008)
The results presented in this section were generated by applying the proposed water

governance assessment framework in a content analysis of the official documents. Eighteen
documents which were used for the analysis were grouped into three sets based on their
orientation (i.e., type, purpose and format) of their content: (a) water laws, (b) institutional
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structure documents, and (c) water policy documents. These groupings made it possible to
compare water governance principles among documents and trace the temporal evolution
of water governance in Mexico. Figure 5.1 presents relative percentages of text coverage
in a pre-Rio context (below the axis), and the post-Rio context (above the axis) within each
three types of documents. The vertical dashed line in the middle indicates the shift in water
management paradigms, which occurred in 1992. Based on Mexico’s traditionally
authoritarian approach to water management, I hypothesize that topics associated with the
pre-Rio context will be predominant before 1992 relative to the presence of topics
pertaining to the post-Rio context. Post-Rio context elements are expected to increase
through time, especially after 1992, while pre-Rio context themes are expected to decrease
after 1992.
Results illustrate the context in which Mexico’s water management governing
systems have transitioned between 1972 and 2008. Findings in Figure 5.1, show that, to
various degrees, all five water governance principles are present in almost all official
documents both in a pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts through the entire period (see Appendix
V). Participation is the only principle missing in four institutional structure documents.
Findings also show that before 1996 there were no provisions made within institutional
structures to ensure that the participation of water users was implemented on the ground.
In compliance with the definition provided for the Participation principle in this study, the
1992 National Water Law makes reference to promoting inclusive stakeholder
participation in water related decision making, as demonstrated by Article 14 as follows:
The [National Water] Commission will accredit, promote and support the organization of
[water] users to improve water resource use and the preservation and control of its quality,
and to encourage the participation of water users at state, regional or basin levels, under
the terms of this law and its regulations (DOF, 1992)

Therefore, findings suggests a failure by the federal government to build a foundation for
inclusive water user participation between October 1993 15 and July 1996 16. This finding
also suggest that changes in the structure of the NWC took place after the financial crisis
of 1994, when the Mexican State had to comply with the ‘good governance’ and IWRM
15

After the enactment of the 1992 National Water Law, the Internal Regulations of the Ministry of Agriculture
and Hydraulic Resources were first amended on October 29, 1993.
16
The National Water Commission was transferred from MAHR to the newly created Ministry of the
Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries on December 1994, but the structure of the MENRF was not
published until July 8, 1996.
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requirements imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, to qualify for funds. Thus, the first
evidence of an institutional structure for facilitating this engagement occurred with the
creation of the ‘Unit for Rural Programs and Public Participation’ (URPPP) in 1996. This
area within the NWC was responsible for organizing water users and ensuring their
participation in water related decision (SEMARNAP, 1996a). The Coordination of River
Basin Councils (CRBCs) was then established in 1997 as an area subordinate to URPPP.
The actions of the URPPP within the structure of the NWC comply with the definition of
Participation, since this area became responsible for promoting inclusive stakeholder
participation in water related decision making. This convergence between text and the
definitions for the five principles proposed in this thesis is demonstrated in Figure 5.1.b,
since the creation of URPPP is registered in the results for the 1996 MENRF institutional
structure under Participation in a post-Rio context (Appendix V, Table 3).
Torregosa (2004) confirms this major change in the structure of the NWC with the
creation of the CRBCs, which was to support the development of RBCs and strengthen
them. This new structure that supports water user participation, marked a change in pace in
the consolidation of RBCs in Mexico. Ripples of this new structure that have been
acknowledged in the literature include the promotion of water user organizations in 1997
(Castelán, 2001a) and the creation of three COTAS in the LChB in 1998 (Guerrero
Reynoso, 2000) (see Section 3.8). Furthermore, Article 15 of the mandatory Regulations of
the National Water Law (RNWL) was amended in 1997, allowing water users to participate
in equal numbers as government representatives in the LChBC, and in other RBCs (DOF,
1997). Finally, before the creation of CRBCs in 1997, only two RBCs had been created in
Mexico (i.e., the LChBC in 1993, and the Valley of Mexico Basin Council in 1995), which
is a sharp contrast to the twenty three RBCs which were established between December
1998 and September 2000 (CONAGUA, 2011) 17. These changes demonstrate Mexico’s
commitment to transition from a traditional state-centred top-down model to a more
inclusive water governance-based approach.

17

The last RBC (Central Pacific Coast) was installed on February 25, 2009 (CONAGUA, 2011).
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of the Transition in Water Governance Principles in Official
Documents
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The frequency with which the three types of documents mentioned themes related
to the different water governance principles show that on average, all five principles were
discussed predominantly in a post-Rio contexts. These findings were surprising because of
the traditionally sectoral, centralized and authoritarian (pre-Rio) approach to water
management in Mexico. Results also reveal that all three types of documents exhibit an
increasing pattern of occurrences in a post-Rio contexts, which was an expected pattern.
The lowest levels of these occurrences were registered during the 1970s, while the highest
levels occurring in the first decade of the 21st century. However, unexpectedly, the 20072012 NHP showed a decrease in the prominence of water governance themes. When
reviewing this document, an increase in topics associated with climate change (when
compared with previous policy documents) was noticed. This increase in the discussion on
climate change could explain the drop in the percentage of text coverage associated with
water governance themes, since climate change was at the forefront of policy and planning
during this period. However, the topic of climate change is not a major focus of this thesis.
The outcomes of the content analysis indeed reveal that in theory, drastic changes
occurred in various water-related documents between 1972 and 2008, evident in the
increase adoption of water governance principles that were geared towards creating an
IWRM process.
As expected, water laws (Figure 5.1a) and water policy documents (Figure 5.1c)
display a marked increase in the percentage of text coverage in the context of the five water
governance principles after 1992. Unique to institutional structure documents (Figure
5.1b), results showed an unexpected, steady (instead of a noticeable) increase in the amount
of text devoted to discussing the five water governance principles in a post-Rio context
from 1977 to 2006. Nonetheless, the general trend suggests a progressive pattern in the
adoption of water governance rhetoric in official documents. Literature indicates that
Mexico followed a centralized top-down approach until 1983, when it began transferring
authority and responsibility to state and municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995;
Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda Pablos, 2004; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). Hence, the
‘collaboration’ of the three levels of government and the ‘coordination’ of their effort is a
theme that became part of the government rhetoric after 1983, as illustrated in the following
statement:
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The 1984 National Water Program considers the coordination of the Ministry [of
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources - MAHR] with states and municipalities, because
the [present] diversification of projects require the collaboration and participation of state
and municipal governments, as well as the intervention of other federal institutions whose
roles are related to projects associated with improving the use of water resources (SARH,
1984:189).

After 1992, results show an increase in the discussion of themes associated with the five
water governance principles proposed in this thesis, as illustrated by the increase in the
percentage of text coverage in a post-Rio context (Figure 5.1). For example, the previous
quote only includes ‘collaboration and coordination’ activities among government agencies
at all levels, but after 1992 themes like ‘collaboration and coordination’ expanded to
include the activities of water users and other stakeholders, suggesting compliance to the
participation principle. This is captured in the following quote:
Article 5: For the implementation and application of the National Water Law, the Federal
Government will promote the coordination of activities with state and municipal
governments, without infringing their authority and within the range of their respective
responsibilities, and will encourage the participation of water users and private
individuals in the development and management of hydraulic public works and services”
(DOF, 1992).

This quote also provides evidence that demonstrates the utility of the water
governance principles proposed in this thesis, and their occurrence in official texts. For
example, Article 5 of the 1992 NWL (quoted above) makes reference to the Federal
Government promoting the coordination of activities with various stakeholders in the
development and management of water services. This example aligns with the Coherence
principle which implies the facilitation of well-coordinated actions and stakeholder
collaborations at all scales. Furthermore, Article 5 makes reference to the participation of
multiple stakeholders (i.e., governments at federal, state, and municipal levels, as well as
water users and private individuals) in the development and management of water
resources, which complies with the definition of Participation which involves inclusive
multi-stakeholder engagement in water related decision making. These evidence, in part,
demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed framework as an assessment tool.
Emerging trends in the three types of documents together suggest that, by 2008,
Mexico had likely established an enabling environment that could have allowed for the
implementation of a viable water governance system. Several authors have noted that
IWRM was embraced in Mexican water policy in 1992 (González-Villarreal & Garduño,
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1994; Mestre, 1997, 2001; Castelán, 2001; Dourojeanni, 2001; Pérez Prado, 2003; Wester
et al., 2003; Castro, 2006), which from the perspective of the present study, explains the
increase in the usage of water governance terminology in official water documents.
The percentage of text coverage pertaining to the five water governance principles
in a pre-Rio context varied across the three sets of documents. This was expected, because
differences on the orientation (i.e., type, purpose and format) of each document. Water laws
are the only group of documents that show a decreasing trend of occurrence with the highest
levels registered in the 1970s, and the lowest values appearing in the first decade of the 21st
century. However, institutional structure documents and water policies do not follow a clear
increasing or decreasing patterns in the usage of pre-Rio terminology. This trend was to an
extent expected, since the literature indicates that Mexico was transitioning from a
centralized state-centred top-down approach to water management associated with the pre1992 period to a more flexible multilevel and multi-stakeholder approach implied in the
concept of water governance after 1992. Hence, official documents prior to 1992 contain
control-command characteristics, as well as strategies involving a regional development
approach, with sectoral and economic tendencies, and supply management inclinations
(Table 1.1), which are characteristic of the water management strategy applied in Mexico
before 1992. This strategies are illustrated in the following quote from the 1981 National
Hydraulic Program:
Water has been a key factor in Mexico's economic development and will continue to play
a vital role supporting economic activities and improving the lives of the population,
which are also objectives established in the [National] Global Development Plan. The
quantification of water demand at national and regional levels is based, on the one hand,
on the evolution of water use and on technical projects on coefficients of water use
volumes, and on the other, on the goals established in the [National] Global Development
Plan and in sectoral plans and programs, such as the Mexican Food System, the National
Agricultural and Forestry Program, the National Urban Development Plan, the National
Industrial Development Plan, the National Energy Plan, and the National Plan for the
Development of Fisheries (SARH, 1983:44).

The strategies cited in this passage do not comply with the operational definitions
provided for several water governance principles proposed in the present study. For
example, these strategies mentioned suggest a fractured and sectoral approach (captured in
a pre-Rio context) to water management, that do not comply with the ideals of facilitating
well-coordinated actions and stakeholder collaboration and all scales captured under the
definition of Coherence provided in this dissertation. Furthermore, this passage does not
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comply (in a pre-Rio context) with the definition of Integration, since it does not
demonstrate the application of an intersectoral approach that uses the basin as the planning
and management unit. Additionally, it does not appear to be rooted in local context, and
does not seem to be effective for promoting the long-term sustainability of water resources.
This disparity between the operational definitions provided for the water governance
principles provides further evidence of the usefulness of the assessment framework
proposed in this research.
As Mestre (2001), has explained Mexico’s approach to water management after
1992 shifted towards the sustainable management of water resources, thus considering
equally the economic, social and environmental elements of development, thus replacing
the traditional focus on economic development. Among other changes, he suggests that
Mexico adopted a demand management approach to water management, which replaced
the traditional supply management approach.
The analysis also reveals that the adoption of different water management
paradigms were not absolute. For example, there were transitional periods where old and
the new water management paradigms overlapped within the documents; hence, some
characteristics of the old traditional ways can be observed after the adoption of new
policies. This was especially evident in the existence of texts in a pre-Rio context within
post-1992 documents. It is also worth noting the pre-Rio context was generally lower in
prominence across all document types prior to 1992, something that was not expected.
However, in general terms their percentage of text coverage tend to decrease after 1992.
Thus, these findings are here interpreted as not contradicting the idea that, in theory,
progress has been achieved in the adoption of water governance principles in Mexico.
Nonetheless, it suggests that some authoritarian elements from the pre-1992 time period
likely persist amidst the adoption of a water governance-based approach after 1992. For
example, the exclusion of water users in decision making was implied in some post-1992
texts such as the 1995-2000 Hydraulic Program which is quoted as follows:
In [rural] communities [with less than 2,500 inhabitants], the participation of the
population in the definition of criteria for the provision of water services has been
insufficient, which has resulted on poor decisions being made because these do not take
into account local conditions. In addition, there has been inadequate infrastructural
maintenance, and there is unfinished works due to lack of funds or because of bad
programming or poor project design (SEMARNAP, 1996: 22).
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This quote from 1996 states that little public participation (if any) was taking place
in rural communities, pertaining planning, development and management of water service
utilities. It also discloses that government officials were making decisions with information
that did not consider the local context. The text suggests that mistakes were made resulting
in bad programming and/or poor project design, and that the mismanagement of financial
resources and poor planning may have resulted in unfinished water infrastructure projects.
This consequently impacted some rural communities that continued with inadequate water
services and infrastructure.
In summary, this section partly addressed the second objective of the thesis, which
is to apply the developed water governance assessment framework to official water policy
documents with the aim of understanding pre- / post-Rio water governance transitions in
Mexico. Findings show a significant increase in the usage of post-Rio water governance
terminology after 1992. They also point to a decrease in the percentage of text coverage of
terminology associated with a pre-Rio context since 1992. Consequently, results reveal
policy shifts in water management paradigms in Mexico after 1992 from a pre-Rio to a
post-Rio practice.
The application of content analysis with the conceptual framework resulted in the
emergence of a broad range of context-based themes pertaining to water governance. These
themes were then reduced into more comprehensive and coherent themes (Table 5.1) using
a code revising process (see Miles & Huberman, 1994). In effect, the framework and
methodology helped conceptualize over three decades of policy and planning for water
resources in the Mexican context, since the official documents reviewed span over thirty
years (1972-2008). For example, collaboration and coordination is a theme that emerged
from the document data through inductive coding (Table 5.1), and is encapsulated within
the operational definition of the Coherence principle provided in this thesis, in the sense
that institutions and organizations should mobilize their efforts in ways that facilitate wellcoordinated actions and stakeholder collaborations at all scales in order to deliver what is
needs when and where it is needed, while making the best use of available resources. Also,
from a historical point of view, collaboration and coordination is a theme that appears
consistently in all documents. The following quotes from the 1972 Federal Water Law
(FWL) and the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic Program, respectively, illustrate how the
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themes of collaboration and coordination appeared over time in official texts, and provide
evidence of the usefulness of the framework proposed in this study:
ARTICLE 54. The Ministry [of Hydraulic Resources], in coordination with the local
authorities, shall develop the necessary [new] towns to compensate for urban property
afflicted by the construction of waterworks. In the case of urban or communal lands, the
Federal Agrarian Reform Law will be applied in coordination with the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (DOF, 1972).
Finally, it should be emphasized that in order to fulfill each of the goals in the 2007-2012
National Hydraulic Program, it is essential for the institutions and organizations with
stake in the management and preservation of water resources in our country, to coordinate
their activities and to collaborate with each other, and with society as a whole
(CONAGUA, 2008a:163).

Results from the analysis of official documents show some strengths of the
proposed assessment framework. They indicate that there is no clear division in the
transition between the old and the new water governance paradigms, in the sense that some
of the characteristics of one may also appear in the other. For example, the quote above
from the 1972 FWL establishes a coordination that is defined by the authority of each
agency or level of government, as the local authority represents the town, the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform is who applies the agrarian (and land) reform legislation, and the Ministry
of Hydraulic Resources applies the 1972 FWL. However, it is not clear if this type of
‘collaboration and coordination’ address or not the issue of institutional ‘fragmentation and
sectorization’. This shows that the proposed framework is able to capture both pre-Rio and
post-Rio characteristics in a water governance system, and identify various constraints, and
opportunities for improvement, as it will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
Table 5.1 presents the themes that emerged from a code revising process as they
pertain to the five water governance principles. These themes emerged from the application
of an inductive coding process to the official documents discussed above, as well as from
interviews with key informants, which are discussed in the next section. It is noteworthy
that the water governance assessment framework proposed in this thesis is not set in stone.
Hence, researchers could continue to build in any themes that do not conform to the
definitions of any of the five proposed principles.
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Table 5.1: Water governance themes by principle
(from policy documents and interviews)
Water Governance
Principle

Participation

Post-Rio Context Themes

Pre-Rio Context Themes

Participation in multilateral
decision-making forums

Little participation / governments make
decisions
Questionable water user’s
representation

Multiple stakeholder engagement

Coherence

Rule of Law

Knowledge

Integration

Collaboration and coordination
Decentralization to the lowest
viable level
Sufficient operational capacities
Comprehensive rules and
regulations
Institutional structures for water
management
Law enforcement
Efficient information systems
Adequate education
Dialogue and negotiation
Basin planning and management
Sustainability and Conservation

5.2

Fragmentation and sectorization
Centralized decision making
Insufficient operational capacities
Legislation gaps and overlaps
Inadequate institutional structures
Little law enforcement
Inefficient information systems
Insufficient education
Lack of transparency
Regional development planning and
management
Negative environmental impacts

Response of participants applying assessment framework to interviews
This section reports results that emerged from interviews conducted with various

stakeholders in the LChB during the summer and early fall of 2008. The assessment
framework proposed in this thesis is applied here to understand the condition of water
governance on the ground. For the analysis, study participants interviewed were grouped
into two broad clusters to help identify variations in accounts based on location and
stakeholder type. The first grouping was meant to account for spatial variation in
stakeholder experiences: hence it was based on the geographical locations of the informant
relative to the basin (i.e., upriver and downriver states). Thus, these respondents were
grouped by state (Figure 5.2). The second grouping was meant to reflect variations in
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perspectives based on the type of stakeholders. It consisted of three categories: (a) water
users 18, (b) state officials, and (c) federal officials.

Figure 5.2: Geographical Location of States in the Lerma-Chapala Basin
When grouped by federal entity (i.e., states), results showed no striking difference
in the percentage of occurrence of water governance principles (i.e., rule of law,
participation, coherence, knowledge, and integration) within the interviews, among all five
states in the basin (e.g., State of Mexico 83%, Michoacan 80%, Queretaro 84%, Guanajuato
87%, and Jalisco 85% of repetition of themes in an pre-Rio context). This suggests that
there are no major differences in the accounts between stakeholders interviewed in upriver
states from those in downriver states. When grouped by type of stakeholder, results show
a sharper contrast. These findings together suggest that stakeholder discordance may be
more prominent among different stakeholder groups rather than being based on the physical
location (i.e., state) of stakeholders. This comes as a surprise, since a stronger difference
between up-river and down-river was expected, as suggested by conflicts associated with
the allocation of surface water, and the issue of water pollution that tends to have greater
impacts down-river. While the importance of analyzing stakeholder perspectives based on

18

Mexico began to change its top-down approach to water management in 1983, within a context of severe
economic crisis. In this study, the municipal level is represented by domestic water service utilities. The law
allows for these services to be privately or publicly managed, and this is probably why the law considers them
as water users instead of local officials. However, in the present study all respondents for domestic water
service utilities are local officials.
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their geographical location is recognized, the above finding resulted in the decision to
analyze stakeholder perspectives along the lines of stakeholder type.
To achieve the third study objective (Section 1.8), it was necessary to identify key
themes and the frequency with which they were discussed during the interviews. The
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of water governance in the LChB
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Results in Figure 5.3 show relative percentages
of repetition of topics concerning the five water governance principles, in a pre-Rio
contexts (below the dashed line) and a post-Rio contexts (above the dashed line). The levels
of repetition are characterized based on stakeholder type.

Figure 5.3: Dominance of water governance principles discussed by stakeholders
(summer/fall 2008)
Overall, results suggest that progress in the transition from an authoritarian-based
approach (i.e., pre-Rio context) to a water governance-based approach (i.e., post-Rio
context) in water management in the LChB has been slow. Interview results reveal that all
five water governance principles were present in all interviews conducted to understand
water governance in the LChB, whether in a pre-Rio or post-Rio context, or both (see
Appendix VI). However, results display a predominance in the repetition of themes in a
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pre-Rio context for all principles (Figure 5.3), in the responses of all three types of
stakeholder groups, indicating that elements of centralized, hierarchical, state-centred, topdown approaches to water management still prevail in the LChB fifteen years after the
creation of the basin council.
Results generally suggest that some level of progress has been achieved in the
implementation of a viable water governance system on the ground, which is marked by
the repetition of themes in a post-Rio context by interviewees (Figure 5.3). For example,
within the Participation, Coherence, Integration and Knowledge principles in the post-Rio
context, some government officials and water user representatives from Queretaro,
Guanajuato and the State of Mexico commented on activities of COTAS 19. These included
conducting a census of existing deep-wells in the aquifer area, collecting piezometric data
on dynamic and static levels of their aquifers, and identifying depletion cones in the aquifer.
An example in this context was provided by a NWC official as follows:
Little by little water users are getting more involved in water management. For example
COTAS [name omitted for confidentiality purposes] are [now] doing the piezometric
readings for their aquifer, […] now they know where their problem areas are [depletion
cones] and they can discuss among themselves what they are going to do to solve their
problems… It’s not easy [to achieve this], but that is what we are aiming for (R#39).

This testimonial justifies the relevance of the proposed assessment framework.
Firstly, it exemplifies the definition of Participation since it suggests inclusive and
legitimate multi-stakeholder representation in water-related decision making forums. It
also complies with the definition of Coherence, since the activities of water users in
COTAS are encouraging coordinated actions and stakeholder collaborations (at the local
scale) in order to deliver what is needed when and where it is needed. It also complies with
the definition of Integration because it is rooted in local contexts and considers existing
and future water demands. Finally, it also captures the definition of Knowledge which
involves making relevant information accessible to all stakeholders for the purpose of
decision making.
Other examples were provided by state officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and State
of Mexico. They reported some forms of progress such as the construction of wastewater
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Spanish acronym. Authors use the same acronym for both the Technical Groundwater Committees and the
Technical Water Councils. COTAS are water user organizations, which are supplementary organizations of
the LChBC (see Chapter 2).
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treatment facilities and pollution prevention programs aimed at reducing water pollution
levels in the basin. These activities suggest a move towards embracing Integration, as they
pertain to stakeholders collectively working towards the conservation and long-term
sustainability of water resources. They further capture the definition integration, since the
basin is utilized as the planning and management unit. For instance, a state water official
provided insights in this regard:
Pollution is a critical problem in the basin. We [state water commission] are talking with
municipal governments and pushing forward the construction of wastewater treatment
facilities. […] Many [municipalities] are reluctant, because of high operation costs
(R#28).

Also, federal officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Mexico City informed on progress
achieved by established programs like the National Micro-basin Program and the Green
Ejido 20 Program, which use a participatory methodology and address environmental, social
and economic issues, in poor areas located in the higher portions of the watershed. The
following quote by a federal official from the MENR highlights work that is being done in
this context:
The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources and the University of [Name
withheld for confidentiality purposes] developed a workshop to certify the technicians
that work in the Micro-basin program. […] We are going to start with the second
generation of trainees… the second generation of government employees dedicated to
participatory planning. But this activity is completely independent from the Basin
Council (R#49).

These types of testimonials are associated with a water governance approach in a post-Rio
context, and suggest that different groups of stakeholders are implementing programs and
activities pertaining to groundwater, water quality, reforestation, soil conservation, among
others, which are geared towards improving conditions in the LChB.
Interviews also revealed that pre-Rio based perspectives remain persistent among
stakeholders, which suggests that much remains to be done in the implementation of a
viable water governance system in the LChB. For example, responses from all three
stakeholder groups contained a significant amount of discussion in a pre-Rio context under
all five principles. Themes associated with Participation, Knowledge and Coherence were
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“Ejido” is a type of land tenure in Mexico that in general terms is commonly referred to as rural communal
lands.
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the ones most discussed by all three groups of informants (Figure 5.3). The following quote
from a state water official demonstrates this:
The National Water Commission still considers the Basin Council as a consultative and
deliberative body that suggests or proposes actions or policies... But the NWC remains as
the sole [water] authority. [From my point of view] That is a contradiction, since
governance implies that the LChBC be managed with the participation of a variety of
stakeholders. Furthermore, there are still no [mandatory] Regulations to the 2004 National
Water Law, which complicates things because there are loopholes [...] the problem is that
there are no clear rules on how civil society is to participate [...]. [Ideally,] Water users
should negotiate, decide and make proposals on their own. But that requires that water
users have at least some minimal knowledge. Knowledge that they don’t have, but they
need in order to provide the Council with founded views and opinions (R#24).

This testimonial also demonstrates the successful use of the framework proposed in
this thesis. It demonstrates the lack of compliance (captured in a pre-Rio context) with the
definition provided for Participation, since the Basin Council is not referred to as a waterrelated decision making forum, and is described as a consultative and deliberative body.
Also, this quote explicitly mentions that water users who participate in the Basin Council
do not have the necessary information on which to base their opinions, which contrasts the
definition for Knowledge (pre-Rio context) with regards to making relevant information
accessible to all stakeholders for purposes of decision making, and to create a level ground
for negotiations and quality collaboration.
Themes associated with Rule of law and Integration were also discussed more often
in a pre-Rio rather than in a post-Rio context. Pertaining to Rule of law in a pre-Rio context,
respondents from all three groups pointed out the lack of law enforcement in the basin.
Several respondents mentioned water pollution, while others referred to issues such as
groundwater overdraft and the drilling of illegal wells which they associated with little or
poor law enforcement. The following quote by a municipal water service provider best
captures the diversity of responses in this context:
There is a strong need for more enforcement in sanitation […]. There are many direct
discharges into the River Lerma […] many from industry. […] Who treats the chemicals
in the water? Nobody (R#17)!

In this regard, a frustrated state water official commented “what is the point of having the
best law in the world is you are not going to enforce it” (R#29). Not using the basin as the
unit for planning and management was another issue associated with the definition of
Integration (and captured in a pre-Rio context) that was mentioned by all three groups of
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respondents. For example, some respondents made mention of wastewater treatment
facilities being built without considering their location within the basin (i.e., up-river,
down-river) and treated water being discharged into the River Lerma close the discharge
centre for wastewater. The testimonial by an industrial water user illustrates this problem:
We are required by law to treat our wastewater. We also understand that it is better for
the environment, and for our children, so we treat our wastewater… You should see…
[Says with sarcasm and proceeds to specify a particular location on the river] There you
can see our drainage pipe with clean treated water being discharged to the river, but a few
meters down river is the discharge from the municipality, and is all raw sewage. It doesn’t
make sense… We clean our water only to become dirty again in just a few meters (R#11).

These results suggest that the viability of the water governance in the LChB is questionable
because of the impact of localized projects and actions, and their outcomes have been
limited. Testimonials from key informants reveal that solutions to local problems are not
having a tangible benefit from a basin perspective. These issues will be further discussed
in the next Chapter.
It must be noted that while discussions in the pre-Rio context were far more
prominent than discussions in a post-Rio context (see Figure 5.3), there is some level of
observable progress towards the implementation of specific water governance processes.
This is because, in general terms, these testimonials presented in a post-Rio context reveal
a step forward in the transition from a traditional state-centred top-down model (i.e., preRio context), which has characterized water management in Mexico for seven decades. For
example, within the Participation, Coherence, Knowledge and Integration principles in the
post-Rio context, informants mentioned that state governments are collaborating through
the LChBC in negotiations with the Commission for Hydraulic Resources of Congress, and
with the Ministry of the Treasury at the federal level. Some respondents mentioned that
they are engaged as a group in ‘dialogue and negotiations’ to obtain a special electricity
tariff “like the one for agriculture” (R#27), to reduce the high operational costs of
wastewater treatment facilities. The following testimonials of two state officials from two
major political parties that consistently oppose each other is significant, since both officials
agreed about the importance of working together “as a Council” because it helps “eliminate
bureaucratic barriers” and solve common problems. The testimonials are as follows:
We have seen that many municipalities abandon wastewater treatment facilities that have
been built by the state government and transferred to them, and one of the main causes
for this problem has been high operation costs. In the [Lerma-Chapala] Basin Council we
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decided to go and talk to members of [the national] Congress and ask them for a special
tariff for the electricity used in wastewater treatment facilities (R#27).
We have coordinated our efforts, and as a group we have appealed to the Commission for
Hydraulic Resources of [the national] Congress, to the Federal Commission for
Electricity, and to the Secretary of the Treasury […] This is a negotiation that still
continues and we feel it is moving forward (R#36).

The relevance of these accounts is that state governments are starting to grasp the
advantages of collaborating with each other and coordinating their efforts, which has not
always been the case. Additionally, they are beginning to think about solving water
problems that go beyond their territorial and political boundaries. This suggests that they
are starting to grasp key problems and potential solutions by trying to conform to the
definition of the principle of Integration provided in this dissertation, since they are
beginning to use the basin as the planning and management unit.
5.2.1

Participant responses in a post-Rio context
Among specific stakeholder groups, there were notable variations in the prominence

of discussions in the post-Rio context. While 9% of discussions by water users touched on
topics related to the water governance principles in a post-Rio context, 19% and 28% of
state and federal officials’ discussions were supportive of a water governance-based
approach (see Appendix VI). The main reason for this variation is that comments by
participants (mainly state and federal officials) included accounts about government
programs and activities like the National Micro-basin Program and Green Ejido, which are
associated with IWRM. The themes that emerged in this discussion included the
participation of multiple stakeholders in decision making (Participation) and the relevance
of coordinating activities among agencies and organizations (Coherence).
With regards to stakeholder participation in decision making in the LChBC in
particular, respondents identified the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement as a
landmark achievement that marked a new way for decision-making in water management
in the LChBC. The 1991 allocation agreement was negotiated and signed by governments,
without the participation of water users (i.e., ‘little participation / governments make
decisions’ - Participation). Hence, the 2004 allocation agreement ended the long-standing
trend of government making decisions without the involvement of non-government
stakeholders. A NWC official provided insights in this context, while providing an example

93

that captures the definition of the principle Participation as it involves multi-stakeholder
representation in water-related decision making forums:
The viability of River Basin Councils was put to the test in 2004 with the [Surface Water]
Distribution Agreement. Traditionally, what the President [of Mexico] said or wanted
done… It was a done deal. The 1991 [Surface Water] Allocation Agreement was
completely done by government [at federal and state levels]. Just government!... [In
contrast,] Water users were involved from the beginning in the negotiations for the 2004
[Surface Water Allocation] Agreement. It took two years to achieve this agreement
among all parties involved… because of the negotiation of the mathematical model… We
finally got the Agreement, and that in part due to the contributions of the Board Member
for the agricultural water use (R#44).

According to Wester, Vargas-Velazquez, Mollard, and Silva-Ochoa (2008), the
1991 agreement did not outline procedures for water transfers, which suggest a lack of
transparency for solving conflicts in the LChBC. Regardless, three transfers were done
from Solis dam to Lake Chapala during the 1994-2003 crisis, and these were an important
reason for agricultural users from the irrigation districts to get involved in the Basin Council
(Wester et al., 2008). Agriculture is the largest water consumer in the basin (77%). Before
1999, there was no involvement of the leaders from the irrigation districts in making
decisions that pertained to LChBC (Wester et al., 2003; Wester et al., 2009). Respondents
generally remarked about the active water user representatives’ participation in the
dialogue, negotiations and decision making which resulted in the signing of the 2004
allocation agreement, which includes mechanisms for possible water transfers during times
of prolonged drought. This is also reflective of stakeholders utilizing the Rule of Law (i.e.,
a treaty) to facilitate Integration (i.e., stakeholder decision making at the basin level). This
is captured in the definition of these two principles as it depicts the existence of strong and
clear regulatory and administrative frameworks that are rooted in the socio-cultural
contexts within which they function (Rule of law) and the use of the basin as the planning
and management unit, while being rooted in local contexts and considering existing and
future demands of water resources (Integration).
Regarding improvements in stakeholder engagement (Participation), some water
users acknowledged their participation in COTAS 21, while state and federal officials made
mention of initiatives to promote participation such as the creation of Sub-basin
Commissions. Sub-basin Commissions in Guanajuato and Michoacan were at an early
21

Spanish acronym for Technical Groundwater Committees or Technical Water Councils.
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development phase during this fieldwork, and consequently participants had little to say
about their outcomes. However, respondents generally acknowledged that COTAS, Subbasin Commissions and Micro-basin Committees, were being implemented in coordination
with different institutions at different levels of government, which is captured in the
definition of Coherence characterized by the facilitation of coordinated actions and
stakeholder collaborations at all scales. A good example in this regard is provided by the
testimonial of an official of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources:
The creation of the Sub-basin Commission has been [product of] an initiative from the
municipalities. They have invited us [the MENR] to join them in their meetings, as were
other state and federal institutions. […] More institutions are slowly joining these
meetings. […] They [the Sub-basin Commission] are setting their own goals and
objectives, and compelling us [state and federal institutions] to coordinate our activities
and programs to solve problems and issues identified by them (R#46).

Respondents’ accounts of activities and actions such as those associated with the 2004
Surface Water Allocation Agreement and with the three types of Auxiliary Organizations
(i.e., Sub-basin Commissions, Micro-basin Committees, and COTAS) shows some
progress in the principles of Integration, Participation and Coherence within a post-Rio
context as suggested by Figure 5.3.
5.2.2

Participant responses in a pre-Rio context
Concerning the pre-Rio context, variations in the amount of attention given to

different principles among stakeholder groups were observed. Specifically, while
participation was the most discussed water governance principle by all participants in a
pre-Rio context, there were variations in reoccurrence, as themes were more constantly
mentioned by water users (33%) relative to state (21%) and federal officials (21%) (see
Appendix VI). Respondent’s testimonials on participation in a pre-Rio context fell under
two main themes ‘little participation/government making decisions’ and ‘questionable
water user representation’ (Table 5.1). These two themes were discussed more persistently
by water users than by the other two groups of participants. For example, most interviewees
did not think that water user’s interests were being represented and/or defended by water
user Board Members. They also mentioned that water user representatives are ill informed
to make valuable contributions and hence do not participate in the discussions. This
happens in part because water user Board Members do not exchange information with those
they represent. In general, Board Members lack knowledge about the problems and
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concerns of the water users they represent, consequently resulting in those being
represented not having their needs met. This testimonial by a water user representative for
‘other services’, who is not a Board Member, best captures the diversity of responses in
this context:
The day of the elections for Board Members at the Assembly [of Water User
Representatives], we exchanged phone numbers, e-mails, and addresses among water
users, and agreed that we were going to be in touch […]. After that, nothing has
happened... No communication. No meeting. No nothing for over a year (R#19).

This statement illustrates discordance with Participation and Knowledge principles
and provides evidence of the usefulness of the proposed assessment framework. With
regards to Participation, the definition establishes that stakeholder representatives should
speak and/or act in the best interest of the groups they represent. Concerning Knowledge,
the definition indicates that stakeholders should communicate in open and direct ways
using simple and clear terminology, which would improve decision making, enhance
stakeholder collaboration. However, this quote reflects discrepancy with the definitions of
these two principles and hence was captured in a pre-Rio context.
Results also show that participation is an area of concern for all three groups of
stakeholders, and suggests that it represents an area of opportunities for improvement.
During the interviews it was observed that most the water users are becoming frustrated
because they do not see any tangible results or benefit in being part of the LChBC. The
following quote by an aquaculture water user best reflects these problem:
I’ve lost interest because they only talk and talk but there are no results […]. There is no
real benefit. You cannot argue anything, and what is the point of wearing yourself out on
things that have already been decided at the top by high ranking government officials
(R#1).

These findings conform with Wester and colleagues (2008, 2009b), who contend that the
legitimacy of the Council as a water governance forum for dialogue, negotiation and
conflict resolution was undermined after the LChBC approved the third water transferred
from Solis dam to Lake Chapala in 2003, regardless of strong opposition from farmers and
their representative to the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council’s Board of Governors. They
mention that among water users, this landmark event created the impression that
participating in the basin council was useless.
It is worth noting that during the interviews, some agricultural representatives
recognized it was valuable to be part of the Council. For example, one agricultural
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representative stated that, though they don’t have much faith in the Council, they continue
to engage in the ‘Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup’ and the ‘Evaluation and
Monitoring Group’ of the LChBC, in order to be informed about what is happening in the
LChBC, as well as to voice their concerns and defend their interests. In this respect, the
following statement by another agricultural water user reiterates this view.
I once told a high ranking official of the National Water Commission, ‘These [Basin
Council] meetings are a lot of talk, a lot of noise, a lot of ^#*&%@$ [expletive], and a
lot of politics’. There is no work being done in the LChBC. […] The NWC created the
River Basin Councils because it is required by LAW… and has to give the appearance
that it is complying with the [National Water] Law… It is only to keep appearances (R#8).

Water users are also the single group who expressed more concerns related to the
five water governance principles in a pre-Rio context, in comparison to other stakeholders.
Respondents extensively discussed issues associated with the Knowledge principle.
Specifically, they disclosed topics associated with the themes of ‘lack of transparency’,
‘insufficient education’, and ‘inefficient information systems’ (Table 5.1). For example,
several respondents mentioned that there is no training, workshop or similar forums to bring
new council members up to speed with ongoing developments and activities. Accordingly,
this was viewed as having a negative impact in the continuity, productivity and quality of
the work done, because of regular changes to the people involved in the Council. In this
regard, it is noteworthy that most municipal officials are changed every 3 years, while state
and federal officials usually change every 6 years. Water user representatives on the other
hand are changed every 2 years. This problem as discussed by general respondents is
exemplified by the following statement that was made by an aquaculture water user:
We are badly informed. […] Because those who are in charge of all this [the LChBC]
should send us information. Well… they don’t seem to worry, because if they cared, they
would have told us what can we do and how we can help. [...] If we were given a booklet,
a magazine or something, then we would have something to guide us [...] but we cannot
inform the water users we represent. What do we report to our people? The government
do not give us training, support or advice about anything. [...] The meetings we go to are
only when their [government] bosses instruct them: ‘we want answers’. It is only then
that the government invites us to meetings (R#2).

This statement exemplifies a discrepancy with the definition of Knowledge (captured in a
pre-Rio context) since relevant information is not being made accessible to all stakeholders
for the purposes of education, decision making, awareness, public scrutiny and capacity
building. Several water user representatives stated that no one has provided them with any
kind of information, and some even pointed out that they do not have an idea of their role
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within the LChBC. In this respect, a livestock water user representative made an iconic
comment, stating that: “no one has given me any information about anything. If I want to
find out something about the Lerma-Chapala basin, I resort to Google” (R#13). This and
other aspects are further discussed in the next Chapter.
The relative dominance of themes discussed by various stakeholders provides a
snapshot of the relative levels of attention they gave to various principles in the discussion
of pre-Rio and post-Rio approaches to water management in the LChB. These findings
together reflect real life concerns around the basin among various stakeholders and help
unearth disconnects between stakeholder perspectives on the condition of water governance
in the LChB.
5.3

The implementation gap: a policy-practice disconnect
An important finding of this dissertation is the existence of an implementation gap

between Mexico’s water policies and the actual behaviour of the institutions responsible
for the implementation of these policies in the Lerma-Chapala basin. There are major
contrasts between the results obtained from the analysis of the three types of official water
documents, and the results of the interviews with key informants. Applying the proposed
assessment framework to the experience of LChB made it possible to identify differences
between what ‘ought to be happening’ according to official water-based documents, and
what ‘was happening’ on the ground based on stakeholder accounts.
It is important to clarify here that only three official documents were used to
compare the statements between official text and participants’ interviews. These three
documents were the ones being enforced at the time interviews were conducted; that is, the
2004 National Water Law, the 2006 Internal Regulations of the Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources (which includes the National Water Commission), and
the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic Program. This comparison was done to determine if the
water governance systems established in official documents are well reflected in practice
in the LChB.
Results show that statements in all three documents are predominantly in a post-Rio
context (Figure 5.4.), which suggests interest by the political elite in establishing an
effective water governance process in Mexico, and hence in the Lerma-Chapala basin.
Findings also suggest that Mexico’s policy makers recognize the importance of a viable
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water governance system and (according to official texts findings in this thesis) appear to
be committed to the implementation of such a system to help cope with existing water
management problems. For example, Article 3, Section 15 of the 2004 National Water Law
states that:
Article 3. For the purposes of this Law, it would be understood for:
[Section] XV. River Basin Council: A governing body that integrates mixed interests.
They are forums for coordination and negotiation, support, consultation and counsel,
between the [National Water] Commission, including the corresponding River Basin
Organisms, and agencies of the federal, state or municipal governments, and
representatives of water users and civil social organizations, of a given watershed or
hydrological region (DOF, 2004).

Figure 5.4: Dominance of Water Governance Principles Discusses in
Official Documents
However, results from the interviews show a situation that is reversed. Here findings
indicate that the discussion with key informants were about themes predominantly in a preRio context (Figure 5.3). Particularly, these perspectives of key informants indicated that,
to a large extent, a state-centred top-down systems of government is still being enforced in
the LChB. For example, an official of the NWC stated that:
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I think that it [the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council] has not been consolidated in such a way
that it could have life of its own, and I think that the National Water Commission has not
done enough to achieve this [consolidation]. […] It [the Council] is a forum with little
operability where the Monitoring and Evaluation Group, which is supposed to be where
most of the [Council’s] work gets done, doesn’t do anything tangible because no decisions
are being made there. And even less [decisions are made] in the Basin Council. [… Water]
Users have no information or knowledge of many things. Then, the decisions that are
made [in the Monitoring and Evaluation Group or in the Basin Council] are more or less
what the National Water Commission wants to bring to the table. I see it [the Council] as
a way to legitimize the National Water Commission’s policies in the basin (R#40).

As evident in the above quote and other results that emerged in the current study, there is
an implementation gap in the LChB, as ‘what ought to be happening’ according to the
official water management rhetoric is not ‘what was happening in practice’ in the basin.
For example, regarding the Participation principle, water user participation in water
management in Mexico has been implemented since the enactment of the 1992 NWL, and
was corroborated and strengthened in the 2004 NWL. Public participation is recognized in
official documents as an important component in water governance, and River Basin
Councils are the main forum for this engagement to occur through representatives from
different civil social organizations (Chapter IV of the 2004 NWL). Article 13 of the NWL
provides a good example of ‘what ought to be happening’ in this context:
The [National Water] Commission, with the agreement of its Technical Council, will
establish River Basin Councils, which are governing bodies that integrate mixed interests,
as established in Section XV of Article 3 of this Law. Coordination, negotiation, support,
consultation and counsel referred to by the already mentioned Section are intended to
develop and implement programs and activities to improve water management, the
development of water infrastructure and the respective services, and the preservation of
the resources of the river basin, as well as others [programs and activities] provided in
this Chapter [IV] and in the respective Regulations. River Basin Councils are not
subordinate to the [National Water] Commission or to the River Basin Organizations
(DOF, 2004).

As demonstrated above, Article 3 Section XV (cited in the previous page) and Article 13
of the 2004 NWL consider RBCs as governing bodies of mixed interests where negotiations
among multiple stakeholders take place, in order to develop and implement coordinated
programs and activities to improve water management, and to preserve the resources of
the river basin (DOF, 2004). However, present study findings indicate that there is an
implementation gap, as results from interviews indicate that there are low levels of
stakeholder engagement in decision making in the LChBC. This is reflected in the voice of
an irritated industrial water user when he remarked, “I'm telling you, we are ‘Councilors’
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in name only” (R#10)! Likewise, many respondents mentioned that all important decisions
concerning infrastructure planning, development and management are made outside the
LChBC. The following testimonials by a water user from ‘other services’ demonstrates
this:
There may be some kind of vote taken in the Council, but all decisions have been made
beforehand. The National Water Commission negotiates everything outside the Basin
Council and the vote is just a requirement (R#21).

Concerning the Coherence principle, the discrepancy between what ‘ought to be
happening’ according to official texts and what ‘was happening’ in the basin, is revealed
by the persistence of a centralized approach to water management and the lack of
implementation of the subsidiarity principle. According to the literature, Mexico started its
decentralization process in the 1980s and grew stronger during the 1990s (see sections 3.3
and 3.6). The 2004 NWL continued with these efforts and decentralized some of the
National Water Commission’s authority and responsibilities from its headquarters in
Mexico City to its River Basin Organizations (RBO) and Local Management Offices. This
decentralizing effort is illustrated in Article 12bis1 of the 2004 NWL, when it states:
River Basin Organizations, within the hydrological regions, are technically,
administratively and legally specialized autonomous units, assigned directly to the
National Water Commission’s Director General’s office, whose powers, nature and
territorial area of influence is set in this Law and is detailed in its [mandatory] regulations
(DOF, 2004).

But, interview findings reveal an implementation gap, disclosed by a policy-practice
disconnect. As expressed by several interviewees and in this case an industrial water user,
“all important decisions are still made in Mexico City. There is only a virtual
decentralization” (R#9). Similarly, many respondents commented on discrepancies around
the issue of ‘virtual decentralization’. For example, according to the 2004 NWL water
planning is to take place at the basin level and “Hydraulic Programs shall be elaborated,
agreed upon and implemented by River Basin Organizations and River Basin Councils […
and] these programs will be incorporated into the hydraulic programing process by river
basin and hydrological regions” (DOF, 2004: Article 15, Section II). But findings from the
interviews reveal an implementation gap, since the National Hydraulic Program 2007-2012
was formed without any input from locals, including the Lerma-Santiago-Pacific RBO and
the LChBC. In this context, a NWC officer commented with some surprise and disbelief:
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I do not know what criteria [the NWC] headquarters used for putting together the National
Hydraulic Program 2007-2012. […] That was another squabble... There was a [national]
videoconference between the NWC’s headquarters and local offices where many states
asked: ‘Hey, where did you [headquarters] get all these information [for the NHP 20072012]? You [headquarters] never asked me [local office]!’ The staff from the area of
Programming [at our office] was very upset […]. ‘Why didn’t you send us the document
[NHP 2007-2012] so we could give you our feedback or enrich it? Who told you
[headquarters] to put those goals? How do you expect me [at the local office] to meet
these goals?’ The goals that headquarters established in the NHP 2007-2012 for everyone
at the local offices are going to be very hard to achieve (R#39).

Concerning the Rule of law principle, results from official documents indicate that
Mexico has a comprehensive set of rules and regulations to govern the country’s water
resources 22. However, interviews reveal a gap in key legislation. According to the Third
Transitory Article of the 2004 NWL, the mandatory Regulations to the NWL were to be
published in the Official Diary of the Federation “within a period not exceeding twelve
months from the entry in force of this [National Water] law” (DOF, 2004). In this context,
findings revealed another implementation gap, as expressed in the voice of a NWC official
who recognized that “The [mandatory] Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law have
not been published yet” (R#44). Similarly, several respondents (mainly federal and state
officials) mentioned that not having the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 NWL has
created levels of uncertainty left by gaps and loopholes in the federal water legislation. The
following quote by a state water official illustrates frustration in this respect:
In practical terms, the previous [mandatory] Regulations of the NWL are still being
applied […] and the 2004 National Water Law was enacted four years ago […]. Let’s be
clear, the [mandatory] Regulations of the 1992 NWL are not consistent with the 2004
NWL. […] The federal government establishes its water policy very well in all its official
documents, but water policy is not being fully implemented, and that brings forward
contradictions and uncertainty. […] It has been four years and we still don’t have the
[mandatory] Regulations to the 2004 NWL (R#25).

Results also revealed an implementation gap concerning information availability,
which pertain to the Knowledge principle. Mexico’s official rhetoric recognizes that
information pertaining water quality and quantity, water uses and water concessions and
other relevant topics related to water resources have to be widely distributed. In this context
Article 13bis 3, Section XVI of the 2004 NWL states that:
22
Other supporting water regulations include the Federal Tax Law, which was amended in 1983 to include
water tariffs, and is updated every year. Also, since 1994, several Official Mexican Rules have been enacted
to regulate a variety of technical aspects associated with water management.
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With support from the River Basin Organizations and their integrated monitoring and
information systems, [members of] River Basin Councils are responsible for knowing, in
a timely and truthful manner, the information and documentation concerning the quantity
and quality of water available, as well as the existing water uses and registered water
rights, and the topics and factors of greater relevance concerning water resources and their
management [in the basin]. The information and documents referred to shall be widely
disseminated among RBC’s members and to the inhabitants of the basin [in general],
enriched with the perspectives and orientations determined by the Basin Council (DOF,
2004: Article 13bis 3, Section XVI).

Despite these claims in the NWL, findings from the interviews disclose a policy-practice
disconnect. Results show that not much information is being shared in practice, as reflected
in the voice of a state water official who stated that “we [the LChBC] do have a fault in
that respect. […] We [Board Members] have not agreed on a single information
compilation and dispersion system. In that sense we do have a significant backlog” (R#27).
Likewise, the testimonials of many stakeholders reveal that this gap between what ‘ought
to be happening’ according to official water-based documents and ‘what was actually
happening’ in practice in the LChB has left many stakeholders uninformed. In response to
information about issues pertaining to policies and programs in the LChBC, respondents
often answered with statements such as “I do not know” (R#10), “I have no idea” (R#13),
and “I am clueless” (R#21). These responses clearly reveal the depth of the implementation
gap reflected in information dissemination problems that indicate deficiencies in
knowledge. The following statement by an aquaculture water user representative further
this implementation gap:
No one has approached me, no one has told me what is it that I am supposed to do. No
one has given me any information about anything. I do not even know what my role in
the LChBC is (R#4).

This implementation gap concerning the dissemination of relevant information is
also having a negative impacts on stakeholder participation in the basin council. Results
show that water users are growing impatient and frustrated, and several even indicated that
they do not want to be part of the LChBC anymore. This finding illustrates the interaction
between water governance principles, which in this case involves the lack of Knowledge
and impacting the desire of Participation. The following quote by a water user
representative of ‘other uses’ provides an excellent example in this context:
At first I struggled a lot with the National Water Commission, asking them to give me
information about the basin, to help me become more aware about water problems in the
basin, to give me tools so I could do more as a representative for my [water] use. I had
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high expectations about all this work in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council… Now, I don’t
care anymore. Now, I am tired of all these. Now, I don’t go to meetings anymore. Now,
if they want to send me [the] information [I requested], the only thing I’ll do [with it] is
toss it in the garbage (R#22).

Finally, concerning the Integration principle, results also reveal a gap between what
government policies indicate and ‘what was happening’ in practice within LChB, according
to interviews with key informants. Findings from official documents (Section 5.1) confirm
that Mexico has followed an IWRM approach to cope with water problems since the
publication of the 1992 NWL. Then, Mexico corroborated and strengthened its
commitment to implementing and IWRM process, as illustrated in Article 13bis 3, Section
I of the 2004 NWL, as follows:
Article 13bis 3. River Basin Councils shall be responsible for:
[Section] I. Contributing to [an] integrated water resource management [process] in their
respective hydrological basin or basins, contributing to re-establish or maintain a balance
between availability and use of water resources, taking into account the different water
uses and users, and favouring sustainable development in relation to water and its
management (DOF, 2004).

However, findings from the interviews reveal that in practice, no associated resources (e.g.,
forests and soils) are even being discussed in the LChBC, as expressed by an agricultural
state official who recognised that “in the LChBC we only discuss water… and only surface
water for that matter” (R#35). Concerning the topic of sustainability, state and federal
officials mentioned that the LChBC has a Sustainability Workgroup. When questioned
further about this group, they indicated that it was in its infancy. These findings provide
more support for the work of several researchers (e.g., WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Estrada
Godoy et al., 2013; Preciado-Jimenez et al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; DelgadoGalvan et al., 2014) who have reported that problems associated with groundwater overexploitation, water pollution, and environmental degradation still prevail in the LChB.
Lastly, many respondents mentioned the basin is not being used as a planning and
management unit (Integration), and that no one is promoting the vision (Knowledge) of the
basin as a unit, as illustrated by the testimonial of an agricultural water user who explained
that “most people [in the LChB] don’t know what a basin is” (R#8). This was particularly
shocking because the emphasis on using the basin as a planning unit in various policy and
planning documents. In this context, Article 13bis 3 (above) states that RBC’s shall
contribute to IWRM “in their respective hydrological basin or basins”, and Article 13 of
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the 2004 NWL (cited earlier) states that RBCs “are intended to develop and implement
programs and activities to improve water management, […] and the preservation of the
resources of the river basin” (DOF, 2004). Similarly, the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic
Program establishes as its third objective the promotion of an integrated and sustainable
management of water resources in river basins and aquifers, and states that:
It is important to emphasize that to preserve the aquifers and rivers of the country, it is
necessary to regulate [1] the use and allocation of their waters based on their availability
and considering as basic premises the [pre-established] order of priority of water uses in
the basin, [2] the efficient use of extracted [ground]water, [3] the gradual reduction of the
[groundwater] extractions, [4] the progressive increase of the recharge for the case of the
aquifers and [5] the need to maintain the minimum [ecological water] flows that must run
through the rivers to guarantee the survival of the flora and fauna of each river basin.
(CONAGUA, 2008a:69).

The use of the basin as a planning and management unit is latent in these three passages.
This unit of management and planning is needed for “the preservation of the resources of
the river basin”, to contribute in the implementation of an IWRM process “in their
respective hydrological basin”, as well as to establish a comprehensive allocation of water
resources in the basin. Nonetheless, interview findings reveal that in general the basin is
not being used as a planning and management unit, as revealed in the testimonial of several
state and federal officers who indicated that they still use political boundaries as the main
planning and management unit. Hence, the existence of an implementation gap. The
following quote by a state water official best illustrates this context:
Our infrastructure programs are developed by us [state government]. […] We also
participate in federal programs for infrastructure development. […] We select our projects
and then we negotiate the NWC. […] Several factors are taken into account, like population
size, budget available, if the municipality is going to contribute with funding, and similar
factors. […] No, we do not consider [geographical] location in the basin as a factor (R#27).

Based on these results it is possible to conclude that while some progress has been
achieved in the LChB, there is still much to be done to establish a viable water governance
system. In synthesis, findings in this dissertation identified the existence of an
implementation gap between Mexico’s water policies and the actual behaviour of the
institutions responsible for the implementation of these policies, which involve all five
water governance principles that make up the proposed assessment framework. Results
reveal that there is a policy-practice disconnect concerning: (1) the participation of
stakeholders in decision making (Participation); (2) the collaboration of institutions and
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organizations working in the basin (Coherence); (3) the existence of a strong legal and
administrative framework (Rule of law); (4) the dissemination of relevant information to
stakeholders (Knowledge); and (5) the use of the basin as a planning and management unit
(Integration), among others. A summary of various achievements and constraints to the
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin is
provided in Table 5.2. The implications of these results are discussed in more detail in the
next Chapter.
Table 5.2: Achievement and constraints in the implementation of a viable
water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin
Achievement

Constraint

Key Findings
Negotiations and signing of the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder
group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the
potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LermaChapala basin.
Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
Not having the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 National Water Law creates a
significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
Deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity
to function efficiently.
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Chapter Six
6
6.1

Discussion
Strengths and opportunities for improvement of the water governance system
in the Lerma-Chapala basin
This chapter analyses and discusses the constraints and the accomplishment in the

implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin. It
presents the actual issues that were discussed in the interviews and compares them with
what is reflected in various documents that were enforced at the time of the study. The
proposed water governance principles represent a range of interrelated conditions that
should be evident in an ideal water governance system. It is important to clarify that the
constraints discussed here also represent opportunities for improving the water governance
system.
To allow for easy reading, the occurrence of the five principles (i.e., Participation,
Coherence, Rule of law, Knowledge, Integration) are explicitly identified within this
discussion. Similarly, the occurrence of the themes that emerged from the data (i.e.,
‘questionable water user’s representation’, ‘fragmentation and sectoralization’, and ‘lack
of transparency’), which are hierarchically subordinate to the principles (see Table 5.1), are
also discussed. The discussion is placed in context by integrating the study outcomes with
relevant clusters of literature. Additionally, attention is paid to understanding how theory
(i.e., water governance principles evident in policies) translate to practice within the LChB.
Finally, a reflection on the value of the assessment framework used in the study is
discussed.
6.2

Stakeholder engagement in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council
The findings of the current study reveal that there is a distinct lack of stakeholder

engagement in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council. Findings show major disconnects
between what is established in laws, policies and institutional structures, and what was
happening in the LChB. Specifically, these findings disclose problems with legitimate
stakeholder representation, communication among stakeholder representatives, and
stakeholder participation. These gaps in implementation point towards a failure of LChBC
to fully establish and facilitate a viable water governance system.
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A multi-stakeholder decision-making process lies at the core of an effective water
governance system. From a theoretical perspective, the water governance literature
establishes that an effective water governance system creates an open and inclusive
multilateral decision-making process that involves the participation of a wide range of
stakeholders while minimizing stakeholder conflicts (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003;
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; WGF, 2012).
Within literature, it is also established that for a water governance process to be
viable it is necessary to have vertical and horizontal networks for stakeholders and their
representatives to share information and address matters that emerge at different scales
across the basin (Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007; Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP,
2015). Informed stakeholder engagement, among other things, allows for decisions to be
more in tune with the context in which issues present themselves (Peña & Solanes, 2003;
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Conca, 2006). Water governance forums for decision making
are considered essential, as they create a platform for stakeholders share information,
brainstorm the most appropriate actions, reach common understanding, and coordinate their
actions, aimed at improving water management at the basin level (Rogers & Hall, 2003;
Lemos & Farias de Oliveira, 2004; Parrado Diez, 2004; Tortajada, 2010a).
On paper, Mexico’s water management policies comply with these aforementioned
issues, acknowledging the importance of participatory approaches to solve water related
problems. This rhetoric is largely present in legislation and guiding documents such as the
2004 NWL, the 2007-2012 NHP and the 2006 Internal Regulations of the NWC. For
example, the 2004 NWL establishes the following parameters around participation:
[River Basin Councils are responsible for:] Promoting the participation of state and
municipal governments, and ensure the implementation of mechanisms for the
participation of the basin's water users and civil social organizations, in formulating,
approving, monitoring, updating, and evaluating the water plan for the basin or basins in
question, in terms of law (DOF, 2004: Article13bis 3, Section V).

In Article 13bis 1 of the 2004 NWL, an explicit structure for River Basin Councils
is provided. It establishes that RBCs are subdivided into smaller administrative units at
different scales; thus, establishing spatial components that attempt to bring decision making
to the most appropriate level of social aggregation. These administrative units are the
Auxiliary Organizations described the 2000 Basin Council Organization and Operation
Rules (i.e., Sub-basin Commissions, Miro-basin Committees, and COTAS).
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In the testimonials of most 23 respondents, they indicated that what was happening
in practice did not follow what was established in these existing policies on multiple
stakeholder engagement. These respondents often considered the legitimacy of water user
representation in the LChBC as questionable. Testimonials suggest that some water user
representatives were not elected by their peers. Rather, they were in some cases personally
and randomly invited to participate by government officials. Several respondents even
stated that water user representation in the Council is only as good as a state corporate vote
for the allocation surface water, and a common statement was that water user
representatives to the Board of Governors of the LChBC “only defend the interest of their
state” and not of those they represent (R#4, R#8, R#16, R#30, R#43).
Article 13bis 3 Section I of the 2004 NWL establishes that water user Board
Members will be elected in the Water User Representatives Assembly, but does not
establish a mechanism for the election. During fieldwork in 2008, the LChBC did not have
the foundation to comply with the structure provided in the 2004 NWL because of gaps in
legislation (i.e., Rule of law). A state water official made the following remark to this effect:
“The structures that the river basin councils have today are not the ones mentioned in the
2004 NWL” (R#26). By 2008, the LChBC still had previous structures in place, and elected
its water user representatives to the Board of Governors as established in the Basin Council
Organization and Operation Rules (BCOOR) enacted in the year 2000. Nonetheless,
Articles 5 and 48 of the BCOOR are unprecise when it comes to the process that should be
followed in electing these board members. Due to the absence of clear ‘rules’ and
procedures for electing water user representatives, the Board of Governors tend to
undermine the legitimacy of water user members. This in turn contravenes what is
established in Rule of law principle.
Three main groups of water user representatives were identified based on the
interviews that were conducted including (1) legitimate representatives, (2) representatives
invited by government officials and (3) politically motivated individuals. The first group
appears to have been chosen by their peers and may be considered as legitimate
representatives. For example, the presidents of the irrigation districts, who are also water

23

In this thesis when it states that most participants commented, it refers that 80% or more made that
comment, many stands for 50 to 80%, several from 30 to 50% and few less than 30%.
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user representatives for the agricultural water use in the LChBC. These leaders were elected
according to their civil social organization guidelines and thus represent thousands of
farmers. The second group, which includes more than a third of water user representatives
interviewed, indicated that they were ‘invited’ to participate by state or federal officials.
For example, an aquaculture water user responded that he became the representative for his
water use because “the authorities always saw me as a person who knows about the issues
related to my sector [aquaculture] and that is why they invited me to participate in the
[Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council as representative for my use” (R#3). The third group could
be described as being composed of self-promoting and politically motivated individuals.
These were generally individuals who took advantage of their political affiliations and
friendships to become representatives for their water use within their state. In general, these
individuals had specific goals they sought to achieve. They also saw this role as an
opportunity to advance their careers as politicians. During the fieldwork, it was observed
that all water user representatives to the Board of Governors of the LChBC seemed to
belong to the last group; thus, deviating from the principle of participation and various
policies and regulations around water governance that were in place.
These findings point to the idea that a number of water user representatives’
(including those in the Board of Governors of the LChBC), do not necessarily represent the
interest of their water use group, indicating a major failure in their role. The theme
‘questionable water user’s representation’ (Table 5.1) was one of the most prominent
among water users, who commonly made statements like “I do not feel my interests are
being represented in the [Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council” (R#8). This issue was also
recognized by several government officials, as depicted in the following account by a NWC
official who acknowledged that water user representatives seldom stand for the needs of
those they represent:
I believe that in general, water user representatives who are Board Members in the LermaChapala Basin Council only represent their state’s interests, and sometimes they only
represent their own interest (R#43).

This lack of legitimacy of stakeholder representatives has a negative impact on the
credibility of the LChBC as water governance forum. Further implications of this state of
affairs include the silencing of voices and the neglect of stakeholder interests and concerns.
This has a greater impact on women and marginalized groups who are underrepresented in
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the LChBC. It is important to note that there were no women among the water user
representatives to the LChBC. Overall, several respondents see the LChBC as a key to
achieving the goals of the National Water Commission and an opportunity “to justify the
implementation of its policies in the basin” (R#2, R#25, R#32; R#40).
Another important issue that was discussed by several respondents was the problem
of water user representatives not getting enough information from their peers and
government officials. As a result, representatives were unable to provide sufficient and
relevant information (Knowledge) to those they represent about the activities of the LChBC.
The Evaluation and Monitoring Group (see Figure 3.8), which is where most of the work
done by the Council takes place, usually meets bimonthly. A one page invitation to the
meeting is the only information sent to stakeholders before each meeting. This meetings
usually follow the same format which include confirming and officially declaring that there
is quorum. They then review progress on agreements reached from the previous meeting,
after which seven specialized workgroups provide information about progress made by
their group (if any). It is worth noting here that many participants reported that the only
workgroup that is operating on a regular basis is the Arrangement and Allocation
Workgroup, which is the one overseeing work related to the 2004 Surface Water Allocation
Agreement. Next, the meeting involves a follow-up session on issues related to the Surface
Water Allocation Agreement (which according to most participants is the utmost important
issue handled by the Council), then there are presentations about government programs like
the “Clean Basin Program”. A sample meeting invitation is documented in Appendix X.
Findings from the interviews disclosed that most stakeholders who do not partake
in the meetings only get meeting minutes, which tend to be vague and contain only basic
information about the agreements reached. Respondents also indicated that stakeholders
who assist in the Evaluation and Monitoring Group tend to piece together information to
make sense of meetings. An example of this claim is evident in the following agricultural
user statements about requesting electronic copies of presentations and/or documents after
the meetings:
… the only reason we are informed is because we go to all the meetings of the Evaluation
and Monitoring Group and the Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup. Regrettably,
other water user representatives usually do not go to the meetings and consequently they
are not well informed. […] To be well informed, we also need to go an extra mile of
requesting for further information from the meetings, otherwise, we leave with
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[information overload and] no resources that clearly articulate important aspects of the
meetings (R#6).

Participants agreed that most water user representatives are ill-prepared to defend
the interests of those they represent, and that their contributions to water management in
the LChBC are limited because they only have partial information available to them. Hence,
the theme ‘insufficient education’ (Table 5.1) was a major point of emphasis among all
three groups of participants. Pertaining this theme, water users indicated that “no one tells
you anything… If you want to know something, you have to find out by yourself… it’s
hectic, it’s stressful” (R#17). This lack of knowledge is further worsened by the fact that
several water users do not have a sufficient understanding of their role. For instance, water
users stated that “I have no idea what my role is” within the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council
(R#3, R#13, R#16, R#23). With respect to information exchange among water user
representatives in particular, there were claims that there have been no meetings and no
communication between Board Members and their representees since elections. A
representative from the municipal water services use expressed his disappointment when
he said:
You [the researcher] are the first person that comes to see me about the Lerma-Chapala
Basin Council in over a year. […] I have no clue of what goes on in the Basin Council.
Things are literally dead around here [with regards to the LChBC]… We went to a
meeting [at the Water User Representative Assembly] and elected a representative [Board
Member] for our water use. But after that NOTHING, I mean NOTHING has happened!
It’s crazy, I don’t know anything (R#16)!

These findings reveal deficiencies in stakeholder networks (Coherence) in the
LChBC and further highlight the fact that information in general was not reaching those
involved in negotiations and decision making. In a nutshell, it is sufficient to say that there
exist deficiencies in Knowledge, which represents one of the principles used in this study
to capture ‘information systems’ or thereof (refer to Table 5.1). The implications of this
lack of communication is an uninformed stakeholder participation in the LChBC. Water
user Board Members are not bringing forward the issues that concern their stakeholder
group, mainly because they have no communication with their representees. Hence, the
LChBC is out of tune with the issues that concern stakeholders at lower scales in the basin
(e.g., Sub-basin Commissions, Micro-basin Committees and COTAS), and water problems
at those levels are not being addressed by the basin council. Another effect of this lack of
communication is that stakeholders do not know about the LChBC or its activities, and
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sometimes respondents expressed their dismay when they recognized that “most people in
the basin do not know that the LChBC exists” (R#4, R#8, R#12, R#26, R#50). Which raises
the question of how stakeholders can become part of a participatory scheme if they are not
even aware that this forum exists?
The above discussed issue also illustrates the integrated and multifaceted nature of
water governance. It captures three core principles used in this study, which include
Participation, Coherence and Knowledge. Pertaining the participation principle, the water
governance literature indicates that decision making should involve multiple stakeholders
(Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005), and
that voicing their concerns and defending their rights and interests through legitimate
representation (WWAP, 2003, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009).
Concerning the coherence principle, the literature suggests that vertical and horizontal
information exchange networks can provide a water governance process with legitimacy,
transparency, credibility, and trust, and consequently could also encourage stakeholder
participation (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007; WWAP,
2015).
Finally with regards to knowledge, the literature considers that informed stakeholder
participation can yield negotiations that are more fruitful in the definition of collaborative
objectives and solutions to water management concerns (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes &
Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015). In this regard, Article 9 of the 2004
NWL agrees with these principles when it establishes that the National Water Commission
has the responsibility:
To promote, organize, recognize, and support water user participation at the national
level, and when it is appropriate rely on state governments to do the same at state and
municipal levels, with the objective of improving water resources management, as well
as to encourage wide and informed water user participation, with the capacity for making
decisions and taking on commitments, in terms of Law (DOF, 2004: Article 9 Section
XIX).

Findings reveal a discrepancy between what it is established in the law and what
was happening on the ground. The 2004 NWL establishes that the NWC has to organize
water users so they can participate in water management, and sees wide and informed water
user participation as something to be encouraged. But evidence shows that there is
‘questionable representation’ (Participation), that there is a ‘lack of transparency’
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(Knowledge) because water users are ill informed about the activities of the LChBC.
Consequently, the interaction of multiple principles point to the failure of water user
representatives in their role in helping to implement a viable water governance system in
the LChCB. These findings are best reflected in the words of an aquaculture water user:
Look, they [government] have not explained a lot. We are asked to participate in the
[Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council only to fulfill a requirement… There has not been any of
the meetings mentioned there [at the Water User Representative Assembly]. It is as if the
government just put us there [at the Assembly] to justify their work. […] Sometimes my
colleagues [representees] ask me questions and the only answer I can provide is that ‘I
will ask the authorities because I do not know the answer’… [I believe that] In reality,
the government has only considered us [water users] to fulfill a requirement. I feel
helpless… Sometimes I think about quitting [as a representative] because I am
[disempowered and] not helping my people (R#2).

The above quote further highlights deficiencies in the way theory translates to practice in
the LChBC. While existing policies acknowledge the importance of multiple stakeholder
engagement, one group of stakeholders (i.e., water users) are merely invited to passively
participate with the aim of fulfilling these policy requirements, without the opportunity to
introduce any change in the decision-making process. Water user representatives are poorly
engaged and informed about ongoing developments and have little or no say in water
management decisions.
Most respondents also indicated that participation in the LChBC takes place only
as consultation, and that the Council is just a forum to provide information about progress
in different government programs. These results contrast with what is stated in Article 13bis
3 of the 2004 NWL, which establishes the responsibilities of RBCs, including:
[Section] VI. To develop, revise, reach the necessary compromises, and propose to its
members, a draft of the Hydraulic Program for the basin, along with the intervention of
the corresponding River Basin Organization in conformity with its authority. This draft
will contain investment priorities and specific subprograms by sub-basins, micro-basins,
aquifers, and vital ecosystems, within their territorial delimitation. It shall be presented
as a proposal to the Council members for approval, and if necessary also for the approval
of the regulatory authority. The River Basin Council will promote the implementation,
monitoring, evaluation of results and feedback for the basin’s Hydraulic Program (DOF,
2004: Article 13bis 3, Section VI).

This quote suggest that the type and level of participation considered by Mexican
water policy allows for high levels of power sharing. Based on Arnstein’s latter of citizen
participation (Arnstein, 1969), the 2004 NWL considers that “trade-offs are negotiated, and
there are no unilateral changes” which correspond to the third highest rug of participation
in the ladder (i.e., partnership) (see Table 2.1). It also involves joint analysis of information
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and shared decision-making power to achieve common objectives, suggesting interactive
stakeholder involvement (Mitchell, 2002; Gomez & Nakatt, 2002). Nonetheless, interview
results differ from what is stated in official texts and reveal that many respondents consider
that negotiations about important issues, like financing and infrastructure development, are
made beforehand by NWC and state governments, rather than through discussions and
negotiations in the basin council. This issue is best depicted by the words of a NWC official
when he acknowledged:
All important decisions are made outside the [Lerma-Chapala] Basin Council. All
negotiations and decisions involving programs by the National Water Commission and
projects take place in a bilateral manner… [that is] between state governments and the
NWC. […] In this regard it is hard not to question the role and importance of the council
(R#43).

However, it is also important to point out that respondents also mentioned that there is only
one relevant decision that is made in the LChBC, and that is the yearly allocation of surface
water. Issues pertaining transparency in the allocation of surface water were raised by
several stakeholders, which is best captured in the voice of a state water official who
acknowledged “the allocation of [surface water] volumes is done based on the information
provided by the National Water Commission, and no one else has the means to verify these
numbers” (R#27). This issue concerning decisions being made outside the basin council is
associated with the theme ‘little participation/governments make decisions’ captured in
Table 5.1, and is reflected in the following statement by a baffled industrial water user:
Why do they take water users to vote in the Basin Council if everything has been decided
already? So we [water users] can’t say we were not included? I’m telling you, it’s all a
PRI 24 style democracy, an autocratic rule [by the NWC] in the Basin Council (R#9).

This finding reveals that almost all important decisions were being made
independent of the LChBC. According to Arstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation,
what takes place in the LChBC is ‘non-participation’, which indicates manipulation and is
described as a ‘rubberstamp advisory committee” (Table 2.1). This kind of decision making
follows the traditional state-centred top-down approach to water governance (i.e., the preRio context). Likewise, more than half of all respondents were under the impression that
the Council is used to validate the federal government’s water policy, while many water

24

The Institutional Revolutionary Party, or “PRI” for its Spanish anachronism, was in power for over 70
years in Mexico, and applied a centralized state-centred top-down approach.
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users expressed their frustration saying that they feel they are being ‘played’ with by the
NWC. These aforementioned challenges of water governance are captured in the following
statement by an ‘other services’ water user representative who was frustrated with the poor
state of stakeholder engagement:
I see the Basin Council as a kind of regulating body for NWC […] public officials control
the River Basin Council […]. All decisions are finalized prior to stakeholder engagement,
and the vote is just a requirement. If the government is going to continue making decision
in such manner, why invite me to be part of the Council?… I think my presence at such
meetings is useless. For us [water users] it is a waste of time, a waste of money, OUR
MONEY. Heck! I even lose money because I do not go to work when I have to attend
these meetings… It is all a puppet show, a charade… It seems that the only reason we are
in the LChBC is to fill a requirement… (R#21).

The concerns echoed in the above quote were also evident in the perspective of multiple
stakeholders who felt they were merely a number in the decision-making process and had
no bearing on eventual outcomes. The significance of this issue is that water users feel they
are being used to justify the government’s policies. Several water users mentioned that they
feel as if they were “just part of a checklist” (R#2, R#5, R#10, R#12, R#16, R#21), which
in turn discourages stakeholders to continue or be part of this participatory scheme (i.e., the
LChBC).
Applying the proposed framework in the analysis made it possible to conclude that
most respondents are concerned with the low levels of participation in decision making in
the LChBC. Another major benefit of the proposed framework is its ability to reveal
interrelationships between different water governance principles, and their associated
themes. For instance, key constraints to a viable water governance system in the LChB
which emerged from the analysis of stakeholder perspectives included: (a) ‘questionable
water user’s representation’ and ‘little participation/governments make decisions’
(Participation), (b) ‘legislation gaps’ (Rule of law), (c) ‘insufficient education’ and ‘lack
of transparency’ (Knowledge), and (d) ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ (Coherence). That
is, findings indicate that there is no clear legislation for electing water user representatives,
which results in a lack of transparency, and thereby compromising the legitimacy of water
user’s representatives. This study concludes that a key constraint in the implementation of
a viable water governance system is the failure of water user representatives to advance
issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.

116

This constraint has been confirmed by other researchers. For example, Wester,
Vargas-Velazquez, Mollard, and Silva-Ochoa (2008), found that effective water user
representation in the LChBC has been challenging, and that the selection of water user
representatives to the Council’s Board of Governors has been questionable. The findings
of the present study clarify the questionable nature of these water user representatives, as
it recognizes that there is no clear mechanism for the election of water user representatives
to the LChBC, because of the lack of communication among most water user
representatives and their representees, and because a minority seem to be legitimate
representatives. Findings also confirm that water user participation in the decision-making
process is nascent, based on deficiencies in rule of law, participation, knowledge and
coherence. While the approach adopted by Wester and collaborators (Wester et al., 2008)
focuses on the negotiations on surface water allocation mechanisms, mainly through the
lens of the agricultural water use, this thesis takes a more comprehensive approach and
goes beyond surface allocation conflicts and considers all water uses. Thus, the current
study contributes to the existing literature of the LChB as it reveals that these problems are
not limited to agricultural water users alone, or just to one state in the basin.
6.3

Collaboration and cooperation to solve common water problems in the LermaChapala basin
Political, institutional and occupational silos continue to support a sectoral approach

(i.e., pre-Rio context) to water governance in the LChB. Findings indicate that information
and collaboration networks are weak in the LChB, and consequently, there is no awareness
about water issues involving the different water uses or about existing water-related
problems in other states. As well it is clear that a fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated
approach to water management persists in the Lerma-Chapala basin, thus constraining the
implementation of a viable water governance system. Results also disclose that there is no
institution nor organization promoting the idea of the basin as a planning and management
unit, resulting in the absence of a management plan for the basin.
Water resources management cuts across many sectors, and involves numerous and
often conflicting interests and demands. As discussed in previous chapters, there have been
calls

for

water

governance

systems

that

eliminate

barriers

that

encourage

compartmentalization and polarities among interest groups involved in water management
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(Mitchell, 2013; Giordano & Shah, 2014; Grigg, 2014). Information sharing (Knowledge)
and collaborative efforts (Coherence) are important pieces that could help eliminate these
barriers (i.e., hindrances to Integration). The literature also contends that knowledge and
information should be shared both vertically and horizontally to enable the coordination of
collaborative activities (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Tortajada,
2010a). Sharing knowledge and information also helps establish networks, raise awareness,
and build empathy among stakeholders (Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2012, 2015;
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Also, informed participation at all levels permits
more fruitful negotiations for the establishment of collaborative efforts (Participation),
which in turn support the integrated management of water resources and an effective water
governance process (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; WWAP, 2015).
Results in Section 5.3, confirm that an enabling policy environment has been
established in Mexico for the implementation of water governance system and the
application of an IWRM approach. In this sense, a participatory collaborative and
coordinated approach is considered as the best way forward in the narrative contained in
the official documents (i.e., 2004 NWL, in the 2007-2012 NHP and in the 2006 Internal
Regulations of the NWC). Article 5 Section I of the 2004 NWL captures the diversity of
statements that have been made in this context by establishing the following guiding
principles:
Article 5. For compliance and enforcement of this Law, the Federal Executive branch
[through the National Water Commission]:
[Section] I. Will promote the coordination of actions with state and municipal
governments, without infringing their authority and within the range of their respective
responsibilities. The coordination of actions concerning planning, implementation and
management of water resources by river basin or hydrological region will be through the
River Basin Councils, where the three levels of government converge, and water users,
citizens and civil social organizations participate and assume commitments, under the
provisions of this Law and its regulations (DOF, 2004).

In contrast to the narrative in official documents, most respondents commented
about the existence of fractures that divide stakeholders and limit the impact of
collaborative efforts in the Lerma-Chapala basin. This refers to the ‘fragmentation and
sectorization’ theme that pertains to the Coherence principle. Through the interviews, it
was possible to observe that most respondents look at the basin’s water management
problems from their own personal perspective, influenced by their political, institutional,
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occupational, and professional biases and interests. For example, government officials at
all three levels 25 often made comments based on their affiliation to the three main political
parties (i.e., federal government – National Action Party, state government – Party of the
Democratic Revolution, and municipal government – Institutional Revolutionary Party), or
on the government agency they work under (e.g., agriculture, environment, water, or public
works).
Also, it was observed that many respondents were familiar only with water
management issues within their own state and/or line of work. Some participants had a
vague idea of specific issues in neighbouring states or other water uses, while a few were
familiar with the main water related issues in the basin. Answers like “maybe some issues”
(R#11) or “I assume they have the same problems that we do” (R#3), were not uncommon.
This ‘lack of education’ and information (Knowledge) has resulted in a ‘fragmented and
sectoral’ approach to water planning and management in the basin. The significance is that
this fragmented vision of the basin has done little to promote empathy among stakeholders,
and in turn has limited the opportunities for the establishment of ‘cooperation and
collaboration’ activities geared towards a common goal (Coherence). In this context,
several respondents commented that everyone in the LChBC looks after their own interest,
and defends their turf. In the words of an agricultural state official for instance, “all
activities are independent of each member of the [Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council. We do
not work as a group” (R#35). Clearly such disconnects do not create an enabling
environment for an integrated approach to water governance.
Likewise, participants indicated that some stakeholders even consider that they
must compete with other states and secure more surface water for their state (R#6, R#28,
R#36, R#42). This suggests that stakeholders in the LChBC do not plan or think of the
basin as a management unit (Integration), because they only protect their state’s interests.
Evidence of this fragmentation and their implications for knowledge, coherence and
integration are exemplified in this quote from a state water official who claimed that “when
we go to the meetings [of the basin council], our main duty is to defend our state’s rights,
and that of our water users, to [surface] water resources” (R#28).
25
The great majority (if not all) drinking water and sanitation service utilities in the Lerma-Chapala Basin
are managed by the municipal government; hence, the use of the term municipal water services to label this
water use in Appendix VIII.
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Similar claims related to the ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ theme (Coherence)
were made by other participants such as NWC officials (R#39, R#40, R#42), state
environmental officials (R#30, R#33), and agricultural, industrial, aquaculture water users
(R#1, R#3, R#6, R#8, R#9, R#11). These fractures together show another theory-practice
disconnect in which existing policies aimed at creating effective collaboration networks
and stakeholder integration, are not reflected in practice because of the self-interested
behaviour of stakeholders which, in part, stems from the lack of information.
Maganda (2003) confirmed the presence of fractures or silos when she
acknowledges institutional rivalries between national, state and local water authorities,
triggered by institutional reforms that resulted in lack of clarity pertaining institutional roles
within the LChB. She also argues that this competition among water institutions has
negatively affect water planning and management in the LChB. However, her study only
shows a partial picture of the basin because the focus of her research was on water politics
in Guanajuato, and the institutional conflict with the NWC (see Section 3.5). This thesis
expands on existing knowledge because it includes all five states in the basin and shows
that ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ is a problem exists at multiple levels and manifests
itself within and among different stakeholder groups across the basin.
Many respondents also talked about existing programs and activities associated with
water governance forums that are being implemented in the LChB by different institutions
and organizations with their own budgets and personnel 26. However, fragmentation is a
major limitation in the establishment of collaborative efforts in the basin (Coherence). This
is in part caused by the lack of a single plan of action for the basin (Integration), which was
an issue mentioned by several respondents. The following quote by a state water official
best captures the diversity of responses in this respect:
There have been some efforts made to put together a plan [for the basin]… I believe that
the best attempt to put together information about the basin was made by Helena Colter
with her ‘Atlas’. She provides very valuable information, but it is an atlas… not a plan.
[…] Someone should sit down and talk to people [stakeholders] and put together a plan

26

The National Micro-basin Program (Programa Nacional de Microcuencas) in MALRDFF, and the Green
Farm Program (Programa Ejido Verde) in MENR, and the establishment of Sub-basin Committees in
Michoacan are examples provided by respondents regarding established programs in the LChB that use water
governance forums to cope with environmental, social and economic issues and rehabilitate the higher
portions of the watershed.

120
that considers the entire basin. […] It would probably have to be the [LChB] Council…
Ha, ha, ha [satirical laugh]! And who would that be?... The NWC (R#25)?

Without a plan for the entire basin, the impact of programs, budgets and activities of
institutions and organizations is dispersed. Some respondents recognised that these isolated
efforts of institutions and organizations have little impact on solving present problems.
Some respondents also talked about collaborative activities that are not linked with the
LChBC that have been established to improve water conditions in the basin. The common
denominator in these collaborative networks (Coherence) was that they have been
established because of good working relationships between individuals in decision-making
positions. The following quote by an official of the Ministry of the Environment and
Natural Resources provides an excellent example in this context:
We have a collaborative program between the municipality, PROFEPA 27 and the NWC.
[…] This are coordinated visits to [different] industries and we avoid problems with lack
of clarity [gaps and overlaps] concerning institutional roles and authority. Before the
industrialist would question who had authority and argue that it was someone else’s role.
Now we go together and we can cover all angles. […] What happened is that my boss is
very well connected and knows a lot of people, so she talked with some people and now
we have a collaboration agreement (R#48).

The present framework made it possible to identify aspects of informal systems creating
synergies, conjugating actions, and having a greater impact in benefit of the basin.
Nonetheless, from the formal perspective, these informal networks are not complementing
the efforts of the Council. This is interpreted here as a lack of coherence due to the
‘fragmentation and sectorization’ of water related activities in the LChB.
‘Fragmentation and sectorization’ also restrains vertical and horizontal information
flows. With regards to the LChBC, almost all respondents acknowledged that information
that is provided during meetings (to those who request it), does not flow beyond its Board
Members and the state and federal officials directly involved in the Council. Thus, there
exist differences in Knowledge dissemination. Officials from the NWC stated that they
send the Minutes of the meetings via email to the members of the Council. However, most
water users (who are not Board Members) indicated that they do not get any information
or that they do not read the Minutes. Consequently, a common answer during the interviews
was “I do not know” (R#2, R#13, R#19). These findings together show that the top-down

27

Spanish acronym for the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection.
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and bottom-up flow of information (which is considered as central to a successful water
governance system) are very weak at best. This further discloses deficiencies in
transparency (i.e., the principle of Knowledge). Stakeholders involved in the Council tend
to work and act independent of each other, which results in the structure of the LChBC
being fragmented (Coherence) and no synergies being created. In line with the
aforementioned problems of ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ and ‘lack of transparency’,
a frustrated livestock water user remarked:
It is WRONG! Information is not reaching any water users. It’s getting to NOBODY! For
instance, none of us [in the livestock association] knew about the existence of COTAS
nor of the River Basin Council... (R#12).

Many respondents stated that water users in the LChB do not understand the concept
of a “basin”. Several respondents also indicated that there are awareness campaigns in the
basin. However, these awareness activities are carried out by state and municipal
institutions and are aimed at addressing local problems, activities and programs. But they
do not promote awareness about water resources issues beyond the institution’s area of
influence. In this respect, a water user representative for municipal water services
commented that:
Here, at the municipal level, we work on raising awareness through our ‘water culture’
program, which we finance with our own budget. […] Combining efforts with the state
government is not possible. There is the issue that we belong to different political parties.
Also, our awareness campaigns have different messages… even slogans and logos are
different. […] Collaborative efforts with the state government are considered taboo, by
both sides. We finance our ‘water culture’ programs and we cover topics that are of our
interest (R#18).

Most respondents agreed that there are no awareness activities concerning the basin, or
platforms promoting the basin as a management unit. There are no activities informing the
population that there is a River Basin Council, its purpose, associated participants, and
related activities and achievements. In this respect a NWC official stated that:
No, there is no one promoting the idea of the basin as a unit. That is something we are
still missing in the basin. There hasn’t been anyone that says ‘let’s look at things from an
integrated water resource management perspective.’ […] We still do not see a situation
[in the LChBC] in which state representatives see the problem and the solution through
the standpoint of a basin. Each one of the representatives still go to the meetings with a
local perspective [or point of view] (R#42).

Findings from implementing the framework presented in this thesis led to the conclusion
that ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ does not allow stakeholders to visualize the basin as
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unit, resulting in one dimensional activities which only serve their respective interests. For
example, a NWC official reflected on this problem as follows:
You have to make people aware that they are part of the basin. They do not even know
what a basin is. [...] The basin concept does not exist for them. So then, how are we [the
National Water Commission] going to take action at the basin level if those living within
the basin do not know they have common problems and that they are part of common
solutions? So much work needs to be done… starting at the grassroots level. Work that
hasn’t been done since the beginning [when the LChBC was created]… We [the NWC]
have lagged behind and we are still not raising awareness about the basin. We are still
not increasing awareness and it is still not considered to be important by those making
decisions (R#40).

By applying the proposed water governance framework in a content analysis of
interviews, it became evident that most respondents expressed disappointment about the
lack of coordination and collaboration among stakeholders (Coherence), and the slow rate
of progress in solving water management problems in the basin. This is illustrated by the
testimonial of a state water official who indicated that:
Progress is too slow and we grew anxious very quickly, so we asked ourselves: ‘What do
we need the Basin Council for?’ We are doing everything with our own programs and
resources anyway (R#26).

Other key constraint that emerged from the analysis of interrelationships between several
water governance principles in the interviews included: (a) ‘fragmentation and
sectorization’ (Coherence), (b) ‘insufficient education’ and ‘lack of transparency’
(Knowledge), and (c) ‘regional development’ as opposed to ‘basin planning and
management’ (Integration), which expose key constraints to the implementation of a viable
water governance system. This helps build on the pioneering work of Ashton, Patrick,
MacKay, and Weaver (2005:452), who were the first to emphasise that “it is the integration
and inclusion of all these principles that underpins the definition of good governance”.
Findings reveal that stakeholders are not aware of the problems that afflict other
water uses in their state or other states, and this does not allow them to appreciate the need
for collaborative actions to solve common problems. The implication is that their partial
knowledge of the water problems of the basin limits their options because they are not
aware that the solution to some problems present in one part of the basin could be found in
other parts of the basin; hence the lack of a holistic approach to problem solving. Findings
show that the LChBC does not properly inform its stakeholders (or the general population
of the basin) about existing management problems, about its initiatives aimed at solving

123

these problems, or promote the idea of the basin, and therefore does not promote the
potential of the water governance forum as a tool to implement an IWRM process. This
study concludes that another key constraint to the implementation of a viable water
governance system is the presence of a fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach
to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are
being implemented in the Lerma-Chapala basin. Although the value of well-coordinated
approaches to water governance are acknowledged within existing policies and plans, they
manifest poorly in practice.
6.4

Decentralization policies for the water sector
Power and authority remains concentrated in Mexico City. Findings reveal an

implementation gap between what is stated in official documents and what was happening
in practice in the LChB. Results from the interviews indicate that decentralization has been
achieved only partially, and that decision making in the water sector remains for the most
part centralized. This implies that local context is not considered in decision making,
planning, and management of water resources in the LChB.
The transfer of power and authority to lower levels of authority (basin level)
involves the principle of subsidiarity. For a water governance system to be viable it is
necessary to plan and transfer management authority to several administrative and
geographical scales (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Tortajada, 2010a).
As discussed in Chapter 2, water governance calls for the elimination of high-handed
decisions, with the aim of ensuring that decisions and actions are more in tune with the
context and scale in which issues present themselves (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003,
2006, 2015; Conca, 2006). An effective and efficient water governance process should
adequately respond to local issues, and consequently, be able to deliver what is needed,
where it is needed, and when it is needed (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003;
WWAP, 2003, 2006). Therefore, the theme decentralization to the lowest relevant scale,
associated with the subsidiarity principle, is considered an important element for
establishing an effective water governance process.
In that sense, Mexico has followed decentralization policies since the 1980s
(Rodriguez, 1997), and the narrative in the 2004 NWL, the 2006 Internal Regulations of
the NWL and the 2007-2012 NHP follow the same pattern for the water sector. The official
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narrative mainly revolves around improving water efficiency and water services through
the transfer of responsibilities to local levels of government and civil social organizations.
It also encompasses the consolidation of institutions and organizations involved in
planning, developing, managing and conservation of water resources, which is a process
that (in theory) began two decades earlier (see sections 3.3 and 3.6). For example, the 20072012 National Hydraulic Program (NHP) states that:
Regarding the decentralization of power, we [the federal government] will continue with
the transfer of authority, roles, programs, responsibilities and resources from the
federation to state governments, municipalities and water users, to bring government and
citizens closer together, to improve outcomes in the sustainable management of water
resources, to expand joint responsibility of all three levels of government, to strengthen
management capacities and to increase administrative efficiency of the government as a
whole (CONAGUA, 2008a:76).

In contrast, most respondents interviewed contended that decentralization has not
been complete, stressing that it has been partially achieved, or that it only exists on paper.
They mentioned that decisions regarding water policy, planning, development and
management are still being made at the NWC’s headquarters. For example, a state water
official emphasized that “things are still done in the same way. […] They are decentralizing
the National Water Commission, but decisions are still made in Mexico City” (R#24).
Similar claims were echoed by all three groups of participants. Some interviewees indicated
that the headquarters still provides the final approval for most federal programs like those
for the construction or maintenance of water related infrastructure; even when the programs
have been transferred to state governments. A few respondents stressed that this happens
mainly because headquarters still authorizes and releases the federal funds assigned to those
programs. Further insight into this process is detailed by a state water official in the
following quote:
It depends on the way the project is funded. If the money comes from the state treasury,
then the negotiation is between the municipality and the state government. […] Now,
when projects are [partly or fully] funded by federal programs […] then negotiations
involve municipal, state and federal governments. […] Once we have everything
approved by the NWC’s Local Office, then the entire package [for each program] is sent
to Mexico City [NWC headquarters] for [final] approval (R#26).

Consequently, in 2008, there were areas within NWC that were still carrying out activities
that should have been already transferred to state governments, municipalities or water user
organizations. This problem is captured in the following statement by an official of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (MALRDFF).
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All irrigation districts where supposed to be transferred completely to Water User
Organizations by now… that was the idea. But [areas working on] irrigation districts
continue to exist within the structure of the National Water Commission. Today there is
in the NWC the office of the Chief of Operations, and the office of the Chief of Irrigation
and Drainage Engineering. What was transferred [to Water User Organizations] was the
operational part, but the government still keeps control of irrigation systems. [...] Planning
for the irrigation systems is still carried out by NWC. There is no real transfer still (R#51).

Another form of decentralization contained in Mexico’s policies pertain to River
Basin Organizations (RBOs). The 13 Regional Management Offices (see Section 3.6)
created with the publication of the Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission
in 1993 (SARH, 1993), were transformed into RBOs by the 2004 National Water Law.
RBOs are defined in Chapter III Bis of the 2004 NWL as technically, administratively and
legally specialized autonomous units assigned directly to the Director General’s Office of
the National Water Commission, and are not subordinated to any other areas at NWC’s
headquarters (DOF, 2004). This means that RBOs are mandated to follow the subsidiarity
principle by bringing decision making closer to the basin level. However, many
respondents acknowledge that centralized-bureaucratic top-down systems remain
persistent. As an industrial water user representative remarked “… decentralization has
occurred in structure but not in decision making…” (R#9). Many respondents also agreed
that water policy and programs are not developed at the basin level. These statements are
in opposition with what is established in the 2004 NWL and the 2006 Internal Regulations
of the NWC. For example, several respondents indicated that even simple decisions like
granting or renewing water concession certificates, which according to the 2004 NWL
should be done by the RBOs (Article 12bis 6, Section XIII), are still being executed at the
NWC’s headquarters in Mexico City. The following testimonial by a NWC official
provides further insight to this regard:
Water concession certificates are made here and then they are validated Mexico City. [...]
The main argument is the workload, and headquarters has more staff. But in an IWRM
approach, we would have to manage water concession certificates at the basin level, and
that is the spirit of the [2004 National Water] Law [...] I suppose it is part of a process,
and we would need a change in mentality (R#43).

The concentration of simple activities at the NWC headquarters has been creating
administrative and management problems in the water sector. The irony is that by
complying with the law by decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of authority (i.e.,
RBO), the NWC could mitigate a number of problems, while making the institution more
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responsive to local needs. For example, the inefficiency of a centralized water concession
renewal process was creating problems at the NWC’s Local Management Offices, mainly
because of delays in issuing certificates which typically take many years. A water user
representative for ‘other services’ provides further insight in this regard when he comments
in disbelief:
I went to a big political event with the Mayor, NWC officials, and other prominent
personalities, to deliver groundwater concession certificates […] what made me laugh
was that we got our certificates eight years late […]. The big deal was that at the event
we were told [by the NWC] to start the renewal process because the concessions are for
ten years. […] There was an important number of wells that got their certificates delivered
that day, and there were people [water users] that got their concessions and these had
already expired […]. It is then when you tell yourself: ‘Eight, ten years late? Things move
very slowly in the NWC!’ (R#20).

Based on these findings, this thesis concludes that the centralization of decision making at
the NWC’s headquarters opposes the subsidiarity principle, thus presenting a challenge for
the establishment of a viable water governance process. The following quote by a NWC
official captures the diversity of responses in this context.
Supposedly, with the decentralization [of NWC], River Basin Organization would gain
strength managing their own budgets and work their programs at a basin level, and in
theory Local Offices would be dependent from the River Basin Organization and not from
Headquarters […] But in reality IT DOESN’T HAPPEN THAT WAY! Because decision
making and water policy are still marked by [NWC’s] headquarters (R#40).

The creation of River Basin Councils (RBCs), such as the LChBC, is also part of Mexico’s
decentralisation policy in the water sector. RBCs are to exercise their functions through
Auxiliary Organizations that work at different scales (Figure 3.9), which in essence
complies with the subsidiarity principle. This study found a major inconsistency between
the official documents and what was happening on the ground. This policy-practice
disconnect tends to constrain progress in the consolidation of the LChBC. In this respect,
most respondents agree that there has been no decentralization of responsibilities from the
NWC to the LChBC or its’ Auxiliary Organizations. Participants also consider that
decentralization has not diffused from Mexico City to the Basin Council.
Some progress has been made with regards to public participation in water
management and the creation of several COTAS and some Sub-Basin Commissions in the
LChB. However, most respondents stated that these water user organizations are not linked
with the Basin Council (Coherence). All work in the LChBC is restricted to issues at the
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basin level (i.e., allocation of surface water) and does nothing related to smaller scales
which would involve its Auxiliary Organizations. This thesis exposes the existence of
limited collaboration and coordination activities between the LChBC and its Auxiliary
Organizations. The following quote by an official of the NWC best captures this challenge:
There is no link… There is no strategy… [Sub-] Basin Commissions and COTAS are part
of local initiatives. There is no line of action provided by [NWC’s] headquarters.
Headquarters support the creation of [Sub-] Basin Commissions and COTAS, but there
is no strategy… At least I do not think there is [a strategy]! … Headquarters have not
addressed the issue of how to link the Basin Council with the [Sub-] Basin Commissions,
or with COTAS. […] I believe that the NWC does not know what to make of the River
Basin Councils… It’s a bit like Alice [a character from Lewis Carroll novel]… If you
don’t know where you are going, it doesn’t much matter which way you go (R#39).

There is evidence that progress has been slow because of the inherent constraints placed by
traditional autocratic forces within the NWC that do not see water user engagement as an
essential component in a viable water governance system. The following quote by a state
water official illustrates the context in which water user participation has developed in
Mexico and the LChBC since the enactment of the NWL in 1992:
I believe that in the beginning there was an intention to establish public participation in
decision making. The Basin Council project design was put together [before 1992] by
Eduardo Mestre, based on French and Spanish examples. In 1997, Mestre is replaced by
Guillermo Chavez Zarate and he puts into practice what the 1992 National Water Law
established. […] Internal resistance did exist within the National Water Commission,
from strong and traditional sectors where the style of government is unilateral
[authoritarian], ‘I do not need to allow others to participate, especially not water users,’
thus was perceived. […] Of course, they never put it in writing (R#24).

This thesis reinforces the idea that institutional organizational legacies have a dominant
role during regime change (i.e., from pre-Rio to post-Rio), and consequently, they have the
potential to facilitate or restrict progress in the transition from the old to the new water
management model (i.e., IWRM). This idea is also supported by the work of various
researchers who consider that the legacy of institutional arrangements can facilitate or
restrict the role played by stakeholders; thus, determining the (un)successful
implementation of a viable water governance system (Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Horlemann
& Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen et al., 2015; Boer et al.,2016).
Similar finding emerged in the work of Wilder (2010), who states that Mexico’s
decentralization agenda has been only partial and very incomplete, stressing that water
policy appears stuck in a transitional phase for almost twenty years. Wilder (2010) also
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points to related issues such as political fragmentation, potential challenges to the status
quo and at the lack of strong political will as possible explanations for policies and laws
not being effectively implemented. Her research is different in the sense that it uses a policy
science approach. The present study validates Wilder’s work by including a more diverse
set of voices to this research context. Specifically, while Wilder’s study relied on the voices
of irrigation districts and water institutions, the current study includes the voices of various
water uses, environmental and agricultural officials, as well as state and federal executives.
Also, while Wilder focused on efficiency, decentralization and sustainability principles, the
present study looks at a broader scope of issues in the context of the five proposed water
governance principles.
Most participants agreed that policy and decision making remains largely
centralized at the National Water Commission’s headquarters. Results confirm what has
been previously established, that there is an interaction among principles and their
associated themes, which point to the existence of a constraint for the implementation of a
viable water governance system. In this case, the themes which were mentioned by most
participants are related to: (a) ‘centralized decision making’ (Coherence), (b) ‘regional
development planning and management’ (Integration), (c) ‘lack of transparency’
(Knowledge), and (d) ‘little participation/governments make decisions’ (Participation).
Findings also show that the NWC has not decentralized authority to its River Basin
Organizations nor does to the River Basin Councils. Decisions continue to be made in a
top-down manner by the NWC’s headquarters, since the authorization of federal fuds are
still controlled from Mexico City. This finding also suggests that the 2004 NWL is being
partially applied at best, which raises questions regarding transparency and accountability.
This thesis concludes that the key constraint in this case is that decision making remains
centralized and does not consider local context.
6.5

The rules for managing water resources in the Lerma-Chapala basin
There is a noticeable gap in key water legislation in Mexico. Findings disclose

management and structural issues such unregulated water banks, and uncertainty in the
roles and authority of RBOs and RBCs, due to the lack of detailed regulations. Not having
the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 National Water Law has left a significant gap in
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Mexico’s water legislation, which represents another constraint to a viable water
governance system.
The literature specifies that a strong legal and administrative framework is a
cornerstone in the establishment of an effective water governance system (Moench et al.,
2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; UNDP, 2004; Grigg, 2011). Consequently, it is important that
the ‘rules of the game’ and the roles of stakeholders are clearly defined and publicly
disclosed, and that authority is exercised and enforced impartially and in accordance with
established rules (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006). From a theoretical
perspective, a strong legal and administrative framework should bring legitimacy, clarity,
transparency, order and credibility to a water governance process while reducing arbitrary
actions and decisions.
The literature acknowledges that Mexico has been supported by a strong legal and
institutional framework for over eight decades (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001; Mestre,
2001a; Dourojeanni et al., 2002). The existence of a legal and institutional framework is
confirmed by the eighteen documents analysed in Section 5.1, which span over three
decades and include laws, policies and institutional structures for the water sector. Also,
results in Section 5.3, establishes that the content of the 2004 NWL, the 2007-2012 NHP,
and the 2006 Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission, have are enough
elements (on paper) to establish a viable water governance system in the LChB. The
following quote illustrates how the general objectives of the 2004 NWL allude to the rule
of law.
ARTICLE 1. This Law regulates Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution [of 1917] in
matter of the nation’s waters, and is of general abidance throughout the entire national
territory. Its provisions are of public order and social interest and its purpose is to regulate
the exploitation, use or utilization of the nation’s waters, their distribution and control, as
well as the preservation of their quantity and quality to achieve their sustainable
development (DOF, 2004).

However, there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, as many respondents
identified existing legislation enforcement deficiencies (Rule of law). In its transitory
articles, the 2004 NWL state that its mandatory Regulations should be enacted “within a
period not exceeding twelve months from the entry into force of” the reforms to the NWL
(DOF, 2004: Third Transitory Article). Nonetheless, many respondents acknowledged that
the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law had not been published.
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Consequently, the 2004 NWL law cannot be fully enforced in the LChB, nor in any other
basin in Mexico. The Regulations being enforced during fieldwork (July-October 2008)
were the Regulations of the 1992 NWL, which according to several respondents have
become for the most part obsolete 28. A NWC official provided further insight and reiterated
the above view when stating:
The Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law have not been published yet, but we
still have the previous ones. […] We thought that the Regulations of the 2004 NWL would
come out shortly after the publication of the Law. […] With regards to river basin
councils, […] we have consulted with the legal areas [of the NWC’s headquarters,] and
there are parts that are not ruled by the Regulations of the 1992 NWL. There are also
many problems with ‘Water Banks’ […]. There is a great gap in water legislation that the
legal areas of the National Water Commission are trying to substantiate through legal
processes, without transgressing the [National Water] Law (R#44).

There are several topics considered in the 2004 NWL that were going to be further
addressed in its mandatory Regulations. However, this ‘legislation gap’ (Rule of law) has
left an assortment of topics without detailed regulations; thus, creating a variety of
challenges related with water management. Among the topics that were discussed by
respondents were ‘water banks,’ the roles and responsibilities of RBOs, and the
restructuring and operation of River Basin Councils.
Groundwater overdraft is one of the main water management problems in the in the
LChB. Nonetheless, water users and state government officials complained about the lack
of control in the extraction of groundwater resources. They referred to existing issues like
the arbitrary allotment of groundwater volumes (‘lack of transparency’ - Knowledge) and
the unreliability of the data in the Public Registry of Water Concessions (‘inefficient
information systems’ - Knowledge). Water banks are described in the 2004 NWL as bodies
“in which the regulated operations for the transfer of water rights will be managed, and
whose functions will be established by the respective regulations” (DOF, 2004: Article
37bis). The law provides for the application of water banks, but no mechanism had been
institutionalised to regulate them because of the ‘legal gap’. Several water users and
government officials mentioned that there is an urgent need for detailed regulations on

28

The Regulations of the NWL available on line, accessed on April, 11, 2017 from the Chamber of Deputies
of
the
Congress
of
the
Union
Web
Page
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/regley/Reg_LAN_250814.pdf are those published on January 12
1994, and the last reform to this legal document is dated as August 25, 2014. It important to note that the last
reforms to Chapter III on River Basin Councils are the ones made in 1997.
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water banks. They commented about irregularities and abuses, as volumes were being
bought, sold and transferred in an unregulated market. Pertaining these issue water users
indicated that “volumes [of water] are being bought and sold, but there is no one checking
them...” (R#9), and no agent “who keeps records of all these transactions” (R#19)? or “how
do [potential] buyers know who has [excess] volumes to sell.” (R#15) Some respondents
even suggested problems concerning corruption, exemplified in the following quote from
an agricultural state official’s discourse:
Supposedly there is no more water available to allocate [in the LChB]… But in practice,
you realize that there are groundwater concessions with volumes that are not being used,
that they have been allocated more water than they need, and that in some cases these
excess volumes are being used to do business […]. The National Water Commission says
that the only option if you want more [ground] water [in the Lerma-Chapala basin] is to
purchase water rights through the water banks… But, there is no regulation for these water
banks. Where are this water banks? How do I buy or sell volumes?... The recognition that
you can buy water means that somebody is not using all the water allocated in their
concessions, otherwise why would they sell it (R#38).

Several respondents also voiced their concern about the activities of the unregulated
water banks and the transference of volumes is being used to drill new wells in aquifers
that were already being overexploited. They questioned the legitimacy of the water
concessions and the transfer of volumes, and mentioned that the NWC does not monitor
the existence of illegal wells, or that the volumes authorised in legitimate concessions are
the ones that are being extracted (Rule of law). Many respondents explained that the
information in the Public Registry of Water Concessions (PRWC) is inaccurate and/or
unreliable (Knowledge), and this situation seems to be worsening due to the unregulated
activities of the water banks. The following quote by a representative of municipal water
services captures these diversity of responses:
I have found many surprises in the PRWC… For example, there have been new
subdivisions in residential areas [in the city], and we request from them [developers] a
copy of the authorization of the National Water Commission for a certain volume of
water, before we approve construction… The developers brought us a Groundwater
Concession Certificate granted by the NWC… We then checked the concession number
in the PRWC, and it turns out that the Certificate the developers gave us is already
registered in the State of Nuevo Leon [almost a thousand kilometers away]… Someone
had already made a transference of the Concession on the side, or something like that!
How did this happen?… We don’t know!... The people who do this transferences are so
cunning that they are capable of much (R#17).
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The assessment framework proposed in this study made it possible to identify that not
having the mandatory Regulations (i.e., deficiencies in the Rule of law) is making it harder
to have accurate information about groundwater (Knowledge), and making the management
of groundwater resources more difficult; thus, resulting in a negative impact on water
resources (Integration). In the case of the LChBC, this gap in key legislation could be
making the problem of groundwater depletion even more complex and critical. Findings
reveal that a gap in key legislation has translated into a lack of transparency, clarity, and
credibility, and even results in doubts around the legacy of the governance process.
Many respondents also acknowledged that the absence of the mandatory
Regulations of the 2004 NWL has created structural problems related to the authority and
roles of RBOs and RBCs. The previous section discussed how the 2004 NWL gives more
autonomy, new roles, and new powers to RBOs, and ways in which the decentralization of
authority from the NWC headquarter to RBO has not taken place. A partial explanation lies
in the ‘legislation gap’ (Rule of law) identified through the proposed framework. In
repeated occasions, the 2004 NWL states that the authority of RBOs will be “established
in this Law and its [mandatory] regulations”. On occasion, this document makes reference
to the Internal Regulations 29 of the NWC. Some certainty concerning the authority and
responsibilities of officials overseeing different priority areas within the commission was
provided within the Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission in 2006. While
this helped narrow legislation gaps, some gaps continue to persist. This finding exposes the
‘lack of transparency’ (Knowledge) and accountability (Rule of law) in policy
implementation. Several respondents were of the view that modifications to the structure,
role and authority of the RBO have not been implemented, as echoed by the testimonial of
a state water official indicated that:
Apparently River Basin Organizations have new powers and new roles, they also have
new job appointments and titles. [...] However, as time goes by it is becoming clear that
not everything has been transferred to the RBOs …. There are still gray areas [in the
legislation] that create confusion regarding who is responsible for what (R#25).

This finding shows that a gap in the regulatory framework has an impact on several
aspects of a water governance system. In the case of the LChB, the lack of detailed

29

Internal Regulations are official documents that also referred to as ‘institutional structure documents’ in
the current study.
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regulations created issues with water management activities such those related to water
banks, as well as structural problems such as the ones with RBOs and RBCs. The 2004
NWL established guidelines for a new RBC structure, specifically for’ Board of Governors.
However the structure could not be implemented because there were not mandatory
regulations established to do so. Because of this gap in key legislation, the LChBC had not
been restructured to comply with the 2004 NWL. Consequently, the structure of the basin
council during the fieldwork was the one established in the mandatory Regulations of the
1992 NWL, and in the BCOOR. The present study concludes that another constraint in the
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin rests on
not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law.
6.6

Institutional roles and capacities for water management
The study findings suggest that the National Water Commission does not have the

structures in place to fulfill its roles and enforce its authority effectively in the LChB.
Findings show major discrepancies between what is established in official documents and
what was happening in practice. This section discusses how the institutional structure of
the NWC constrain the implementation of a viable water governance system in the LChB.
Literature suggests that it is important to match institutional roles with relevant
authorities to ensure the proper functioning of water governance systems (WWAP, 2003;
Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007). Having roles and responsibilities clearly
defined and establishing systems of checks and balances brings transparency to water
governance systems and allow for government officials and institutions to be held
accountable for their actions, decisions and/or omissions (WWAP, 2003; Tortajada, 2010a;
WGF, 2012).
The NWC is Mexico’s sole water authority. According to Article 6 of the Internal
Regulations of the NWC, the water authority is spatially organised in two levels (i.e.,
national and regional) with administrative units that are hierarchically subordinated to the
Director General’s Office of the NWC (SEMARNAT, 2006). RBOs and Local
Management Offices are important pieces in the NWC’s decentralization strategy (Wilder,
2010), as this structure is intended to allow the federal institution to be more responsive to
local issues, thus complying with the subsidiarity principle (Coherence). Article 86 of the
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2006 Internal Regulations of the NWC, articulates this point by listing the functions of
Local Management Offices as follows:
In support River Basin Organizations, Local Management Offices are to exercise its
authority and its operational, executive, administrative and legal activities, with regards
to integrated water resources management and the public goods under its care
(SEMARNAT, 2006: Article 86, Section III).

The assessment framework proposed in this thesis was able to identify structural
problems associated with the theme of ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (Coherence).
Most respondents indicated that the NWC does not have enough staff at the local level to
fulfill their duties around the supervision of infrastructure development, overseeing various
programs, and enforcing various laws and pieces of legislation. Many respondents
mentioned that the NWC has a very strong structure at the headquarters and a weak one at
the local level. Evidence of these nationally strong and locally weak structures are captured
in the following statement made by a NWC official:
If you look at the structure of the River Basin Organizations, they are not the same as
those in Headquarters. Headquarters have more areas to carry out their work. […] RBO
do not have the strength and structure they have in Mexico City; and it is even worse at
the Local Office… We have an Inverted Pyramid Structure! The Local Office is the one
that has less personnel and has the weakest structure. Here [at the local office] many areas
have been merged. The work that is carried out by two sub-directions at the RBO, is done
here by only one (R#41).

The NWC’s limited operational capacity was cited by water users and government officials
as being the root cause of most water management problems such as water pollution, the
existence of an unknown number of illegal wells, the drilling of new wells without
concessions, and groundwater extraction without supervision among other issues. The
following testimonial by a livestock water user reflects some of these concerns that were
expressed by a variety of stakeholders:
Not having enough staff is a big problem when it comes to enforcing the law […] The
government has applied an irrational criteria to reduce its bureaucratic burden and they
have cut it too thin. There is only little staff left and the National Water Commission has
stopped doing acts of authority. They don’t act as authority any more. They have no
ability to operate and enforce their authority (R#9).

According to Sandoval (2004) and Castro (2006), budget restrictions and personnel
cuts that occurred during the 1990s reduced the capacity of the federal authority to monitor,
measure, regulate and manage water resources effectively. This pattern continued, and it
was reported that the labour force of the NWC, which stood 38,188 employees in 1989
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dropped to as low as 13,406 in 2008, with most layoffs taking place at the local level
(CONAGUA, 2011a, 2014a). This provides further explanation for the NWC’s limited
operational capacity at the local scale. Respondents acknowledged that though the NWC
has highly qualified staff, it is impossible for them to fulfill all their administrative,
operative, and enforcement duties effectively due to its limited labour force. The following
quote by a NWC official captures the diversity of responses in this context:
Honestly, we do not have the human capacity for regulatory oversight… How many
projects can you oversee when you have only one engineer and over fifty projects to
supervise? We do not have the capacity to see if contractors or municipalities actually did
what they told us they were going to do. We do not have the capacity to monitor and
oversee... and supervising construction projects is not the only thing he does. We know
exactly what we should be doing. However, we don’t have enough staff to do it. We are
trying our best [at the local level], but we need more staff to be successful (R#39).

Findings from implementing the proposed assessment framework led to the
conclusion the ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (Coherence), the ‘lack of law
enforcement’ (Rule of law), and the interaction of these themes and principles, represent
major problems that have negatively impacted water resources management (i.e., water
pollution and overexploitation of groundwater resources), the credibility of the NWC, and
the establishment of a viable water governance system in the LChB.
This study also found disconnects between policy and practice regarding the role of
the NWC. From the policy perspective, the literature encourages the avoidance of
conditions in which management and regulatory roles are merged under a single authority,
since that creates operational and credibility problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP,
2006; Batchelor, 2007; Grigg, 2011). However, in practice the NWC is the sole water
authority in Mexico and is responsible for development, management and regulatory
activities associated with water resources. This condition is reflected in Article 9 of the
2004 NWL establishes that:
The purpose of the National Water Commission is to exercise the powers conferred to the
water authority and establish itself as the Federation’s Governing Body with technical,
regulatory and advisory status, in matters of integrated water resources management,
including the administration, regulation, control and protection of the public water
domain (DOF, 2004).

In this context, several respondents remarked that the NWC administers water resources,
enforces the law, and sanctions those who do not comply with the law, and that this
institutional structure has led to situations of abuse, corruption and negligence. Some
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respondents indicated that water users are afraid to present complaints about irregularities
or corruption, because they are fearful of potential reprisals, including the cancellation of
their water concessions by the NWC (R#13, R#19, R#25, R#28, R#41). There were a few
respondents who pointed out that the NWC is fulfilling the roles of ‘judge, jury and
executioner’; hence the feeling that credible systems of checks and balances had to be
established. An excellent example of this discussion is provided by a NWC official who
remarked that:
The National Water Commission is playing the role of judge and jury. […] No, I don’t
think that there is any interest nor vision to change the structure of the institution... The
NWC’s failure to act, or to do as little as possible, is because there is no one forcefully
demanding us [NWC] to change… The NWC is not enforcing the law, and until someone
comes and demands that we change and enforce the law, we are going to continue as we
are: laying low, taking it easy, without hassle (R#42).

Findings from implementing the framework further revealed that most respondents
are concerned about ‘inadequate institutional structures’ (Rule of law) that often stem from
the sole water authority having contradictory roles. For example, the same authorities hold
administrative and enforcement roles. Accordingly, study respondents alluded to the fact
that this results in ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (i.e., the lack of Coherence)
particularly at the local level. The interaction of these principles and associated themes are
in part responsible for the slow progress towards improving water management in the
LChB, as manifested in the prevalence of problems such as the overexploitation of
groundwater resources, the pollution levels in rivers and lakes, and the conflicts for overallocated surface water resources. This study concludes that a constraint in the
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin is directly
linked to deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission.
6.7

Water allocation mechanisms in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council
A major accomplishment in the LChBC has been the successful negotiation of a

treaty for the allocation of scarce water resources. Findings disclose that stakeholders
successfully engaged in a deliberative decision-making process that resulted in this treaty.
Legally binding agreements such as water resource allocation treaties represent an
important aspect of water governance regulatory frameworks that reduce arbitrary
decisions and actions, help mitigate conflicts, and provide legitimacy, clarity, transparency
and credibility to the water governance process (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006,
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2015). Mexico’s official water management documents recognize the relevance of
including water users in negotiations to reach widely acceptable solutions to water
management problems. Article 13bis 4 of the 2004 NWL provides a good example in this
regard.
In conformity with this Law and its regulations, the National Water Commission, through
River Basin Organizations and within the scope of River Basin Councils, will consult
with water users and civil social organizations to solve potential temporary limitations to
existing water rights, in order to cope with emergencies, extreme scarcity, hydrological
imbalance, overexploitation, [water] reserves, pollution, and risk, or when the
sustainability of vital ecosystems is compromised; by the same token, [the NWC] will
solve the limitations arising from the existence or declaration and implementation of
regulated zones, reserve zones and prohibition zones. In these cases, domestic and
municipal water uses will have priority [over other uses] (DOF, 2004: Article 13bis 4).

Findings in this thesis reveal that the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement
was praised by several respondents as the greatest achievement of the Lerma-Chapala Basin
Council. A common reflection was expressed by a NWC official when he said, “the [surface
water] Allocation Agreement […] took a lot of work and time, but it is a great achievement”
(R#43). Similarly, participants made it clear that this is the only case where negotiations
and decisions pertaining an important conflict have been made in the LChBC, and in
particular within the ‘Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup’ (Figure 3.8). In contrast to
the constraints already discussed in this chapter, this achievement complies with what is
established in Mexico’s water policy (i.e., Article 13bis 4 of the 2004 NWL). This reflects
a good example of successful policy-practice connection. Hence, this study acknowledges
the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement as a major achievement.
The main conflict in the LChB is the allocation of surface water, which resulted into
the signing of the 1991 ‘Agreement on Availability, Distribution and Water Uses’ by
government representatives from the five states in the basin and the National Water
Commission without the participation of water users. But this agreement proved to be
inadequate in mitigating conflicts, evident in the continuous decline of lake water levels
during the second Lake Chapala Crisis (1994-2003), leading to a revision of the treaty
(Wester et al., 2008). Participants in the present study indicated that water users, state
government and NWC officials participated and contributed as equals in negotiations that
took approximately two years before reaching this landmark agreement which a state water
official acknowledged as “the first time we [multiple stakeholders] witnessed this level of
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water user involvement in decision making in the [Lerma-Chapala] basin and in Mexico as
a whole” (R#25). The present study suggests that this allocation agreement marks a
successful step in water management decision-making within the LChB, which is notably
different from the previous state-centred top-down approach (i.e., pre-Rio context). This
success was likely driven by the Lake Chapala crisis between 1994 and 2003, which likely
acted as a wakeup call for all stakeholders.
While the agreement was successful, some respondents still pointed out some
disagreements that emerged in the negotiations, the most significant of which concerned
determining which mathematical model that was most appropriate for determining surface
water allocation in the basin. In this context, the federal government and the State of
Guanajuato presented two conflicting models, each arguing that their model was more
relevant based on the local context. After heated discussions and debates, the federal model
ended up being used. The established agreement details the technical elements that guide
the allocation of surface water for competing uses along the basin, and sets up minimum
volumes that should remain in the reservoirs to guarantee the supply of authorized water
concession while reducing the risk of floods. It was described as a complex negotiation
because the agreement attempts to provide security to water users while at the same time,
limiting their rights to avoid water over-allocation during times of drought. Results indicate
that there exists an orderly allocation of surface water to each state through the
establishment of mutually agreed rules that bring transparency into the water governance
process and aid in mitigating potential stakeholder conflicts and conflicts between states
(specifically, the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato), especially during periods of drought. In
this context, a state water official made the following statement:
It was a very long process. […] Discussions and negotiations revolved around two
different mathematical models. One model was put forward by the Mexican Institute of
Water Technology and the other one by the State Water Commission of Guanajuato. […]
There were many people involved and the negotiations that took two years. Both sides
brought in experts to explain their models and no question went unanswered. In the end,
the decision was to use the model proposed by the National Water Commission and the
Mexican Institute of Water Technology. Guanajuato was not very happy… But, Hey!
That’s the thing about democracy, you don’t always get your way (R#24).

The impact of the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement on water governance is
significant. This is because it provides an empirical example that a viable water governance
process can be implemented in the LChBC.
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Wester, Vargas-Velazques, Mollard and Silva-Ochoa (2008) have acknowledged
the complexity of surface water allocation in the LChB and confirm the above mentioned
finding that the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement was product of a series of
negotiations that lasted years, which involved the active participation of the five states in
the basin, the National Water Commission, and water user representatives. However, their
study differs from this thesis because their analysis focused on negotiation processes in the
context of surface water allocation through a descriptive approach. They also acknowledge
that the LChB is in a complicated transition from a centralized to a multi-stakeholder
approach to water management. This research builds on their study by emphasising that the
decision-making process that resulted in the 2004 agreement marked a new approach to
decision making manifested in a policy successfully translating into practice within
Mexico’s water policy environment. As well, this approach indicates some progress in the
transition from a state-centred top-down model (i.e., pre-Rio context) to a water
governance-based approach (i.e., post-Rio context) to water management. Wester and
colleagues provide valuable research that focuses on the difficulties of renegotiating water
allocation in overcommitted basins, especially when attempting to secure environmental
flows. Hence, this thesis considers it important to emphasise this achievement in response
to Biswas’ and Tortajada’s (2010) call for examples of good practice in water governance
and IWRM within jurisdictions aiming to make progress.
6.8

Final Remarks
The framework presented in this thesis resulted in the identification of several

themes that relate to the way water is governed in the LChB. It also made it possible to
identify strengths and constraints in the assessed water governance, even in cases where
multiple principles within the framework were intertwined in complex ways. The strengths
and constraints presented here have the potential to enhance or limit the viability of any
water governance system.
A major benefit of this framework rests in the simplicity of the five core principles
that were utilized. This refinement made it possible to compare guiding principles in
existing policies and official documents to the practice of water governance on the ground
within the LChB. A clear finding that emanates from the analysis is the existence of major
disconnects between existing policies and the actual practice of water management. Thus,

140

while policy documents reflect a shift from a state-centred top-down approach to a water
governance-based model, interviews reveal that the opposite is happening in the LermaChapala basin. The testimonials of two federal officials, from the National Water
Commission and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, provide a
contextual summary of these findings:
I can see fear in the National Water Commission. Fear to lose control to some extent…
to lose Power. [...] I do not think we [the NWC] have overcome that part yet... That fear
has not been surpassed. However, I think we are seeing a little less than before. […] I am
not saying that public participation is not taking place, but it is necessary that participation
be more effective. But, there is still some fear remaining within the NWC: ‘And if we
lose control?’ [They ask themselves.] I believe that we are headed to a real aperture of the
Basin Council and decisions will start to be made there, and we will leave behind meetings
in dark corners (R#41).
Evidently there is a lack of a participatory culture in Mexico… in the general population.
And there is no culture of delegating tasks, at all levels of government. There is an
inexplicable fear to let others participate in water management. I do not know why…
There is a lot of fear of losing power... There is much fear. Exaggerated fear. But I think
it has a lot to do with the issue of political parties and the political system [in Mexico].
[…] I think we have to review all that… All that is influencing water governance (R #
49).

It is noteworthy that a benefit of the proposed framework also lies in the breath of
issues that were unearthed around water policy, planning and management in the LChB.
The scope of these issues transcends the current thesis. Therefore, a summary of the
findings discussed in this Chapter are outlined in Table 6.1. The table also shows the
interplay of various water governance principles, demonstrating the multifaceted nature of
water governance. Because of the broad scope of issues that emerged from the analysis,
not all micro-level details are captured in this discussion. A more comprehensive
documentation of the broad range of themes that were discussed by respondents are
captured in Appendix VII.

Table 6.1: Summary of findings by water governance principles and themes
Principle

Context

Theme

FWUR1
I
I
I
I

FSUA2

Constraints
DMRC3
NHMR4
D

SNWC5

Achievement
SWAA6
I
I

Participation in multilateral decision-making forums
Multiple stakeholder engagement
Participation
Little participation / governments make decisions
I
Pre-Rio
Questionable water user’s representation
Collaboration and coordination
D, I
Post-Rio
Decentralization to the lowest viable level
D
D, I
I
Operational capacities
Coherence
Fragmentation and sectorization
I
I
I
Pre-Rio
Centralized decision making
I
I
Insufficient operational capacities
I
Comprehensive rules and regulations
D
D
D
Post-Rio
Institutional structures for water management
D
D
D
D
D, I
Law enforcement
Rule of Law
Legislation gaps and overlaps
I
I
Pre-Rio
Inadequate institutional structures
I
I
I
Little law enforcement
I
I
I
Information systems
I
Post-Rio
Education
I
Dialogue and negotiation
D
I
Knowledge
Inefficient information systems
I
I
Pre-Rio
Insufficient education
I
I
Lack of transparency
I
I
I
I
Basin planning and management
D
I
Post-Rio
Sustainability and Conservation
Integration
Regional development planning and management
I
I
Pre-Rio
Negative environmental impacts
I
I
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the
Lerma-Chapala basin.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) Deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(D) Findings from official document analysis.
(I) Findings from interview analysis.
Post-Rio
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Chapter Seven
7

Conclusions
This chapter concludes the dissertation by providing a summary of major findings.

It also discusses the conceptual and practical contributions of the thesis, proposes some
directions future research, and provides recommendations to improve water governance
and management practices in the Lerma-Chapala basin.
7.1

Summary of findings
This thesis commenced by acknowledging the challenges that emerge when

addressing water governance. Specifically, it pointed out the lack of a strong consensus on
a single definition of the concept of water governance itself (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010;
Varis et al., 2014). Following an in-depth review of water governance and management
literature, the current study also found that there exist no standard framework for assessing
the effectiveness of water governance systems. Thus, while a wide range of frameworks
have been used to assess various aspects of water governance, the disparate nature of these
frameworks makes it difficult to compare study findings or holistically understand how
multiple factors impact water governance systems.
To address these complexities, this dissertation sought to find common ground and
consolidate various frameworks into a holistic but simplified framework that could be
applied to assess water governance systems, strengthen debates on water governance and
holistically value spatial and temporal variations in water governance. Drawing insights
from existing literature the study developed a framework with five core water governance
principles (i.e., Participation, Coherence, Rule of law, Knowledge and Integration). The
proposed framework was then tested by applying it in a content analysis of water-based
policy and planning documents in Mexico and interviews with various stakeholders in
Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin. Finally, findings from the document analysis and
interviews were compared to understand the extent to which existing policies around water
manifest themselves in practice.
Overall, the study finds that, while a drastic evolution in water policy from more
to-down to a bottom-up approach can be observed, the practice of water governance within
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the LChB largely remains centralized, hierarchic and state-centred. Thus, at best, a
participatory water governance approach for the most part exists in theory.
First objective:

To develop a water governance assessment framework by refining
normative attributes that best conceptualize water governance in the
existing research literature.

This thesis determined that the abundance of water governance principles offered
in the literature represents a challenge for researchers. However, this dissertation finds that
some of these principles have overlapping meanings; hence the attempt to reduce the
existing set of principles into a refined, simplified and holistic group that is suitable for
assessing water governance in multiple contexts. The refinement process resulted in five
key principles: participation, coherence, rule of law, knowledge and integration. These
principles represent structures that are required for a water governance system to function
effectively.
Following the application of the proposed framework to the case of the LermaChapala basin in Mexico, this thesis finds it allows for a better conceptualization and makes
it easier to cluster related topics into related themes that allow for effective analysis and the
comparison of multiple data sources. In this case, interviews and policy documents were
analyzed to reveal connections between policy and practice in water governance. Because
of the holistic nature of the developed framework and its effectiveness, it could be applied
to compare conditions across multiple scales (e.g., local, national and international) and
monitor the evolution of water governance over time. The proposed framework could also
be applied to a critical literature review, as it captures multiple contexts within which issues
of water governance could emerge. In a nutshell, the framework proposed in this
dissertation effectively serves the purpose for which it was developed.
Of note is the ability of the developed framework to capture the interplay among
water governance principles and their associated themes. This made it possible to identify
constraints and achievements (see Table 6.1) associated with water governance in the
LChB, which leads the current dissertation to conclude that the proposed framework serves
the purpose of identifying needed changes within water governance systems. However, this
interplay also reveals a potential shortcoming in the framework, as it does not clearly
differentiate between water governance and management. For example, issues related to
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water management such as water pollution or groundwater overexploitation, could be the
result of lack of enforcement or a gap in legislation, which are more closely related to water
governance. Thus, gaining detailed understanding would require an in-depth analysis of
management and governance issues and their interactions. In this context, the present study
agrees with Tortajada (2010a) that describes water governance and water management as
being interdependent, but it also agrees with Mitchell (2013) regarding the need for more
research to understand the interaction between these two concepts.
Second objective: Apply the developed water governance assessment framework to
official water policy documents with the aim of understanding pre/post-Rio water governance transitions in Mexico.
The proposed framework was applied to existing water related policy and planning
documents in Mexico. This analysis confirmed a transition from a state-centred top-down
approach to a water governance-based mode to a more participatory approach, which was
evident in the orientation of various policy documents. These shifts have been partially
identified by several studies on water policy in Mexico (see González-Villarreal &
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010).
Hence, the ability to expose these shifts using the proposed framework adds more
credibility to its effectiveness. The observed trends led this dissertation to conclude that
there have been significant shifts in water management paradigms in Mexico since 1992.
This is evident in the noticeable increase in the use of water governance-based terminology
in official documents. These terminologies were classified using the five principles in the
proposed framework.
The pattern resulting from applying the proposed framework to official documents
suggest that Mexico did not follow an evolutionary pattern that progressed through years
(or even decades) of engagement to achieve policies for integrated water resources
management. Finding reveal a noticeable change over a short period of time, which was
driven by a top-down approach. Wilder (2010) explains that Mexico was under pressure to
modernize its water policy framework during the negotiations of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1992. Also, Buchenau (2008) mentions that President
Salinas (1988-1994) considered NAFTA a key piece in his neoliberal economic strategy,
and the crowning achievement of his administration. Consequently, it is likely that in 1992
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President Salinas was highly motivated to approve a new water law, which complied with
the requirements of the NAFTA negotiations, while embracing IWRM as a new paradigm
for solving water resource management and governance issues in Mexico.
Findings also show that significant changes in the institutional structures of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (MAHR) took place after the creation of
the National Water Commission in 1989 (SARH, 1989), and the publication of the NWL
in December 1992 (SARH, 1993). However, it was not until 1996 that the NWC created
mechanisms aimed at facilitating inclusive water user participation within its structure. It
also needs to be considered that the political and economic context in Mexico changed
radically between 1993 and 1996. For example, Mexico experienced a major financial crisis
in December 1994, a few weeks into a new presidential administration (i.e., Ernesto
Zedillo, 1994-2000), and consequently, Mexico had to comply with the “good governance”
and IWRM requirements placed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
in order to gain access to funds that would help work its way out of the crisis (Hamnett,
2006; Wider & Romero Lankao, 2006; Wilder, 2010).
This suggests a strong pressure on Mexico’s political officials to implement water
governance reforms, which in part explains the creation of the Coordination of River Basin
Councils within the structure of the NWC and the reforms to Article 15 of the RNWL in
1997, which allows water users to participate in equal numbers as government
representatives in the LChBC (DOF, 1997). Therefore, findings also suggest a level of
reluctance of the politicians in fully implementing water governance reforms, possibly
because it represented a revolutionary change in the status quo. It is noteworthy that the
outcomes of this policy analysis were compared to interview data to understand how these
changes to political structures impacted water governance on the ground.
Third objective:

Apply the developed water governance assessment framework to
stakeholder interviews to understand the state of water governance in
the Lerma-Chapala basin, and how these conditions relate to policy
and the overall creation of a viable IWRM process.

The implementation of the proposed framework to the LChB made it possible to
identify discordances between the formal and informal systems. For example, informal
practices such as the clientelistic and paternalistic attitudes rooted in Mexico’s socio-

146

political context stem from state-centred top-down system that prevailed in Mexico for
several decades. These problematic practices have resulted in the existence of: (1)
government officials who do not value stakeholder engagement and participation in
decision making processes, and (2) water users who are not used to being engaged with
government officials and other stakeholders in decision making. These deeply rooted
traditional structures are limiting the implementation of water governance policies. The
application of the framework also allowed for the identification of operational gaps in the
Lerma-Chapala basin regarding the implementation of laws and policies. The persistence
of a silo approach to water governance and management, which is a remnant from the
previous social order, reflects the lack of multi-stakeholder coordination and engagement.
Further, the interview findings reveal that in 2008 the NWC did not have enough
staff on the ground to fulfill their duties pertaining to supervision, oversight and
enforcement, which were described as having ripple effects on pollution and
overexploitation of water resources because of porous law enforcement. In this context,
findings show that the implementation of neoliberal national policies drastically reduced
federal water bureaucracies (Sandoval, 2004; Castro, 2006; Wider & Romero Lankao,
2006). However, a by-product of these policies was the emergence of operational problems
for the NWC at the local level. The concurrent analysis of official document and interviews
depict the discordance between what ought to be happening (according to laws and policies)
and what was happening on the ground (based on key informant testimonials).
However, findings reveal that some progress has been achieved in the
implementation of water governance. For example, the 2004 Surface Water Allocation
Agreement demonstrates the viability of implementing a multi-stakeholder decisionmaking process to reach agreements that mitigate conflicts and solve sensitive issues in the
LChB. The proposed framework made it possible to identify progress in the implementation
of water governance principles in the basin, and it would be a mistake to dismiss this
progress as something without significance, because though minimal, they mark a step
forward in the implementation of a viable water governance system in the basin. Based on
these interviews with stakeholders who are directly engaged in water use, management and
governance, the current thesis concludes that progress in water governance and IWRM has
been slow, with much more work remaining to be done.
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7.2
7.2.1

Contributions of the study
Conceptual contributions
The most significant conceptual contribution of this research, which adds to the

existing literature, lies in the creation of a holistic water governance assessment framework.
This research refines seventeen dominant water governance principles in the existing
literature among other themes and contextually consolidates them into five coherent and
well defined principles. These five core water governance principles were applied in the
current study to textual and interview data to gain an understanding of water governance
within the Lerma-Chapala basin of Mexico. The framework proposed here represents a
consolidation of at least fourteen years of constantly evolving water governance principles.
The successful application of these principles to compare interviews and policy documents
and reveal policy-practice disconnects provides evidence for the effectiveness of the
developed framework. Because the principles consolidate varying ideas in the literature, it
is also an all-encompassing framework that could be utilized for systematic literature
reviews and the assessment of spatio-temporal variations in water governance in various
jurisdictions.
Studies like Van Leeuwen and Sjerps (2016), Van Leeuwen and Sjerps (2015),
Hurlbert and Diaz (2013), Oliveira et al (2012), da Costa Silva (2011), Engle and Lemos
(2010), and Lautze et al (2011), address some conceptual aspects of water governance, but
they focus on three or four principles (included in the seventeen principles offered in the
literature) and thus, do not paint a full picture of the range of principles that could be
assessed. This dissertation addresses the need to reconceptualise principles by proposing a
refined set and meanings of water governance principles; thus, creating opportunities for
researchers that ensure they (1) avoid repeating similar or related principles in their work,
(2) identify themes that stem from the data relating to water governance and understand
how various aspects of water governance are interrelated, and (3) identify strengths and
constraints of water governance systems, using their functionality as the main criterion.
A second conceptual contribution of the thesis resides in better definition of
hierarchic concepts pertaining to water governance. Subordinated to the concept of the five
principles described above, this thesis proposes a series of themes (Table 5.1). These
themes encapsulate indicators that emerged from the data. More specifically, this thesis
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contributes to the understanding of how these themes interplay and outlines to determine
the viability of water governance systems. Understanding this interplay is becoming crucial
because of increasing water demands and potential conflicts. These concerns are addressed
in this thesis by identifying the implementation gap through the concurrent analysis of
official documents and interviews, which point towards strengths and opportunities for
improvement in a specific water governance system. It is noteworthy that, despite using
only five principles, the proposed framework is not opposed to emergence of new themes.
The framework presented in this thesis is not set in stone, but rather, marks a new move
towards the creation of an all-encompassing framework for assessing water governance.
7.2.2

Methodological contributions
The current study demonstrates the value of content analysis in testing newly

developed frameworks. In the context of the current study, a water governance framework
was developed by integrating ideas from multiple clusters of literature on water governance
and management. Content analysis requires the development of an analytical codebook
with well-defined themes to help guide the coding (Krippendorff, 2013). In the context of
this thesis, the methodology therefore added more rigor to the development of the
framework by requiring the researcher to come up with well-defined principles that could
be superimposed on the data. The content analysis also made it possible to superimpose the
five principles on the interviews and policy documents to understand water governance
within specific geographical contexts. Due to the structured nature of the analysis, it was
possible to compare the practice of governance based on stakeholder interviews to existing
water governance policies. Although studies of water governance have used content
analysis (e.g., Gillet et al., 2014; Kuzdas et al., 2015), the current study specifically
highlights the value of the methodology for creating a well structure framework, testing the
framework on different clusters of data and comparing outcomes in different data sources
to understand how water governance policies manifest in practice.
Since content analysis of documents and interviews has been applied in studies on
water governance (Baumgartne & Pahl-Wostl, 2013; Grecksch, 2015), the current study is
a confirmation that the methodology is indeed useful for the study of water governance,
which is often multifaceted and complicated. It reveals the value of the methodology in
capturing broad themes pertaining to water governance, organizing them under specific
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clusters (i.e., principles) and quantifying their prominence to tease out the most recurrent
topics across different clusters of data. For example, the quantification of key topics in
water policy documents and stakeholder interviews made it possible to visualize these
trends through graphs and visually compare the prominence of different themes.
This thesis advances the understanding of the relationship between formal and
informal systems in water governance. For example, interinstitutional collaboration and the
coordination of efforts is formally established in Mexico’s water policies. However,
progress in the establishment of collaboration networks is slow because of informal
structures such as sectoral inertias that remain in institutional memory. Research has been
conducted on institutional fragmentation (Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk; 2015), the impacts
of water reforms on local contexts (Olivieira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Mapedza
et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016), networks (Kuzdas et al., 2015), conflict and cooperation
(Funder et al., 2010) and legitimacy (Wood, 2015) in an attempt to further understanding
of the relationships between formal and informal systems. This thesis builds on research in
this domain by confirming the importance of considering local context when developing
water policy reforms, and shows that local context has the capacity to support or restrain
the implementation of water governance.
7.2.3

Recommendations for policy and practice
Based on the development and application of a framework for assessing water

governance, the current study was able to identify multiple situations where local
knowledge provided potential solutions for addressing common problems at the basin level.
It is noteworthy to emphasise that there is no quick fix or single solution to improve water
governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin, and that any improvements in the water
governance system will require time, dedication and ongoing adjustments. As observed in
the water governance literature, the establishment of a viable water governance system is
not a one-time event, but rather a long evolutionary process.
Based on the study findings, three major recommendations that emerged from key
informants’ perspectives on improving water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin are
discussed. Though the complexity of the issues that emerge reveal that a lot of work
remains, this section attempts to recommend some practical actions that could potentially
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enhance the experience of water governance and management in the LChB. These three
suggested mechanisms for improving water governance in LChB are discussed as follows:
1. The federal government should provide integrated water resource management
training and education programs at all levels through the River Basin Council’s
structures.
It is imperative to change the mentality of government officials and water users to
facilitate the transition from a traditional state-centred top-down practices, to a more water
governance-based approaches. People should be aware of the importance of having the
basin as a management unit and informed of the problems that exist in their basin, with an
emphasis on the ones present in their sub- and micro-basin (i.e., local scale). As revealed
in the current study, the most significant changes in water governance occurred when the
LChB underwent some of its greatest challenges. People need to become familiar with the
problems and potential solutions to water-related problems at the local and basin levels.
They also have to become more aware of what is at stake if they fail to play part in water
governance forums. It is necessary to make water users and the general public aware that
there is a basin council with established frameworks (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations) for
them to be participate in decision making and in the implementation of collaborative
measures to achieve common goals. They also need to know that there are water user
representatives in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council who are to voice their concerns, as
well as the mechanisms through which they can participate in the election of their
representatives. Overall, the education and empowerment of water users could potentially
result in water users demanding more accountability from their representatives.
Training and education on integrated water resource management at all levels of the
basin, should also be required for all NWC officials (headquarters, RBOs and Local
Management Offices) to help facilitate cultural change. This is necessary because existing
traditional structures are deeply engrained in the practice of water governance and
management. As such, transformative education is needed to help stakeholders rethink their
approaches. Loucks (2000:5) observes that “changing the social and institutional
components of water resource management systems is often the most challenging because
this involves changing the way individuals think and act”. Much work and political will is
required to implement a viable water governance process in the Lerma-Chapala basin. In
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this regard, Biswas and Tortajada (2010a) provide an example of the transformation of the
institutional culture.
A major finding of the current study is the existence of fractures in stakeholder
coordination and collaboration. An additional recommendation is to carry out educational
programs that bring together multiple stakeholders in forums (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations)
where their role and responsibilities can be discussed in-depth, and where stakeholders can
brainstorm about problems and potential solutions, while attempting to come up with
management plans for the sub- or micro-basin, or aquifer, and establish legally binding
agreements on collaborative activities. This actions would ensure that legal frameworks for
collaboration are established at the local level and minimize arbitrary or poorly coordinated
decision making. Without this mechanisms in place, existing fractures will likely remain
persistent.
2. Strengthen water user participation and representation in the LChBC.
The federal and state governments have to support user participation and help water
users in the establishment and consolidation of civil social organizations (i.e., Sub-basin
Commissions, Micro-basin Committees, and COTAS). It is necessary to let stakeholders
participate in planning, implementation and management of water resources at all scales
(i.e., aquifer, sub- and micro-basin, and river basin). This will contribute to the
establishment of a more viable water governance system. Representation can be
strengthened through the formation of Auxiliary Organizations at different levels, which
could provide the opportunity for various representatives (e.g., representatives from
aquifers, sub- and micro-basins) to be part of the election process for water user Board
Members to the LChBC. Building communication and collaboration networks between
Auxiliary Organizations could help provide more rigorous and balanced solutions to
problems identified by stakeholders at the local level. This could also aid in informing water
users and the population within the basin about the activities of the basin council, and how
the council copes with the problems that are brought forward. If user participation is equally
supported in all states, it will be possible to improve the democratic process. Several
researchers have provided examples in multiple contexts were these kinds of informed
participation are that are lacking in the LChB have yielded positive transformative results
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(for examples, see Norman et al., 2013; Gallego-Ayala and Juizo, 2014; and Dell'Angelo
et al., 2016).
3. Strengthen legislative and administrative frameworks to improve water governance
systems.
Findings in the present study revealed that the mandatory Regulations to the 2004
National Water Law have not been enacted, and consequently, the 2004 NWL cannot be
fully applied. They disclose management and structural issues such unregulated water
banks, and uncertainty in the roles and authority of RBOs and RBCs, due to the lack of
detailed regulations that define how the system should work as a whole, and who should
do what and to what extent. Thus the rule of law cannot be established effectively when
key legislation is lacking. Consequently, it is imperative that this legal gap be closed.
Findings also show that it is imperative that agencies and organizations have staff
who are well trained, appropriately equipped and sufficient in numbers to carry out their
assigned duties effectively, especially at the local scale. A strong legislative and
administrative framework is considered in the literature as a cornerstone in the
implementation of an effective water governance system; however, the capacity to enforce
the law is also an important factor in the successful implementation of the rule of law.
Therefore, this thesis recommends that the operational capacities of water related
institutions and organizations, especially concerning enforcement duties be strengthened
particularly at the local scale. The reasoning behind this recommendation are well echoed
in state water official’s claims as follows: “what is the point of having the best law in the
world is you are not going to enforce it” (R#29). Laws that are not enforced become dead
letters.
Another major recommendation of this thesis is that the administrative and law
enforcement activities around water should be carried out by different institutions.
According to the National Water Law, the National Water Commission is not only
responsible for implementing administrative and normative functions of water governance.
It is also responsible for enforcing and interpreting the NWL and its regulations, and for
applying sanctions regarding water. To avoid a conflict of interest it is necessary to separate
the administrative and normative functions from enforcement and sanctioning ones. This
could be done by separating these functions into two independent institutions. Mexico has
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experience in this regard. In 1996 Mexico’s federal government separated the
administrative functions in the forestry and fishery sectors and place them under the newly
created Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries, while placing the
enforcement functions under the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection.
These separation of functions and powers also establishes a system of checks and balances,
as the activities of one agency requires the other one to function effectively. This success
has, to a large extent, been achieved in Mexico’s forestry and fisheries sectors should serve
as a useful lesson for the governance of water.
Finally, a major area of deficiency in governing Mexico’s water lies in the lack of
state-funded research that monitors the system and provides evidence-based insights on
existing deficiencies and potential improvements. For example the framework developed
in the current study could be applied to monitor systemic and practical aspects of water
governance in the LChB and help identify deficiencies on a variety of themes, including
stakeholder relations, policy and planning, and water management practices on the ground.
As such, this thesis strongly recommends the establishment of a third-party research body
responsible for monitoring policy and practice in governance and use of water resources
over time and provide feedback on potential improvements that could be made.
7.3

Study limitations
The current study is not without its limitations. The first limitation is that this

research focuses on the basin level and does not apply the water governance assessment
framework to smaller scales (i.e., sub-basin, micro-basin, or aquifer levels). Not all
challenges and strengths can be observed at a large scale; consequently, the assessment of
water governance could be improved by including smaller scales in such studies.
Additionally, this thesis does not focus comprehensively on Auxiliary Organizations, the
interplay among these organizations and the basin council. All these factors constitute key
aspects of water governance systems that were beyond the scope of the current study.
However, such analysis would have yielded more detailed results on the practice of water
governance on the ground. Applying the assessment framework to these subsidiary
organizations could provide further insight on themes, constraints, achievements and
opportunities that could together contribute to improvements in the water governance
system of the Lerma-Chapala basin.
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A second limitation concerns language differences acknowledged earlier. This
limitation was minimised by working in the source language (i.e., Spanish) for as long as
possible (Van Nes et al., 2010), which proved to be useful by helping the researcher
preserve original meaning to the full extent possible. Nonetheless, the translation of quotes
proved to be challenging, as it was often difficult to find English words that perfectly
depicted what the texts and/or respondents were saying. Although the researcher sought to
preserve original meanings in the translation process, it is worth noting that literal
translations from one language to another (i.e., Spanish to English) may not always be very
clear (Van Nes et al., 2010). To avoid confusion, some grammatical corrections were made
to literal translations to make readings in English easier, while maintaining original
meanings to the best extent possible.
7.4

Directions for future research
There are at least three directions for future research that emerge from this thesis.

First, future research could further test the water governance assessment framework in
different basins in Mexico and in other jurisdictions. Research should also be carried out at
various scales, including lower tier governance forums (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations) using
the same assessment framework. It is desirable to study vertical and horizontal interactions
among water governance forums at various scales.
A second direction for future research involves international development and
financial institutions. Most, if not all the constraints identified by this study are associated
with the ‘good governance’ principles used by international financial institutions who
significantly impacted Mexico’s water governance trajectory. Having a strong legal and
administrative framework, decentralization policies, public participation in decision
making, and the sustainability of natural resources (including water), are all part of the
preconditions imposed by international financial institutions to client nations who desire
funding. Consequently, future research could seek to answer the following questions: “Why
do international financial institutions fail to put more pressure on governments to fulfill
funding preconditions?”, “Why do international financial institutions continue to provide
funding to countries that partially implement structural adjustment programs?”, “How are
international financial institutions assessing progress in the implementation of structural
adjustment programs?”
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A final direction for future research would be to focus on the impact of
bureaucracies in the implementation of reform processes and their outcome. Constraints
identified in this research indicate that the Mexican water bureaucracy plays an important
role with regards to the pace by which reforms are implemented. Changes that threaten the
prevailing status quo are often met with different levels of resistance from the ruling
bureaucracy, and may result on an unnecessarily long and slow process. Outcomes of the
study also indicate that this very long transition from one water management paradigm to
the next has not solved the serious management related problems that were present in the
basin since the 1980s. New research is beginning to address such issues. The current study
encourages more research in this regard.
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Water governance principles defined by researchers

All men and women should have
opportunities to improve or
maintain their well-being. Equity
between and among the various
interest groups, stakeholders, and
consumer-voters needs to be
carefully monitored throughout the
process of policy development and
implementation. It is essential that
the penalties for malfeasance are,
and are seen to be, equitably applied

Democratic

The quality, relevance and
effectiveness of government
policies depend on ensuring wide
participation throughout the policy
chain – from conception to
implementation. Improved
participation is likely to create more
confidence in the end result and in
the institutions that deliver policies
[legitimization]. Participation
crucially depends on all levels of
government following an inclusive
approach when developing and
implementing policies. Broad
participation is built on social
mobilization and freedom of
association and speech, as well as
capacities to participate
constructively.

Equity between and among the various
interest groups, stakeholders, and
consumer-voters needs to carefully
monitor throughout the process of
policy development and
implementation. It is essential that the
penalties for malfeasance be, and be
seen to be, equitably applied

WWAP, 2003

Ashton et al., 2005

Ashton et al., 2006

WWAP, 2006

All citizens, both men
and women, should have
a voice – directly or
through intermediate
organizations
representing their
interests – throughout
processes of policy- and
decision-making. Broad
participation hinges
upon national and local
governments following
an inclusive approach.

The quality, relevance and
effectiveness of policies,
legislation, regulation and
practice, depend on ensuring
wide participation throughout
the policy chain – from
conception to
implementation. Improved
participation is likely to
create more conﬁdence in the
end result and in the
institutions which deliver and
implement policies

Where the quality,
relevance, and
effectiveness of policies,
legislation, regulation,
and practice depend on
public participation from
conception to
implementation, to
create greater confidence
in the institutions of
governance and the
outcomes of policy

All citizens, both men
and women, should have
a voice, directly or
through intermediate
organizations
representing their
interests, throughout
processes of policy- and
decision-making. Broadbased participation
hinges upon national and
local governments
following an inclusive
approach.

Batchelor, 2007

Wide participation
should be ensured
throughout the water
policy chain, from
conception to
implementation and
evaluation

All groups in society,
both men and women,
should have
opportunities to improve
their well-being.

All groups in society,
both men and women,
should have
opportunities to improve
their well-being.

Democratic values in respect
of the sharing of power,
representation and
participation are essential.

Equity between and
among various water
interest groups,
stakeholders and
consumers should be
carefully monitored
throughout the policy
development and
implementation
process;

Refined definition

The quality, relevance and
effectiveness of government
policies, legislation, regulation
and practice, depend on ensuring
a wide, inclusive and informed
participation of stakeholders
(both men and women) and civil
society, throughout the policy and
decision-making processes, from
conception, through
implementation, to evaluation.
Broad-based and engaged
participation can legitimize policy
and decision making processes,
thus improving the efficiency in
the implementation of policies
and programs, and their
outcomes.

Water governance has to provide
opportunities for men and women
to improve their well-being, and
make safe drinking water
available to all people regardless
of their social, ethnic or religious
conditions. Equity between and
among the various interest
groups, stakeholders, and civil
society need to be carefully
monitored throughout the policy
development and implementation
processes, applying a system of
checks and balances.
Democratic values with respect of
the sharing of power,
representation and participation
are essential

Merged definition

MetaPrinciple

Values associated with
power sharing,
representation and
participation are essential
in water governance. The
quality, relevance and
effectiveness of
government policies,
legislation, regulation and
practice, depend on
ensuring a wide, inclusive
and informed participation
of stakeholders (both men
and women) and civil
society, throughout the
policy and decisionmaking processes, from
conception, through
implementation, to
evaluation. Water
governance has to provide
opportunities for the
participation of all men
and women, regardless of
their social, ethnical or
religious conditions.

Participation

The quality, relevance and effectiveness
of government policies depend on
ensuring wide participation throughout
the policy chain -from conception to
implementation. Improved participation
is likely create more confidence in the
end result and in the Institutions which
deliver policies. Participation crucially
depends on all levels of government
following an inclusive approach when
developing and implementing policies.

Rogers and Hall, 2003

Inclusive

Rogers, 2002

Equitable

Principle
in
literature

Participative

Proposed Meta-principle Participation
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Rogers and Hall, 2003

Policies and action must be coherent and
easily understood. The need for coherence in
governance is increasing: the range of tasks
has grown; and so has diversity; challenges
such as climate and demographic change
cross the boundaries of the sectoral policies
on which the government has been built;
regional and local authorities are
increasingly involved in water policies.
Coherence requires political leadership and a
strong responsibility on the part of the
institutions to ensure a consistent approach
within a complex system.

Policies and action must be coherent.
The need for harmony and coherence
in governance is increasing as the
range of tasks has grown and become
more diverse. Challenges such as
climate and demographic change cross
the boundaries of the sectoral policies
on which the government has been
built. Coherence requires political
leadership and a strong responsibility
on the part of the institutions at
different levels to ensure a consistent
approach within a complex system.

Classical economic theory demands
efficiency in terms of economic efficiency,
but there are also concepts of political,
social, and environmental efficiency which
need to be balanced against simple economic
efficiency. For example, minimizing
transaction costs will go a long way toward
political efficiency.

Classical economic theory demands
efficiency in terms of economic
efficiency, but there are also concepts
of political, social, and environmental
efficiency which need to be balanced
against simple economic efficiency. It
is also essential that governance
systems do not impede action, for
example, minimizing transaction costs
will go a long way toward political
and economic efficiency.

Effective

Responsive

Policies must deliver what is needed
on the basis of demand, clear
objectives, an evaluation of future
impact and, where available, of past
experience. Responsiveness also
requires policies to be implemented in
a proportionate manner and decisions
to be taken at the most appropriate
level. Most importantly, the policies
should be incentive-based. This will
ensure that there is a clear social or
economic gain to be achieved by
following the policy.
Policies must be effective and timely,
delivering what is needed on the basis of
clear objectives, an evaluation of future
impact and, where available, of past
experience. Effectiveness also depends on
implementing policies in a proportionate
manner and on taking decisions at the most
appropriate level. Most importantly, the
policies should be incentive-based. This will
ensure that there is a clear social or
economic gain achievable by following the
policy.

WWAP, 2003

The increasing
complexity of water
resource issues,
appropriate policies
and actions must be
taken into account so
that they become
coherent, consistent
and easily understood.

Ashton et al., 2005

Policies and actions must
be coherent and easily
understood. Coherence
requires political
leadership and a strong
responsibility on the part
of the institutions to ensure
a consistent approach
within a complex system.

Ashton et al., 2006

Where policies and
implementation
actions are
consistent with other
initiatives, and are
clearly aligned and
well understood by
all participants.

Institutions and
processes should serve
all stakeholders and
respond properly to
changes in demand
and preferences, or
other new
circumstances.

WWAP, 2006

Taking into account
the increasing
complexity of water
resources issues,
appropriate policies
and actions must be
coherent, consistent
and easily understood.

Institutions and
processes should serve
all stakeholders and
respond properly to
changes in demand
and preferences, or
other new
circumstances.

Policies must be effective
and timely, delivering what
is needed on the basis of
clear objectives, an
evaluation of future impact
and, where available, of
past experience.
Effectiveness also depends
on implementing policies
in a proportionate manner
and on taking decisions at
the most appropriate level.

Where policies are
timely and
appropriate,
delivering what is
needed, based on
decisions made
during participative
decision-making
processes

Processes and
institutions should
produce results that
meet needs while
making the best use of
resources.

Batchelor, 2007

Refined definition

Water policies and
actions must be
coherent, with
political leadership
and a strong
responsibility taken
by institutions at
different levels

Decision makers have to ensure that
policies, programs, regulations and
actions in the water sector are
coherent, consistent and clearly
aligned with other initiatives, and
are easy to follow and understand
by all participants. Within a
complex integrative system it is
important that roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined,
in order to avoid conditions in
which institutions and organizations
at different scales, or at the same
level, oppose or nullify each other.

Concepts of
political, social, and
environmental
efficiency related to
water resources
must be balanced
against simple
economic
efficiency;
governmental
systems should not
impede needed
actions.

Water governance systems should
not impede or obstruct action, and
should aim to balance the concepts
of political, social, environmental
and economic efficiency.

Water demands,
evaluation of future
water impacts and
past experiences
should be the basis
for water policy;
policies should be
implemented, and
decisions made, at
the most appropriate
level

Decisions should be made and
policies implemented at the most
appropriate level, in order for
policies and programs to deliver
what is needed, when it is needed,
and where is needed.

Policies must be effective and
timely, delivering what is needed,
when it is needed. This depends on
the ability of stakeholders to make
informed decisions and implement
policies at the most appropriate
level, while making the best use of
resources.

Merged definition

MetaPrinciple

Governance systems have to
ensure that policies, programs,
regulations and actions in the
water sector are coherent,
consistent and clearly aligned
with other initiatives. It is
important that roles and
responsibilities of all
institutions. Organizations and
actors are clearly defined, in
order to avoid conditions in
which institutions,
organizations and actors at
different scales, or at the same
level, oppose or nullify each
other's programs and activities.
Policies, programs, regulations
and roles should be easy to
follow and understand, in order
to facilitate collaborative
actions and activities, and
create synergies among
stakeholders. Decisions should
be made and policies
implemented at the most
appropriate level, in order for
policies and programs to be
effective and timely, delivering
what is needed where and when
it is needed, while making the
best use of resources and
improving outcomes.

Coherence

Rogers, 2002

Efficient

Principle
in
literature

Coherent

Proposed Meta-principle Coherence
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Water governance principles defined by researchers

Rogers, 2002

Rogers and Hall, 2003

WWAP, 2003

Above all, water governance has to be
strongly based upon the ethical
principles of the society in which it
functions. This manifests itself most
strongly in the issue of property rights
for use, access, and ownership of water.

Above all, water governance has to
be strongly based upon the ethical
principles of the society in which it
functions and based on the rule of
law. This manifests itself most
strongly in the issue of justice,
property rights for use, access, and
ownership of water. Legal and
regulatory frameworks should be
fair and enforced impartially.

Water governance has
to be based on the
ethical principles of
the societies in which
they function, for
example by respecting
traditional water rights

Rule of law

Accountable

Integrity

Ethical

Principle
in
literature

Roles in the legislative and executive
processes need to be clearer. Each of the
institutions must explain and take
responsibility for what it does. But there
is also a need for greater clarity and
responsibility from all those involved in
developing and implementing policy at
whatever level. The “rules of the game”
need to be clearly spelled out, as should
the consequences for violation of the
rules, and have built-in arbitration
enforcing mechanisms to ensure that
satisfactory solutions can still be
reached when seemingly irreconcilable
conflicts arise among the stakeholders.

Roles in the legislative and
executive processes need to be
clear. Each institution must explain
and take responsibility for what it
does. But there is also a need for
greater clarity and responsibility
from all those involved in
developing and implementing
policy at any level. The “rules of
the game” need to be clearly spelled
out, as should the consequences for
violation of the rules, and have
built-in arbitration enforcing
mechanisms to ensure that
satisfactory solutions can still be
reached when seemingly
irreconcilable conflicts arise among
the stakeholders. Decision-makers
in government, the private sector
and civil society organizations are
accountable to the public, as well as
to institutional stakeholders. This
accountability differs depending on
the organization and whether the
decision is internal or external to an
organization.

Governments, the
private sector and civil
society organizations
should be accountable
to the public or interest
they are representing

Ashton et al., 2005

Ashton et al., 2006

WWAP, 2006

Batchelor, 2007

Refined definition

Merged definition

MetaPrinciple

Water governance has
to be based on the
ethical principles of
the societies in which
it functions, for
example, by respecting
traditional water
rights.

Penalties for corrupt
behavior or sharp
practices should be
applied equitably – water
governance must be
strongly based on the
ethical principles of the
society in which it
functions and on the rule
of law.

Water governance has to be
strongly based upon the ethical
principles and context of the society
in which it functions and on the rule
of law. Legal and regulatory
frameworks should be fair and
applied impartially.

Water governance has to
establish an enabling
environment that is strongly
based upon the ethical
principles and context of the
society in which it functions
and on the rule of law. The
“rules of the game” and the
consequences for violation of
those rules need to be clearly
spelled out. The roles and
responsibilities of all the
institutions, organizations
and actors involved in
developing and
implementing policy at all
levels need to be clearly
established, and they should
be held accountable for their
decisions and actions. It is
necessary to have a built-in
arbitration mechanisms to
ensure that satisfactory
solutions to water issues can
be reached. Authority has to
be legitimately exercised and
in accordance to publically
disclosed rules, and enforced
in accordance with
established procedure.
Penalties for not complying
with the rules or with
responsibilities should be
fair, clearly established, and
applied impartially. A system
of checks and balances
should be established in
order to monitor compliance
with the law and with
responsibilities, thus bringing
clarity, transparency,
legitimacy, and credibility to
the water governance system.

Rule of law

Proposed Meta-principle Rule of law

Leadership that is honest,
faithful and diligent, and
that protects human rights
and freedoms, is critical.

Leadership that is honest, faithful
and diligent, and that protects
human rights and freedoms, is
critical.

Roles in the legislative and
executive processes need
to be clear. Each institution
must deﬁne and take
responsibility for what it
does. There is also a need
for greater clarity and
responsibility from all
those involved in
developing and
implementing policy at
whatever level.

There is a need for greater clarity
with regards to the roles and
responsibilities of all the
institutions, organizations and
actors involved in developing and
implementing policy at all levels.
This is particularly important in the
case of the legislative and
administrative roles, and executive
processes. The “rules of the game”
and the consequences for violation
of those rules need to be clearly
spelled out. Penalties for not
complying with the rules should be
equally applied. Government,
private sector and civil social
organization, have to be
accountable for their decisions and
actions. Built-in arbitration
enforcing mechanisms needs to be
established to ensure that
satisfactory solutions to water
issues can be reached.

Where every role in the
legislative,
administrative, and
executive processes is
made clear, and where
there is appropriate
clarity and responsibility
from everyone who is
involved in developing
and implementing policy
at every level

Governments, the
private sector and civil
society organizations
should be accountable
to the public or the
interests they are
representing.

Legal frameworks
should be fair and
enforced impartially,
especially laws on
human rights.

The rules of the game, as
well as legislative roles
and executive processes,
must be clear; each
water-related institution
must explain and take
responsibility for its
actions; penalties for
violating the rules and
arbitration-enforcing
mechanisms must exist
to ensure that
satisfactory solutions to
water issues can be
reached.

Legal frameworks should be fair
and enforced impartially, especially
laws on human rights.
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Water governance principles defined by researchers

Communicative

Transparent

Open

Principle
in
literature

Rogers, 2002

Rogers and Hall, 2003

Institutions should work in an open
manner. Together with the government
agencies and private companies, they
should actively communicate about
what the institutions and the
government do and the decisions they
take. They should use language that is
accessible and understandable for the
general public. This is of particular
importance in order to improve the
confidence in complex institutions.
In addition to being open, good
governance requires that all policy
decisions are transparent so that both
insiders and outsiders can easily follow
the steps taken in the policy
formulation. This is particularly
important with regard to financial
transactions, which should discourage
suspicious or illegal transactions.

Institutions should work in an
open manner. They should use
language that is accessible and
understandable for the general
public to increase confidence in
complex institutions. In addition
to being open, good governance
requires that all policy decisions
are transparent so that both
insiders and outsiders can easily
follow the steps taken in the
policy formulation. This is
particularly important with regard
to financial transactions.

Governance institutions and systems
need to communicate among the actors
and stakeholders in very direct ways.
Correctly done, this will lead civil
society to be socialized into governance
over a wide range of issues. Governance
in the water sector can be used as an
education model for all other sectors
and vice-versa.

Transparency and accountability
are built on the free flow of
information. Governance
institutions and systems need to
communicate among the actors
and stakeholders in very direct
ways. Correctly done, this will
lead civil society to be socialized
into governance over a wide
range of issues.

WWAP, 2003

Information should flow
freely within a society.
The various processes
and decisions should be
transparent and open for
scrutiny by the public.

Ashton et al., 2005

Ashton et al., 2006

Governance institutions
should work in an open
manner. They should
actively communicate
about what they do and the
decisions that are taken.
They should use language
that is accessible and
understandable for the
general public.

Where governance
institutions are transparent
and inclusive,
communicating freely
about what they do and the
decisions that are taken,
using language that is
accessible and
understandable to all
stakeholders.

WWAP, 2006

Information should
flow freely in society.
Processes, institutions
and information must
be directly accessible
to those concerned.

Batchelor, 2007

Water institutions
should work in an
open and transparent
manner, using
language
understandable to the
general public; water
policy decisions
should be transparent,
particularly regarding
financial transactions.

Governance
institutions must
communicate among
water stakeholders
both horizontally at
the same levels and
vertically between
levels

Refined definition

Public, social, private and multilateral
institutions should work in an open
manner, actively communicating
about what they do and the decisions
they take, in a language that is
understandable to all stake holders
and the general public. This actions
increase confidence in complex
institutions.
All policy formulation processes and
decisions should be made accessible
and easy to follow by both insiders
and outsiders. Information has to flow
freely in society, and made available
for public scrutiny, thus providing
transparency, credibility, and social
accountability.

Institutions, organizations, actors and
stakeholders need to communicate in
very direct ways. Information has to
flow freely, both vertically and
horizontally. Information can also be
used for educational purposes and
awareness campaigns.

Merged definition

MetaPrinciple

Governance forums,
networks and systems need
actors and stakeholders to
communicate in very direct
ways. They should work in
a clear and open manner,
actively communicating
about what they do and the
decisions that are taken.
All policy formulation
processes and decisions
should be made accessible
and easy to follow by both
insiders and outsiders.
Information should flow
freely (vertically and
horizontally) in a language
that is understandable to all
stakeholders and the
general public, and should
be made readily available
for public scrutiny.
Information in the water
sector can also be used for
educational purposes, and
for awareness campaigns.

Knowledge

Proposed Meta-principle Knowledge
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Water governance principles defined by researchers

Sustainable

Integrative

Principle
in
literature

Rogers, 2002

Rogers and Hall, 2003

Water governance should enhance the
effectiveness of Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM). The
institutions will have to consider all uses
and users within the traditional water
sector and also their interconnections
with and impacts upon all other
potential users and sectors.

Water governance should
enhance the effectiveness of
Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM). The
institutions will have to consider
all uses and users within the
traditional water sector and also
their interconnections with and
impacts upon all other potential
users and sectors.

Water governance must serve future as
well as present users of water services.

The institutions should also be
built with an eye toward longterm sustainability. Water
governance must serve future as
well as present users of water
services.

WWAP, 2003

Water governance
should enhance and
promote integrated and
holistic approaches

Ashton et al., 2005

Ashton et al., 2006

WWAP, 2006

Water governance
should enhance and
promote integrated and
holistic approaches

Batchelor, 2007

Refined definition

Water institutions should
consider all potential water
users and sectors and their
linkages with, and impacts
on, the traditional water
sector.

Water governance should promote an
enabling environment that induces
institutions and decision-makers to
consider all uses and users within the
traditional water sector, as well as the
prevailing conditions at the local
context. They should also take into
account their existing and possible
interconnections, and their impacts
upon all other potential users and
sectors, following an integrated and
holistic approach.

Water policies should be
incentive-based, to ensure
clear social or economic
gain if the policy is
followed; long-term
sustainability of water
resources should be the
guiding principle

Water governance must serve future
as well as present users of water
services, and aim towards long-term
sustainability of water resources.

Merged definition

MetaPrinciple

During the policy and decision
making processes, decisionmakers have to consider
present and future freshwater
uses and users, including
aquatic and terrestrial
ecosystems, and aim towards
the long-term sustainability of
water resources. Decisions
should be strongly based upon
local traditions and context, and
take into account existing and
possible interconnections and
their impacts upon all other
potential users and sectors,
following an integrated and
holistic approach.

Integration

Proposed Meta-principle Integration
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Principle

Rule of law

Governance Context

Autocracy Context

The existence of a comprehensive set of
laws, norms, rules and regulations (formal
and/or informal) that govern over water
resources.

Deficiencies in legislation such as the
existence of gaps, overlaps or contradictory
laws, norms, rules and/or regulations
(formal and/or informal).

The presence of authority that is
legitimately exercised and in agreement
with publicly disclosed norms and rules
(formal and/or informal).

Deficiencies in law enforcement.

The establishment of institutional roles
that distribute power effectively with
existing checks and balances.
The existence of arbitration forums for
conflict resolution and management.

Administrative, operative, normative,
enforcement and sanction roles being
dominated by individual institutions.
Arbitrary actions and decisions, abuses and
corruption.
Lack of accountability among stakeholders.

The establishment of legal stakeholder
roles (both formal or informal).
The engagement of multiple stakeholders
(e.g., governments, civil social
organizations and private sector) in
decision making.

Participation

Stakeholders engaged in decision-making
at various scales (from basin to local
levels) within water governance forums.
Effective top-down and bottom-up
networks.
Legitimate multi-stakeholder and multisectorial representation including
minorities or marginalized groups.
Decentralization of authority and
responsibility to the most appropriate level
of social aggregation.
Stakeholders' collaborative activities (both
formal and informal) are coordinated to
achieve common goals and objectives.

Coherence

Clearly established institutional roles and
responsibilities.
The available of sufficient resources (e.g.,
financial, staff, equipment) that make it
possible for stakeholders to be
administratively and operationally
functional, and fulfill their duties
effectively.

Stakeholder participation limited to
consultation.
Important negotiations and decisions are
made by top politicians, outside water
governance forums.
No clear guidelines for the election of
representatives.
Failure of representatives to adequately
cater to the needs of their respective
stakeholder groups

Centralization of authority and decision
making (top-down approach).
Uncoordinated sectoral approach to policy,
planning, and management of water
resources.
Stakeholder roles and responsibilities are
not clearly established.
Stakeholders are poorly funded, staffed
and/or equipped to fulfill their duties
effectively.
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Principle

Knowledge

Governance Context

Autocracy Context

Stakeholder negotiations is characterized
by equality, transparency, open dialogue
and direct communication.

Information is collected independently by
stockholders and shared under specific
conditions or on a need to know basis.

Up-to-date information is shared and
accessible for decision making, awareness
raising, and public scrutiny, in clear and
simple terminology.

Reliability of available information is
questionable, or too technical and difficult
to understand by non-experts.

The presence of capacity building
programs and activities for staff and
stakeholders.

Insufficient capacity building programs and
activities.
Awareness campaigns are localized or have
a sectoral focus.

The presence of forums and awareness
campaigns/activities for the general
population.

Integration

The use of the basin as a unit for water
resources planning and management to
enhance hazard mitigation, water source
protection, water pollution controls and
other activities that sustain water resources
in an effective manner.
Decision making takes into account
present and future demands of water users,
aiming towards long-term sustainability
(e.g., conservation of vital aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems).

Uses political boundaries for planning and
managing water resources instead of using
the basin scale.
Economic development is the priority,
regardless of anthropogenic induced scarcity
and negative environmental impacts,
including pollution.
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Interview Guide

Topic 1 The role played by all three levels of government and water users in governance
forums and networks.
•

What is your (or your institution’s) role in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (could
be direct or indirect)?
• Do you know who are the other members of the LChBC and what are their roles?
If yes, who are they and what do they do?
• What roles do the three levels of government play with regards to investment in
drinking water and sanitation infrastructure today (at present times)? What role do
the social and private sector play in decision-making with regards to this type of
investment today? Are you familiar with the processes to get these investments
selected and approved today? If yes, what is this process? Who approves these
investments?
• What kinds of decisions are made by the municipal and state governments with
regards to water management?
Topic 2 The type of issues and concerns brought forward and discussed within the
LChBC.
•

What kind of issues and concerns are brought forward and discussed in the LChBC?
Examples?
• What mechanisms are applied to incorporate water user representatives into
decision-making processes? Examples?
• What mechanisms are used by the LChBC to inform stakeholders about the
problems present in the basin and about the “hot spots” that require immediate
attention?
• How does the LChBC inform stakeholders (and the population in general) about the
issues addressed by the Council, about the resolutions reached to alleviate these
issues, about the implementation or enforcement activities, about progress
regarding resolutions, and about the results obtained through the actions taken to
solve such issues?
Topic 3 Stakeholders’ role the LChBC, their engagement in decision making, and in the
execution of agreements (if any).
•
•
•
•

Who are the stakeholders that are engaged in decision-making processes in the
LChBC? What type of decisions are they engaged in?
In what kind (or type) of issues do you (or your institution) are engaged in?
How are stakeholders concerns brought to the attention of the LChBC and how are
they addressed?
How does the LChBC make sure that stakeholders comply with the implementation
of agreements reached by the Council?
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•

How do you (or your institution) visualize stakeholder engagement taking place in
the LChBC?

Topic 4
•
•
•
•
•
•

The role of the LChBC in the implementation of an IWRM process;

Is there a management plan for the LChB elaborated by the Council? If yes, how
was plan developed? Who were the stakeholders engaged in its development? How
was it approved?
How does the LChBC addresses problems that threaten the conservation and
sustainability of water resources (quality and quantity of surface and groundwater)
in the basin?
Do stakeholders get involved (directly or indirectly) in solving problems that are
generated outside their state or municipality (up-river, down-river)? What
mechanisms or forums are available to address these problems?
Does the LChBC deal with issues that involve resources different than water (forest
and soil)? If yes, Examples?
Who speaks for the natural environment in the LChBC (the environment is
considered a water user in Mexican legislation)?
What mechanisms are available to address controversial issues (conflicts) in the
LChBC?

Topic 5 The degree of cooperation and coordination among institutions, organizations
and water users in the implementation of policies, plans and programs.
•

•

•

What mechanisms (or processes – if any) are used by the LChBC to stimulate
dialogue and negotiations and the coordination of collaborative activities? If yes,
what kind of collaborative activities are there in the LChBC? Who are the
stakeholders usually involved in these type of negotiations and activities?
Are you aware of other water governance forums that address relevant water issues
in the basin (state, municipal, sub-or micro-basin, or aquifer levels)? If yes, which
one? What kind of issues does this forum address? Who are the stakeholders
engaged in the governance forum? How are stakeholder representatives elected (or
chosen)?
Is the work of these water governance forums linked with the activities of the
LChBC?

Topic 6 The capacities of the LChBC and of its members (where applicable) with regards
to human resources, professional profiles, equipment, funding, training, and
information flow and availability.
•
•

What strengths does your institution (organization) have to offer to improve water
problems in the LChB? How are these strengths contributing to the LChB with the
present governance system?
Do you think your institution (organization) could contribute more than it does at
present? If yes, how? What is preventing you from contributing more?
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•
•

Do you think that the different institutions and organizations in the LChBC have
the capacities required to implement an effective IWRM process in the basin? Why?
Do you think there are enough institutional capacities (financial, human resources,
equipment, etc.) in the LChBC to implement an IWRM process? If no, what
capacities need to be improved upon and in what institutions or organizations?

Topic 7 Limitations and opportunities to establish an effective water governance system
in the LChB.
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

What kind of information is available to the members of the LChBC to help them
formulate their decisions on the issues brought to the table? If limited, what can be
done to make relevant information more readily available?
What is your opinion on the present levels of transparency, accountability and
credibility in decision-making and implementation processes in the LChBC? If
negative, what modifications or specifications do you think are needed to strengthen
present levels?
What do you think is the perception of the population about the LChBC and what
it does? If negative, what can be done to inform civil society about the issues dealt
with in the LChBC and raise awareness about water problems in the basin?
How would you describe the level of stakeholder participation in the LChBC? If
negative, what can be done to encourage a more active participation of water users
(civil society in general) in governance forums such as the LChBC?
What can be done to improve water management in the basin using the LChBC and
as a platform for negotiation among stakeholders?
Are there any limitations you perceive for the establishment of an effective water
governance system in the LChB?
What opportunities do you see that could establish an effective water governance
system in the LChB?

Topic 8 Improvements to the governance system in the basin.
•

What changes would you suggest to strengthen the water governance systems in the
basin?

Complementary questions (in a few words):
 What does integrated water resources management mean to you?
 What does water governance mean to you?
 How would you describe the role of the LChBC (as a governance forum) in the
implementation of an IWRM process?
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Appendix V: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles
within each document

Table 1: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document
(Mexico’s water laws)
Water Law
1972 FWL
1992 NWL
2004 NWL

Post-Rio Context
Paradigm
Shift (1992) Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
Before
6
1
2
6
13
4
6
6
After
13
3
6
8

Knowledge
3
9
9

Total
18
38
39

Pre-Rio Context
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
0
4
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
0

Knowledge
0
0
0

Total
5
2
1

*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles.
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate agreement with the definition of the five principles proposed in this thesis, while pre-Rio context indicate noncompliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. Includes all water laws at the federal level between 1972 and 2008.
FWL:
NWL:

Federal Water Law
National Water Law

Table 2: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document
(Mexico’s water policy documents)
Post-Rio Context
Paradigm
Shift (1992) Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
1
3
3
1975 NHP
1
2
1981 NHP
2
1
4
Before
1984 NHP
2
1
4
2
1995-2000 NHP
4
2
6
4
2001-2006 NHP
3
3
8
5
After
4
2007-2012 NHP
2
2
5
Water Policy

Knowledge
2
3
2
4
3
3

Total
10
12
11
20
22
16

Pre-Rio Context
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
1
2
1
0
0
1
4
0
1
2
3
2
2
2
0
0
0
1
3
1
0
1
0
0

Knowledge
0
1
0
0
0
0

Total
4
6
8
4
5
1

*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles.
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate compliance with the definition of the five principles proposed in this study, while pre-Rio context indicate noncompliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. All accessible water policy documents between 1975 and 2012 are
included in the sample.
NHP:

National Hydraulic Program/Plan
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Table 3: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document
(Mexico’s institutional structure documents)
Internal
Regulations
1977 MHSPW
1977 MAHR
1983 MUDE
1985 MAHR
1989 MAHR
1993 MAHR
1996 MENRF
2001 MENR
2006 MENR

Post-Rio Context
Paradigm
Shift (1992) Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
5
0
1
2
5
0
1
3
Before
7
0
1
4
8
0
1
5
9
0
2
4
11
0
3
5
11
1
3
5
After
10
2
2
5
10
1
3
8

Knowledge
3
6
5
6
3
4
5
5
6

Total
11
15
17
20
18
23
25
24
28

Pre-Rio Context
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0

Knowledge
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Total
0
1
0
2
0
0
1
2
2

*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles.
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate agreement with the definition of the five principles proposed in this thesis, while pre-Rio context indicate noncompliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. Because of the vast number of reforms to institutions that occurred over
time, only documents that recorded major changes to institutional structures related to water resources were included in the analysis. Therefore, changes
to areas with no direct implications for water resources (e.g., livestock, fisheries, forestry, and housing), are not considered as ‘major changes’ to the
institutional structures because they have no effect on results nor do they contribute to the analysis.
MHSPW: Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works
MUDE: Ministry of Urban Development & Ecology.
MAHR: Ministry of Agriculture & Hydraulic Resources.
MENRF: Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries
MENR: Ministry of the Environment & Natural Resources.
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Appendix VI: Percentage dominance of water governance principles within
stakeholder interviews

Table 1: Percentage Dominance of Water Governance Principles within Stakeholder Interviews
Post-Rio Context
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
Water Users
0
2
3
2
State Officials
1
5
9
4
Federal Officials
2
11
6
6
Stakeholder
Groups

Knowledge
1
1
3

Total
9
19
28

Pre-Rio Context
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent
13
33
10
13
13
21
11
20
11
21
8
18

Knowledge
22
16
15

Total
91
81
72

*Note: Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate compliance with the definition of the five water governance principles proposed in this study, while pre-Rio
context indicate non-compliance with the definitions. Values show relative percentages of repetition of topics concerning the five water governance
principles proposed in this thesis, in a pre-Rio and a post-Rio contexts. The levels of repetition are characterized based on stakeholder type.
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Appendix VII: Percentage of respondents by principle, context and theme

199

State
officials

Federal
officials

0

47

38

28

4

20

46

23

9
83

0
80

31
85

13
83

87

80

77

81

87

93

77

86

Participation in multilateral
decision-making forums

26

73

85

61

Multiple stakeholder
engagement

52

73

100

75

Pre-Rio

Little participation /
governments make decisions
Questionable water user's
representation

91

100

100

97

87

93

100

93

Post-Rio

Collaboration & coordination
Decentralization to the lowest
viable level
Operational capacities

30

60

85

58

52

67

92

70

4

7

31

14

Fragmentation & sectoralization
Centralized decision making
Insufficient operational
capacities

91
78

100
100

100
92

97
90

83

80

77

80

Information systems

22

13

46

27

Education

13

0

54

22

Dialogue & negotiation

17

27

31

25

Inefficient information system

74

87

69

77

Insufficient education

100

93

85

93

Lack of transparency

100

100

92

97

Basin planning & management

61

100

77

79

Sustainability & Conservation

52

100

77

76

Regional development planning
& management

96

100

100

99

Negative environmental impacts

70

40

38

49

Post-Rio

Pre-Rio

Post-Rio

Pre-Rio

Post-Rio

Water
users

Pre-Rio

All
Respondents
(%)

Post-Rio

Theme

Pre-Rio

Integration

Knowledge

Coherence

Participation

Rule of law

Principle Context

Percentage of respondents by
group

Comprehensive of rules &
regulations
Institutional structures for water
management
Law enforcement
Legislation gaps & overlaps
Inadequate institutional
structuress
Negligible law enforcement
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Appendix VIII: Respondents key list
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List of Characters and Numbers to Identify Respondents
Sector

Aquaculture (water users)

Agriculture (water users)

Industrial (water users)

Livestock (water users)

Municipal water services (water
users)

Other services (water users)

State Water Institutions

Federal Entity*
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
E
B
C
E
A
B
C
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E

* Name of states was withheld for confidentiality purposes.

Water users
State officials

Respondent Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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List of Characters and Numbers to Identify Respondents (cont.)
Sector

Environment State Institutions

Agriculture State Institutions

National Water Commission

Ministry of the Environment and
Natural Resources

Ministry of Agriculture,
Livestock, Rural Development,
Fisheries and Food

Federal Entity*
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
A
B
C
D
E
F
A
B
C
D
E
F

Respondent Number
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

F

51

* Name of states was withheld for confidentiality purposes.

State officials
Federal officials
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Appendix IX: Summary of findings by water governance principle

Summary of findings for Participation
Context

Theme

Post-Rio

Participation in
multilateral decisionmaking forums

Multiple stakeholder
engagement

Pre-Rio

Little participation /
governments make
decisions

Questionable water
user’s representation

FWUR1
The only important decision
made by the LChBC is the
yearly allocation of surface
water ^.

FSUA2

Constraints
DMRC3
Decentralization policies
include basin councils and
their subsidiary
organizations *.

Water users engaged in
determining the yearly
allocation of surface water for
the basin ^.

Most decisions for water
planning, development and
management are made
between governments, outside
the River Basin Council ^.
Some water user
representatives have not been
elected by their peers ^.
Water user's interests and
concerns are not being
advanced in the LChBC ^.

NHMR4

SNWC5

Achievement
SWAA6
Water users and government
representatives participated in
negotiations and decision making
in the Arrangement and
Allocation Workgroup of the
LChBC ^.
Water users and government
representatives negotiated and
reached an agreement on the
methodology to determine the
yearly allocation of surface water
in the basin ^.

Traditional authoritarian
forces in the NWC do not
see water user engagement
as an important component
in water governance ^.

1

(FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
(FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the
Lerma-Chapala basin.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis.
2
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Summary of findings for Coherence
Context

Theme

FWUR1

Post-Rio

Collaboration
and
coordination

Decentralization
to the lowest
viable level

FSUA2
IWRM encourages
collaboration among all
sectors and levels of
government in a basin *.
Collaborative networks
(formal and informal) in
the basin, not linked to the
LChBC ^.

Auxiliary
Organizations for
public participation
*.

Constraints
DMRC3

NHMR4

SNWC5

Decentralization reforms
since the 1980s *.
Sub-basin Commissions,
and COTAS have been
created in the basin ^.

Achievement
SWAA6

Decision
made by
stakeholders
at the basin
level^

Operational
capacities

Pre-Rio

Fragmentation
and
sectorization

Centralized
decision making
Insufficient
operational
capacities

Precarious
information flow
between water user
representatives and
representees ^.

Silo approach to planning
and management due to
political, institutional,
occupational and
professional biases ^.

Limited or no
collaboration activities
between the LChBC and
its Auxiliary
Organizations ^.
Decisions still made at
National Water
Commission's
headquarters (top-down)^.

No clear roles and
responsibilities for RBOs
thus decisions still made by
the NWC’s headquarters ^.
Not enough
staff in NWC
to fulfill their
mandate ^.

1

(FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
(FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LCHB.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis.
2
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Summary of findings for Rule of Law
Context

Theme

Post-Rio

Comprehensive
rules and
regulations

Institutional
structures for
water
management

Constraints
FWUR1
Enabling
environment that
promotes
stakeholder
participation *.
Stakeholder
participation can
take place at
RBCs and
subsidiary
organizations *.

FSUA2

DMRC3

2004 National
Water Law
reinforce
decentralization
policies for the
water sector *.

NHMR4
Mandatory Regulations to the
2004 NWL to be enacted
within twelve months from the
publication of the law *.
Roles and responsibilities of
RBOs and restructuring of
RBCs to be determined in
Regulations to the 2004 NWL
*.

SNWC5

The NWC is the sole
water authority.
National and regional
levels subordinated to
the Director General's
Office *.

Achievement
SWAA6
Enabling environment for
stakeholder dialogue and
negotiation to seek
solutions to water problems
*.
Stakeholders dialogue,
negotiate, and make
decisions in RBCs *.
Workgroup negotiated
agreement and oversees its
implementation ^.

Law
enforcement

Pre-Rio

Legislation gaps
and overlaps
Inadequate
institutional
structures

Unprecise
election process
for water user
representatives ^.
Not enough
Auxiliary
Organizations in
the basin ^.

Mandatory Regulations of the
2004 NWL have not been
enacted, creating management
and structural problems ^.
Partial
decentralization
achieved ^.
2004 National
Water Law is being
partially applied,
raising questions on
accountability ^.

Management and
regulatory roles are
merged under a single
authority ^.
NWC at local level not
fulfilling supervision,
oversight and law
enforcement duties ^.

No monitoring or oversight of
volumes extracted, no
cancellation of illegal wells ^.
Negligible law
Lack of accountability
enforcement
because there are no clear
roles for RBOs and NWC
headquarters ^.
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LChB.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis.
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Summary of findings for Knowledge
Context

Theme

FWUR1

FSUA2

Constraints
DMRC3

NHMR4

Post-Rio

Information
systems

Education
RBOs are not
subordinated to
any other areas at
the NWC’s
headquarters*.

Dialogue and
negotiation

Pre-Rio

Inefficient
information
systems

Insufficient
education

Water users have little
or no knowledge about
the Council's purpose or
structure, or about their
role in the Council ^.
Partial or no
information about the
Council's activities
reaching water users ^.

No mechanisms to inform
water users or the general
public about the LChBC,
its purpose or activities ^.
Difficult collaboration
because stakeholders have
little knowledge of issues
in other states or water
uses ^.
Vertical and horizontal
information flows are
weak or nonexistent ^.

SNWC5

Achievement
SWAA6
Information was made
available to all participants
during the negotiations to
aid in decision making ^.
Provided explanation of
complex concepts in
mathematical models
during negotiations ^.
Two years of dialogue and
negotiations between
stakeholders to reach an
agreement for surface
water allocation ^.

Inaccurate or unreliable
data in the Public Registry
of Water Concessions ^.

Decision making
remains largely
centralized at the
NWC’s
headquarters ^.

No clear mechanisms for
the allocation of
groundwater volumes^.
Lack of
transparency
Roles of RBOs, RBCs,
and NWC's headquarters
are not clear ^.
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LChB.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis.
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Context

Theme

Post-Rio

Summary of findings for Integration

Basin planning and
management

FWUR1

FSUA2

Constraints
DMRC3
Basin plans to be developed
by basin council in
collaboration with River
Basin Organizations *.

NHMR4

SNWC5

New wells being
drilled in overexploited
aquifers due to lack of
regulation for water
banks. Groundwater
depletion increasing ^.

Persistent water
pollution, illegal
wells, groundwater
overexploitation
because of negligible
enforcement ^.

Achievement
SWAA6
Agreement
considers the basin
as the unit for the
allocation of
surface water ^.

Sustainability and
Conservation

Pre-Rio

Regional development
planning and
management

Negative
environmental
impacts

Stakeholders do not
plan, think, or
envision the basin
as a unit ^.

Water policy, plans or
programs are not developed
at the basin, sub-basin,
micro-basin or aquifer level
^.

1

(FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
(FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the
Lerma-Chapala basin.
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis.
2
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Appendix X: Example of invitation to a meeting of the Evaluation and
Monitoring Group of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.
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Appendix XI: Curriculum Vitae
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Curriculum Vitae

Luis Francisco Silva Jimenez
Education and training
2005 – present

Philosophy Doctor - Geography
Western University
Thesis: Water Governance in the Lerma-Chapala Basin of Mexico:
A Shift from State-centred to a Multi-stakeholder Approach?

2003 - 2005

Master of Environmental Studies – Geography
University of Waterloo
Thesis: Sustainable Water Resource Management: Capacity Building
and Public Participation in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico.

1989 - 1993

Bachelor of Environmental Studies – Geography (Honours)
University of Waterloo
Thesis: Coastal Tourism Development Planning in Mexico: IxtapaZihuatanejo and Cancun case study.

Scholarships / Grants
2005-2008

The University of Western Ontario Graduate Research Scholarship.

2007

Terralingua, Travel Grant (February 9 to 18), Chihuahua, Mexico.

2006

International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental
Change (IHDP) /Asia-Pacific Network on Global Environmental Change
(APN), Workshop funding and Travel Grant (October 10 to 29), Chiang
Mai, Thailand.

2005

Central American Water Resource Management Group, Travel Grant
(March 6 to 12), Managua, Nicaragua.

2003-2004

University of Waterloo Graduate Research Scholarship.

2004

Central American Water Resource Management Group, Research Award.

2001

Guanajuato State Water Commission, Travel Grant (April 8 to 14),
Habana, Cuba.

1987

Northland College, Entrance Scholarship.

Academic Experience:
Guest Lecturer:
Guest Lecturer. Government, Communities, NGO’s and Development in Mexico. Personal
Experiences. Presented to PSCI453/651, Advanced Topics in Third World Politics
and Development. University of Waterloo, October 2003.

213

Guest Lecturer. Indigenous People in Latin America. Presented to PSCI350B, The Politics
of Developing Areas. University of Waterloo, February 1993.
Teaching Assistant:
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2007), People, Places and Landscapes GEOG024, University
of Western Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2007), Environment, Economy and Society GEOG153A,
University of Western Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2006), Geopolitics GEOG148B, University of Western
Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2006), World Cities GEOG155, University of Western
Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2005), Economic Geography GEOG270, University of
Western Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2005), Resource Planning and Management GEOG154G,
University of Western Ontario.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2004), Resource Management, University of Waterloo.
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2003), Human Geography, University of Waterloo.
Teaching Assistant (1988), Ecology of the Tropical Rain Forest and Native People (field
course in southern Mexico). Northland College.
Teaching Assistant (1987), Spanish. Northland College.
Research Assistant:
Research Assistant, Department of Political Sciences, University of Waterloo (2003).
Duties include:
- Research topics related to: pesticide use in floriculture, cut-flower world
markets, cut-flower world producers, pesticide impact on peasant’s health,
women’s role in the cut-flower industry, and the cut-flower industry in Latin
America.
Research Assistant, Department of Political Sciences, University of Waterloo (1991).
Duties include:
- Assist in field research in the Ecuadorian Andes on topics related to: land and
agrarian reform, government and NGO development rural programs, liberation
theology, ethnic identity, and agrarian social movements.
Non-Academic Experience
Consultant, Terralingua (2006).
Duties include:
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-

Provide a document on the geology, hydrology and forest resources of the
region of Norogachi in the municipality of Guachochi, Chihuahua, in
northwestern Mexico, as part of the project “Eco-cultural Health in the Sierra
Tarahumara”.

Technical Specialist, Marshal Mackin Monaghan Limited (2002)
Duties include:
- Develop a work plan for a project proposal pertaining alternative working
activities within the formal sector of the economy, for the people working in
the informal sector collecting recyclables from the garbage in the dump of
Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
Director General of Social Development, Guanajuato State Water Commission (2000 2002).
Duties include:
- Negotiate with 33 municipal governments the creation of interdisciplinary
teams to provide technical and administrative support for drinking water and
sanitation service utilities in rural communities.
- Plan, implement, supervise and evaluate a capacity building program involving
33 interdisciplinary municipal teams that service over 700 rural communities.
- Implement a watershed management program with a strong emphasis on public
participation. Fifteen Water User Organizations collaborate with the state,
federal and municipal governments aiming to balance overexploited aquifers
and reduce pollution levels, among other activities.
- Develop regulations for a government trust that supports water user
organizations and supervise it.
- Supervise and provide input in awareness programs related to water
preservation (quality /quantity).
Head Promotion Executive, Mid-West Regional Development Council of the State of
Guanajuato (1999 – 2000).
Duties include:
- Develop a regional, environmental and recreational management project for the
“Purísima Reservoir” with the participation of community members, private
sector, landowners, civil social organizations including NGO’s and federal,
state and municipal governments.
- Supervise a multidisciplinary team working to improve the quality of life in
very poor highland communities. This was done applying community
development strategies, combined with the rehabilitation of depleted natural
resources, within a River Basin Management approach.
- Prepare and promote the Regional Development Support Program for the years
2000 and 2001; and get the projects approved by the councillors (i.e., civil
social organizations, private sector, and government representatives form eight
municipalities) and by the corresponding administrative authorities.

215

Assistant State Representative for Natural Resources, Federal Attorney’s Office for
Environmental Protection (1995-1999).
Duties include:
- Research and elaborate diagnostics on fisheries, wildlife and forestry activities
in the states of Tabasco and Guanajuato, Mexico, in order to plan and
implement law enforcement activities.
- Field supervision of enforcement activities related to fisheries, flora, fauna,
forestry, environmental impact assessment, the Centla Wetlands Biosphere
Reserve, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in the states of Tabasco and Guanajuato.
- Write and review technical assessments to support legal resolutions product of
enforcement activities related to fisheries, forestry, wildlife, environmental
impact, and CITES.
- Coordinate and supervise field activities of 35 multi-level institutions and
organizations (federal, state and municipal governments, academic institutions,
private sector and NGO’s) to determine the cause of death of aquatic fowl in
Lake Yuriria, Guanajuato, and complete a final technical report of the
investigation.
Assistant Director, (federal) Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (1993–
1995).
Duties include:
- Participate in multi-sector work groups for 14 productive chains related to the
agriculture, livestock and forestry, to analyse and reduce unnecessary
government restrictions. This work was done in order to become more
competitive in NAFTA.
- Research and elaborate diagnostic of the cotton, sugarcane and fructose, sheep
and goat livestock sub-sectors; used to develop strategic plans in order to
become more competitive in NAFTA.
- Participate in the negotiations between the federal government and fertilizer
producing companies, to stabilize national prices after soaring international
prices and mitigate the impact on the Mexican agricultural sector.
- Coordinate the activities of the National Milk Commission to establish import
quotas to be auctioned in the national market to meet demands on a monthly and
yearly basis, thus balancing demand and supply.
Conference Presentations
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2012), A shift from government to governance: Integrated Water
Resource Management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin. Canadian Association of
Geographers: Annual Conference. University of Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier
University, Waterloo, Ontario.
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2007), Water Governance: New Issues or Old Problems.
Environmental Research Western: Colloquium. University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario.
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Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2005), Sustainable Water Resource Management: Capacity Building
and Public Participation in the Lerma Chapala Basin, Mexico. Canadian
Association of Geographers: Annual Conference. University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario.
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2005), Gestión Sustentable de Recursos Hídricos: Desarrollo de
Capacidades y Participación Social en la Cuenca Lerma Chapala, México.
International Hydrogeology and Water Resources Management Congress. Central
American Water Resource Management Group. Managua, Nicaragua.
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2003), Sustainable Water Resource Management. Canadian
Association of Geographers Ontario Chapter: Annual Conference. Queens
University. Kingston, Ontario.
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2001), Regional and Community Planning and Organization in the
Purisima Basin. 2nd International Scientific Congress of Hydrologic River Basins
Management: Geocuenca II. University of Havana. Havana, Cuba.
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2000), Regional Planning and Public Participation: the Guanajuato
Case Study. 6th National Congress on Regional Development and 6th International
Congress of Regional Sciences of the Pacific Basin. National Autonomous
University of Mexico, Pacific Regional Science Conference Organization, Regional
Science International Association, and Regional Development Science Association
of Mexico. Mexico City, Mexico.
Article review
2009

Reviewed manuscript entitled “Water governance in the Oldman River basin:
advancing the goal of aquatic ecosystem protection”. Canadian Geographer.

Relevant volunteer work
2007

Workshop facilitator and interpreter (English/Spanish): Field work in a Native
American community (i.e., Raramuri) in the Sierra Tarahumara in northwestern
Mexico. Workshop implementing a participatory approach to diagnose problems,
identify possible solutions, and prioritize activities to elaborate a collaborative plan
linked to ecosystem health, as part of the project “Eco-cultural Health in the Sierra
Tarahumara”. February 12 to 16, Chihuahua, Mexico.

2006

Dialogue Event Facilitator: “Informed and Fair Water and Trade Futures: a
dialogue about regional cooperation, development, and governance in upper
Mekong region and the north-south economic corridor in 2025”. October 20-21,
Chiang Mai, Thailand.

1991

Simultaneous translator (English – Spanish, Spanish – English) for the Elders
Group in the “Indigenous Nations of the Americas International Conference:
Strengthening the Spirit”. November 10-14, Ottawa-Hull, Quebec, Canada.

